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ABSTRACT 
GENDER AS AN ‘INTERPLAY OF RULES’: DETECTING EPISTEMIC 
INTERPLAY OF MEDICAL AND LEGAL DISCOURSE WITH SEX AND GENDER 
CLASSIFICATION IN FOUR EDITIONS OF THE DEWEY DECIMAL 
CLASSIFICATION 
 
 
by 
 
Melodie J. Fox 
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Under the Supervision of Professors Richard P. Smiraglia and Hope A. Olson  
 
When groups of people are represented in classification systems, potential exists for them 
to be structurally or linguistically subordinated, erased or otherwise misrepresented 
(Olson & Schlegl, 2001). As Bowker & Star (1999) have shown, the real-world 
application of classification to people can have legal, economic, medical, social, and 
educational consequences. The purpose of this research is to contribute to knowledge 
organization by showing how the epistemological stance underlying specific 
classificatory discourses interactively participates in the formation of concepts. The 
medical and legal discourses in three timeframes are examined using Foucauldian 
genealogical discourse analysis to investigate how their depictions of gender and 
epistemic foundations correspond and interplay with conceptualizations of similar 
concepts in four editions of the Dewey Decimal Classification. As knowledge 
organization research seeks solutions to manage the paradigm change from assumptions 
of universal knowledge to instability of knowledge, recognition of epistemological 
underpinnings of classification systems is necessary to understand the very real 
consequences of corresponding classifications of gender. 
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Chapter 1: Research Problem Statement 
  
Because classification separates likeness and difference, defining what makes 
things alike or different is an imaginative human act that is a necessary and fundamental 
part of classification.  However, classifying human groups can lead to sensitive questions 
of identity, determinism, agency, power, and authority, as well as questions of whether 
the classification is “reflecting reality” or if it is overtly teleological. Additional 
complications include the limitations of language and ontological considerations such as 
warrant. Western classification principles, in particular mutual exclusivity, assign rigid 
borders to classes that disallow ambiguity, graded membership or participation in 
multiple classes. And, practically speaking, it matters. Gender, sexuality, gender 
expression and gender identity have blurred and become more individualized and fluid, 
yet most formal classifications of gender remain firmly binary. With more scholarly and 
popular attention being brought to gender diversity, the need to allow for more 
accommodating classifications has become more pressing.  
As Stryker (2006) notes, any investigation of “embodied difference,” whether it is 
feminism, critical race studies, transgender studies or the like, results in revealing 
“systems of power that operate on actual bodies, capable of producing pain and pleasure” 
(p. 3). Real people are affected by classification—it is not restricted to theorizing. In this 
project, the concerns of three groups affected by formal classifications of gender will be 
addressed. First are women who identify with their sex, but do not identify with socially-
ascribed gender characteristics of roles. These can be manifested through choice of 
appearance, behavior, occupation or any acts of rebellion against the norms. Along with 
women in general, I later specifically address the women who transgress against the 
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feminine roles of their eras by attempting to enter the professions of law and medicine.  
Next are transgender individuals whose gender identity and bodily sex do not match. 
Finally, intersex individuals are those who have outwardly or inwardly varying genitals, 
and consequently, their sex not clearly in one box or the other. More specific descriptions 
will occur below, but these groups have distinct but related struggles, and at times can 
work against each other. Because elements of this research focus on privileged women 
who strive to be attorneys and physicians, or women who do not need to work, or trans 
and intersex people who can afford medical care, for example, the results of this research 
are biased toward white, affluent people. Race and class are mentioned where significant; 
however, this study focuses on sex and gender rather than intersectional identities. 
A scan of recent headlines illustrates a need to challenge the strict, binary 
definitions of sex and gender currently in use. Epicene athletes, such as South African 
runner Caster Semenya and Indian sprinter Duttee Chan, who both identify and compete 
as women, are required to undergo gender-verification testing prior to every competition 
(Levy, 2009; Hutchinson, 2015). Recent studies have revealed that medical school 
curricula include little to no instruction on the medical needs of gay and transgender 
people (Obedin-Maliver, et al., 2011). Elementary schools increasingly need to manage 
trans1 and transitioning children (Irvine, 2013). Middle-school-aged students are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Greenblatt (2005, p. 87) notes that the term “transgendered” can be considered 
offensive (similar to the term “colored”), and therefore the term “trans” will be used to 
describe and identify this population. Additionally, I will on occasion use the plural 
pronouns “they” and “their” rather than gendered pronouns to refer to trans or intersex 
people in general terms or in cases where a preferred sex has not been stated. I will also 
refer to people in the pronoun of their lived gender before or after transition. Spade 
(2003) prefers “gender transgressive,” which encompasses the spectrum of trans 
identities (p. 17, n5).	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increasingly being prescribed puberty suppressants to avoid developing features such as 
Adam’s apples and breasts so that transitioning would be easier later on once a decision 
has been made; however, this process can also remove fertility (Talbot, 2013).  
Intersex individuals are those with sex organs that do not fit the standard idea of 
male and female genitalia. Some parts may be absent, both a penis and ovaries may be 
present, they may be partially formed or be unusually shaped, or any number of 
variations. Intersex people may or may not identify strongly with a particular gender, and 
because of the standard of identifying sex with just a glance, at times may have no idea 
that they are intersex until a surgery or other procedure reveals the presence or absence of 
another organ. The concern of intersex people is to reduce the amount of cosmetic 
surgeries performed to “normalize” genitals, especially on babies or children. The 
intersex movement emerged in the 1990s and has shown to be quickly influential 
particularly in consciousness-raising (Greenberg, Herald & Strasser, 2010, p. 13).  
Foucault (1980) in his introduction to the memoir of the intersex Herculine Barbin points 
out that medical discourse dictated the choices one makes regarding gender choices: “It 
was no longer up to the individual to decide which sex one wanted to belong to, 
juridically or socially. Rather, it was up to an expert to decide which sex nature had 
chosen for him” (p. ix). Christmas (2010) argues, however, that many intersex people 
identify firmly with one of the two binary genders, and that assumptions should not be 
made that intersex people are of a third gender. 
Currently, the term “intersex,” includes a variety of conditions, yet with little 
consensus (Rosario, 2007, p. 262). The advocacy group, the Intersex Society of North 
America (ISNA) (2008) “find[s] that doctors’ opinions about what should count as 
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‘intersex’ vary substantially,” and define it as “biological variation,” considering 
intersexuality a socially constructed concept (para. 7). Many intersex people never 
discover the condition because the difference manifests internally (e.g. extra internal 
organs) and it may not be known until it is uncovered in an autopsy or never. Many also 
never experience gender identity issues and identify with whatever gender was assigned 
at birth. Intersexuality may be dangerous if it interferes with necessary biological 
processes, or it can be completely physically harmless.  How can difference as slight as 
“variation” be classified? Codified gender partitioning exemplifies oppression resulting 
from categorical assumptions and exceptions. 
The purpose of this research is to contribute to knowledge organization by 
showing the epistemological underpinnings of classification structure and the resulting 
consequences, using gender as a case study. When groups of people are represented in 
classification systems, potential exists for them to be structurally or linguistically 
subordinated, erased or otherwise misrepresented (Olson & Schlegl, 2001). And, as 
Bowker and Star (1999) have shown, the real-world application of classification to 
people can have legal, economic, medical, social, and educational consequences. As 
knowledge organization research seeks solutions to manage the paradigm change from 
assumptions of universal knowledge to instability of knowledge, recognition of 
epistemological underpinnings of classification systems can help understand the very real 
consequences of corresponding classifications of gender. Hjørland (2010) writes, “The 
relative strengths and weaknesses of different [epistemic] approaches are an important 
research question for the field of KO” (p. 40). What is meant by strengths and 
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weaknesses could mean anything from retrieval effectiveness to respect given through 
rhetorical space to terminological agency and subjectivity. 
 Do classification systems exist that can accommodate less rigid borders and 
liberate gender from the typically binary or trinary pigeonholes, or what Gilbert (2009, 
93) refers to as “strict bigenderism?” By “classification,” it is important to note that what 
is meant is formal, anthropogenic, institutionalized systems of classification, such as 
bibliographic, disciplinary or organizational systems, not the mental processes of 
categorization that take place in the human mind or metaphysical “first origins” that 
would be impossible to discern. This study concerns the epistemic foundations of the 
classification of gender as it is ontologically formalized into knowledge structures for a 
specific purpose.  
The problem statement is organized in the following way. First, several key areas 
are discussed and relationships between them explicated: 1) the definition of 
epistemology and an introduction to the epistemic spectrum, along with its relationship to 
knowledge organization; 2) epistemology’s effects on how gender is categorized; and 3) 
the meaning and consequences of oppression 4) and finally, how oppression manifests in 
classification. This discussion will be used as a foundation to analyze the implications 
sections of the dissertation, where a selection of discursive depictions of gender from the 
legal and scientific domains have been examined and compared to those in the Dewey 
Decimal Classification, a bibliographic classification scheme, to how they interplay to 
discursively define gender.	  
 
 
6	  
	  
	  
	  
Epistemology 
Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that studies knowledge and who can 
know, what constitutes reality and the gaps between knowledge and reality or knowing 
and being (ontology). Frohmann (1994a) describes the critical approaches to evaluating 
knowledge organization systems such as classification schemes as scientific, 
psycholinguistic, linguistic and pragmatic, and he argues that evaluation is an 
epistemological problem, since the different approaches would apply different evaluative 
standards (p. 119). In order to study and understand classification and other methods of 
organizing information, the stance on knowledge and knowing must be defined. To start, 
the important considerations in the study of epistemology are outlined.   
Epistemology examines the relationship between the knower and the object of 
knowing, in particular determining how much that object is interpreted or defined by the 
knower, and whether the object has any agency to affect how it is being defined or known. 
A stance’s location on the epistemological spectrum depends on how much objectivity or 
subjectivity occurs with any individual. In traditional, philosophical epistemology, which 
seeks “truth” or universal knowledge, an individual knower attempts to expunge any sort 
of emotion, needs or passions from the process of knowing, in order to arrive at “pure,” 
independent, or value-neutral knowledge (Longino, 1993, p. 104). Code (1991) writes 
that traditional, academic philosophers consider the knower “a featureless abstraction” (p. 
1) which effectively erases the influence of context.  
Though the main critique of language in knowledge organization primarily relates 
to thesauri such as subject headings, the classification of gender in particular also is 
affected by language. Language is a byproduct of categorization; that is, as we move 
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about the world, items that we encounter are placed into categories with names 
established in our minds. For ambiguous categories, a name may not exist for that item. 
Consequently, the limitations of the English language are responsible for some of the 
failure of imagining gender as fluid. The English language limits us to the use of 
gendered pronouns that force us to choose a gender when interacting with someone, 
which can be uncomfortable. While most of the time it is easy enough to “look and see” 
what gender someone presents, looking and seeing is not a no-fail methodology. 
Choosing a gender when perceiving someone causes anxiety for both parties and 
dehumanizes the interlocutor who has ambiguous gender traits. Gilbert (2009) writes that 
without having gender category information, “we are practically incapable of interacting 
and at a loss as to how to communicate” (p. 93). A transitioning female-to-male (MTF) 
trans person interviewed by Morgan (n.d.) recalls that he would “give [people] five 
minutes to look me up and down and decide what the hell I am;” otherwise, they could 
not concentrate on what he was saying (p. 145). Another transitioning (FTM) interviewed 
by Morgan and Stevens (2008) expresses a desire to remain ambiguous, but regardless of 
this desire, the person is trapped by gendered pronouns:  
I don’t identify as a man, but the world sees me as a man. I would rather be a 
gender queer, gender bending, masculine looking person, who has a lot of what 
traditionally are assigned as feminine qualities than the other way around, being 
seen as a woman or as female with butch qualities. (p. 594-595) 
The desire to remain unclassified speaks volumes for the wariness (and weariness) of 
being burdened by expectations to fit precisely into particular categories. This person has 
positioned himself in the gaps between genders, where currently no language exists for 
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him to express his subjectivity. When discussing him, the inaccurate “him” must be 
chosen over the demeaning “it.” Attempts to create a neutral pronoun system in English, 
which have occurred since at least the eighteenth century, have been met with ridicule by 
the mainstream, in what Baron (1986) calls “a history of shame” (p. 9). However, the 
need for them is evident and change is slowly occurring, as some trans people identify 
with and use neutral pronouns such as “ze” to replace “he” and “she,” or “hir” to replace 
“him” and “her.” The risk of creating a class for ungendered people is that the qualities 
are reified by defining them, yet the double bind exists that if it remains undefined, it 
remains illegitimate. 
Though many nuanced epistemological stances exist, a rudimentary discussion of 
the epistemic spectrum is presented here, with more detailed explanation of identified 
stances appearing in chapter 6.  Epistemic stances are typically roughly arranged along a 
spectrum which for simplicity’s sake will be rudimentarily presented here with the 
acknowledgement that more complexity exists. Olson (2012) points out that a universalist 
stance, or one that accepts universal knowledge, historically was the sign of a “civilized 
society,” demonstrating its progress towards knowing truth (p. ix). On the other hand, a 
stance that recognizes and values subjectivity would land on the postmodern end of the 
spectrum, where reality is constructed by individual perspectives and consequently mind-
dependent. In the middle are social approaches where knowledge is generated 
collectively and critical realist perspectives, where a mind-independent reality exists, but 
our knowledge of it is imperfect. 
The Epistemic Spectrum 
Universal epistemic stances. Most traditional methods of scientific classification 
take universal epistemological stances, which are based on logical structures and assume 
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one classificatory position per “thing,” even if multiple topics exist or characteristics 
overlap. A universal stance is attractive for a number of reasons, but primarily because 
one standard set of conceptualizations can be used in all contexts. Universal stances 
originated from the Platonic concept of forms articulated in the fourth century BCE and 
remained relatively stable until the turmoil created by the advent of postmodernism in the 
mid-to-late twentieth century. Haraway (1991) writes that scientific objectivity considers 
the object of knowing as “passive and inert” (p. 197), which, in the case of gender can be 
dangerous. With the object of knowing denied agency, it becomes a product of the 
knower, which, history has shown, prevents self-definition. As an example, guideline 
RE9958 of the American Academy of Pediatrics calls the birth of an ambiguously-
gendered child a “social emergency,” and calls for the assembly of a team of experts to 
help determine the child’s “true sex” (Hester, 2004, pp. 215-216). Because society 
possesses no tolerance for ambiguity when it comes to gender, a family cannot wait to for 
the child to decide a gender identity, and so consequently the medical team must make a 
determination. Intersex babies are typically “assigned” a gender and their sex surgically 
altered around 18 months old (Hale, 1996), at times with disastrous results, such as in the 
recent case of the child whose adoptive parents are suing over a surgery that assigned a 
baby to the wrong gender (Jenkins, 2013). In his introduction to Herculine Barbin’s 
memoir, Foucault (1980) asks, “Do we truly need a true sex?” (p. vii), which begs the 
question of whether a “true” sex exists in all cases and what “sex” means in the first place.  
Postmodern epistemic stances. On the postmodern end of the spectrum, “reality” 
is dependent on an individual human’s perspective, regardless of the instability of what is 
considered knowledge. Postmodern stances signify a messiness that is attractive in its 
10	  
	  
	  
	  
explanatory power, but a significant obstacle to knowledge organization as we know it 
because of the dynamic and individual nature of the knowledge being organized. For 
gender, postmodern views reject stable categories and give the subjectivity to the 
individual object as knower. Therefore, the object has the authority to either accept or 
reject gendered traits or roles, or reject their biological sex. However, despite how much 
the individual “knows” about what sex he or she is, society places many obstacles in the 
way of expression. For example, even though obstetricians typically proclaim sex with a 
cursory glance at the genitalia at birth, those seeking a sex change must “live” in the 
other gender (genitalia notwithstanding) for a prescribed amount of time, usually one 
year, before going ahead with medical intervention. 
Social epistemologies. Between universal and postmodern epistemologies lie the 
social epistemic stances, or those that accept group knowledge, either such as that of a 
demographic or marginalized group, or a pragmatically-based community of practice or 
domain. Those too are attractive in that they suggest that consensus-driven knowledge 
can be identified for a specific group, but again, a major flaw might be the essentialist 
assumption that identity categories necessarily share a collective way of thinking. An 
additional stumbling block may be usefulness in environments where a more general 
classification is necessary. A multitude of variations on these fundamental categories 
exist that attempt to reconcile perception, reality, truth, and being, including various 
modes of epistemic pluralism. More recent developments in research have addressed 
social and emotional influences on epistemology, as well as differences in what 
constitutes material reality and how and whether that can be known. As a branch of 
philosophy, epistemology is speculative. The “right” epistemology cannot be determined. 
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Rather, the consequences of the identified stance taken are the more important 
consideration (Fox, 2014, pp. 242-243).  
Epistemology in Bibliographic Classification 
Bibliographic classification schemes, such as the Dewey Decimal Classification 
(DDC) or Library of Congress Classification, are comprised of a western, Aristotelian 
structure that follows a universalist epistemology (Olson, 1999b). This disallows graded 
membership or membership in multiple classes, which, when classifying human groups, 
can mandate accidental characteristics as essential to all members of the group. Also, 
those who may fall in the borderlands between classes or belong to multiple classes are 
forced into one or the other. As a consequence of this recognition, a paradigmatic shift 
has recently occurred in knowledge organization that explores how to manage or include 
multiple epistemic perspectives in classification and provide more subjectivity for people 
as both users and objects in classification schemes. For example, Hjørland & Hartel 
(2003) argue for the consideration of four epistemic stances in creating and evaluating 
knowledge organization systems such as classifications: empiricism (confirmation 
through experience/observation), rationalism (use of reason), historicism (development 
and understanding of a subject through time), and pragmatism (practical goals and uses) 
in the hopes that they cover all angles of a subject. Even those researchers who seek 
universal, phenomenon-based classifications (e.g. Gnoli & Poli, 2004; Gnoli, 2012) find 
ways to accommodate different perspectives. The progression of knowledge organization 
research will be explored in more detail in the literature review in chapter 2. 
Ontology  
Closely related to the concept of epistemology is ontology, or the study of being, 
or what “is.” Because their relationship could potentially cause confusion, it is important 
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to clarify their link in terms of this project. The term ontology is used inconsistently in 
knowledge organization, sometimes referring to the philosophical meaning—what “is” 
being organized—and sometimes used as a synonym for classification—the structure and 
characteristics of a category. The latter term especially prevails in retrieval-related 
literature (Smiraglia, 2014, p. 43; Martinez-Avila & Fox, in press). Philosophically, 
epistemology relies on ontology to tell us what “is,” and ontology relies on epistemology 
to tell us how we can know what “is.” Structurally, epistemology tells us how the 
knowing occurs or what the values are behind the decision-making; whereas ontology is 
more descriptive of what is known based on the epistemic stance. In other words, 
ontology provides the actual qualifications or definition of a “thing,” and epistemology 
provides the belief system for why the particular definition, structure, facets or qualities 
were chosen. This project focuses on epistemic stance; however, the ontological status 
often serves as the manifestation of the epistemic stance, so both are discussed. 
Gender and Sex Classification 
Placing humans in groups is sticky. No matter the group, classification of humans 
leads to uneasy questions of how identity is formed, which can directly conflict or be 
supported by group membership. What is the purpose of grouping humans? If it is the 
same purpose as grouping anything else, it would be to gather like items and separate 
different ones. It is to include, to exclude, or both. In libraries, this purpose both reflects 
the subject of bibliographic groups, and also attempts to identify groups for the purpose 
of reflecting the subject matter of the work being classified (literary warrant). But for 
humans, “difference” can be a loaded term that can imply inferiority and marginalization, 
and “sameness” can imply determinism. Rubin (1975) established a foundational 
understanding of what she calls the “sex/gender system,” by which she means the process 
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of attributing gender to sex. However, even that understanding is hobbled by the 
assumption that only two binary sexes exist. The unity needed to fight oppression 
requires the ability to coalesce as a group, which is another complication to a more 
nuanced understanding of sex and gender classification. 
In terms of sex and gender classification, epistemic stance suggests the degree 
humans have in self-definition. Who “authors” sex and gender? What is their authority? 
Is the knowledge classification a result of an explicit or implicit agenda? A universal 
epistemic stance may suggest that despite a person’s preferred gender identity, the 
person’s gender (the object) can only be defined by the perceiver or some other 
established authority (e.g. a law stating that birth sex is immutable). Women have been 
subject to the imposition of such gendered characteristics as being naturally gentle, 
emotional, talkative, nurturing, weak, noncompetitive, or in possession of female sex 
organs, and for men, that they are aggressive, authoritative, interested in sports, or 
unemotional. To author one’s own gender can involve resisting the accidental qualities 
assigned by others by merit of membership in a particular gender category whether 
physical (e.g. gender identity differing from physical sex). Those identifying with no 
gender may be erased altogether or be assigned a gender if such a category does not exist 
in the universal classification (e.g., checking the M or F box on a form). In a simple 
example, in 2011 in New Jersey, a trans man was terminated from his position observing 
males undergo urine drug tests once it was found he was born female, since only men are 
allowed to perform the job (Perez-Pina, 2011). The epistemic stance taken by the agency 
that fired him is that even though he has performed or “authored” his gender as a man 
since he was five years old, their classification is rigid and disregards his identity, 
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claiming their view as the authority. A male is a man and a female is a woman. If the 
agency were to assume a more postmodern epistemic stance, it would assume the trans 
man authors his reality, and that reality is that he is a man despite that he was born with 
female sex organs. By disallowing women to perform the job, it also tacitly assigns 
assumptions to both genders. These assumptions could have innocent origins in not 
wanting to cause discomfort, but then the assumptions pile up regarding sexual desire, 
power relations and physiology. 
Oppression 
Before proceeding, it is important to understand what is meant by “oppression,” as the 
term carries much weight, but can be misapplied to any situation of human unhappiness. 
Spade (2011), influenced by Foucault’s notion of power, finds “oppression” a misleading 
term in that it suggests “that one set of people is dominating another set of people,” when 
in reality power operations are much more systemic and complex and cannot be “fixed” 
by changing one person or one aspect (p. 25). Instead, Spade prefers the term “subjection,” 
since “it indicates that power relations impact how we know ourselves as subjects 
through these systems of meaning and control” (p. 25). However, I will use the seminal 
definitions of oppression as described by Marilyn Frye and Iris Young, which are still 
useful and should not be omitted. Additionally, the findings show that in some instances 
that one set of people is dominating another set of people; therefore, the original 
terminology will be used.  
Frye (1983) narrows the definition of oppression down to several forms of 
women’s oppression that can be applied to other instances of oppression: the double-bind, 
systemic barriers, assimilation and servitude. The double-bind occurs where “options are 
15	  
	  
	  
	  
reduced to a very few and all of them expose one to penalty, censure or deprivation” (p. 
2). As examples, Frye uses the prude/whore dichotomy applied to young women or the 
working mother/stay-at-home mom opposition to illustrate that they are “caught between 
systemically related pressures” (p. 3). Systemic barriers include those that have nothing 
to do with “individual talent or merit, handicap or failure,” but rather “membership in 
some category” (p. 7) and “restrict or penalize motion in any direction” (p. 4). Examples 
could include anything from being sexually discriminated against at work to being 
deemed “unfeminine” (p. 4). Frye also identifies “assimilation into the patriarchy” or 
adapting to masculine norms, as a phenomena resulting in resentment between and 
among women of different classes (pp. 8-9). Finally, Frye sees a condition of servitude as 
pervasive in the condition of womanhood. She acknowledges that women certainly can 
and have asserted themselves toward their own interests, but “at every race/class level 
and even across race/class lines men do not serve women as women serve men” (p. 10). 
By “serve” Frye means the nurturing roles such as mother, assistant, and wife that 
subordinate individual interests to support others. The oppressions are a direct result of a 
person’s chosen identities, the “social categories in which an individual claims 
membership as well as the personal meaning associated with those categories,” which is 
how an individual expresses a sense of self (Shields, 2008, p. 301). 
Also noting that a strict, singular definition of oppression is impossible, Young 
(1990) explains, “All oppressed people suffer some inhibition of their ability to develop 
and exercise their capacities and express their needs, thoughts, and feelings.” (p. 40). In 
an effort to flesh out the definition, she breaks oppression into five categories: 
exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism and violence.  
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Exploitation results from “the transfer of the results of the [paid or unpaid] labor of one 
social group to benefit another” (p. 49). Young calls marginalization “perhaps the most 
dangerous form of oppression,” where “a whole category of people is expelled from 
useful participation in social life and thus potentially subjected to severe material 
deprivation and even extermination” (p. 53). The powerless are those “situated so that 
they must take orders and rarely have the right to give them” with “little opportunity to 
develop and exercise skills” (p. 56). Cultural imperialism occurs when “the dominant 
meanings of a society render the particular perspective of one’s own group invisible at 
the same time as they stereotype one’s group and mark it out as the Other” (p. 59). 
Finally, violence is considered oppressive, not only because of the obvious physical 
consequences, but also because of the “daily knowledge shared by all members of 
oppressed groups that they are liable to violation, solely on account of their group 
identity” (p. 62, emphasis Young’s). Violence can include physical violence as well as 
harassment and intellectual violence. The common denominator to all of these 
oppressions is that they occur as a result of group membership. Additional types of 
oppression involve the “disciplining” of the physical body to meet established gendered 
expectations, whether through appearance or behaviors, such as those identified by 
Bartky (1998) and Hochschild (1979). 
While Frye and Young have in mind membership of established gender categories, 
Butler (2009) notes that “the ‘appearance’ of gender is often mistaken as a sign of its 
internal or inherent truth” (p. i), meaning that it is assumed that whatever is on the outside 
is also on the inside, both physically and in bearing. Despite efforts to match the inside 
and outside, gender recognition laws are inconsistent from state to state, so a person may 
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be considered one gender in one state, and a different gender in the next state (Spade, 
2004; Newlin, 2008). Similarly, processes and results of gender recognition vary from 
state to state. If trans people desire a gender amendment on a birth certificate, for 
example in California, they must fill out a number of forms, pay fees, appear before a 
judge with certified documentation attesting “clinically appropriate treatment for the 
purpose of gender transition” (Cal. Health & Safety Code §103425). To marry, they must 
prove gender congruence with their sex, and can only marry if the gender and sex match 
and are the opposite of the partner. 
Oppression in knowledge organization. The notion of oppression can also be 
interpreted as a type of conceptual violence through the categories as wrought by Frye 
and Young and related to principles of classification, categorization and linguistic 
representation. In classification, oppression occurs through overt or insidious bias that 
potentially can deny access through structures created by and for a dominant class. 
Oppression can take forms “embedded in unquestioned norms, habits, and symbols, in 
the assumptions underlying institutional rules and the collective consequences of 
following those rules” (Young, 1990, p. 41). A consequence of classification being 
socially constructed is that the bias of the classificationist, which can be individual, 
institutional or structural, filters down to users of the system, whose knowledge structures 
are shaped by the ways knowledge is represented. Budd (2003) describes classification as 
an agent of “symbolic power,” and points out that without seeing classification as a 
“discursive act,” categorical differences can be perpetuated (p. 28). The disconnect 
between classificatory position and search attempts can affect information retrieval, 
which results in information being undiscoverable, a disempowering or oppressive effect.  
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The acceptance of these practices as “normal” or the inability to recognize them 
constitutes the type of oppression that Frye (1983) calls “assimilation into the patriarchy” 
(p. 9).  For example, the terms “transgender” and “intersex” share a facet in the 23rd 
edition of the DDC, which leads to assumptions that the terms may be interchangeable or 
that the groups share the same concerns. 
Until researchers took up the cause, users of bibliographic classification systems 
experienced the “injustices some groups suffer as a consequence of often unconscious 
assumptions of well-meaning people in…the normal processes of everyday life” (Young, 
1990, p. 41). Olson and Schlegl (2001), in a meta-analysis of knowledge organization 
literature written since the 1970’s, identified 31 identity-related topics found to be 
affected by four different types of bias in knowledge organization standards, which 
includes both classification systems and verbal subject representation: subject heading 
lists and thesauri. Regarding classification, first, the topic can be treated as an exception, 
as if its existence strays from the norm (e.g. a class for female doctors when no class 
exists for male doctors). Also, the topic can be “ghettoized,” or exiled to a class, which 
removes it from a broader swath of categories such as DDC’s (1885-1965) infamous 396 
class that lumps women into one class, removing them from inclusion in the general 
classes (discussed in detail later). Third, the topic can simply be omitted, as if it does not 
exist (e.g. no class for women in DDC 1). Fourth, it can be lost in a structure that does 
not follow the rules of the classification scheme, again, such as “Women” as a 
subdivision of “Customs, Costumes, Popular Life” (2nd- 16th editions, 1885-1965), and 
finally, the terminology can be biased (e.g. “Biographies of Eccentrics, Cranks, and 
Fools”) (p. 65), which can be a form of intellectual violence. To add to those, 
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classifications can also commit cultural imperialism by subordinating or delegitimizing 
groups, making condemning moral judgments, reinforcing stereotypes or dehumanizing 
groups. Adler and Tennis (2013) also create a “taxonomy of harm” that builds on Olson 
and Schlegl’s rubric, enumerating further ways that oppression can be committed in 
classification adding “pathologization,” where the classification diagnoses through 
structure (e.g., homosexuality classed under “perversion”), and “erasure,” which is 
omission that is intentional rather than accidental (“hermaphrodites” removed from the 
classification and restored in the next edition). 
Objectors may question whether the structures in bibliographic classification truly 
oppress users because of the invisibility of the structure in the catalog. In other words, 
when searching a library catalog, users are not exposed to the names of classes nor the 
placement within of structure because unlike subject headings, which appear on the 
catalog record, classificatory position is simply represented by a call number. However, 
as Christensen (2011) cogently shows in his pragmatic study tracing how particular 
intersex titles are classed, the placement on the shelf and the surrounding works 
serendipitously discovered while browsing tell a story of the concept space. The 
appropriateness and fit with the nearby titles can reveal the biases, ignorance, or 
indifference of both the classificationist and classifier. The nearby titles also reveal the 
hierarchical associations. 
If a searcher cannot find information, finds information in a judgmental hierarchical 
position, or finds it represented in an otherwise demeaning fashion, it may be perceived 
as truth. While inanimate objects like rugs or sea sponges may not care where or how 
they are classified, groups of people do care, as it can carry medical, legal, social, and 
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educational consequences, among others. Dewey (1876) repeatedly called it sacrificing 
“theoretical harmony and exactness…to the practical requirements of the library” (p. 4); 
Hansson (2013) calls it “pragmatic adjustments [to ontology and epistemology] for 
bibliographic purposes” (p. 389), but to people it matters. Smiraglia (2006) writes, “when 
a gay adolescent searches for literature to help understand and finds that it all falls under 
‘perversion’ then we have oppressed yet another youth”  (p. 186). Not only has the youth 
been oppressed, but anyone else can take this classificatory judgment to be truth and may 
perpetuate stereotypes and prejudicial behavior that spill out into practical life.  
Conclusion 
Budd (2003), following Pierre Bourdieu’s and of Jurgen Habermas’s theories of 
praxis, argues that many library practitioners unwittingly proceed in a state of “epistemic 
doxa” or “unthought” (p. 30), not realizing how library policies have social impact on 
users. However, the myriad epistemological stances underlying knowledge organization 
theory, which will be outlined in the next chapter, demonstrate an attempt to support 
praxis with theories of knowledge. Foucault (1977a) writes, “Each society has its regime 
of truth…that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the 
mechanism and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the 
means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the 
acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true” 
(p. 131). The tools of knowledge organization make up and are supported by this 
discourse, so it is important to examine the theories of knowledge that underscore them. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
	  
Though formal gender classification will be examined rather than cognitive 
perceptions of gender, it is important to understand the landscape onto which the formal 
classifications are projected both in gender studies and in knowledge organization 
research. Hjørland (2010) believes concepts constitute the “building blocks” of 
classification, writing, “A classification is thus a structure of concepts (classes)” (p. 38).  
Consequently, this project must describe the different ontological formulations of the 
concept of “woman,” with the epistemology telling us how we know this. As Mikkola 
(2009) asks, questioning the definition of “woman” confounds most people: “Aren’t 
women simply female humans?” (p. 560). But the answer is not simple for historical, 
political and social reasons, as described in the previous chapter. The literature on this 
topic spans a multitude of disciplines, including law, philosophy, history, psychology, 
anthropology, ethnography, zoology, sociology, literary and critical studies, and, of 
course, women’s studies, as well as the more recently-emerging gender studies fields that 
include the study of trans people and masculinity. Intersex people have been consistently 
written about since at least Aristotle (as “hermaphrodites”), but over the twentieth 
century, a growing batch of research has emerged from a number of fields, including 
legal and medical-scientific fields.  
It is also crucial to understand the backdrop of the field of knowledge organization 
related to the epistemology(ies) underlying classification. Research exploring the social 
side of knowledge organization has increased dramatically in the last two decades, as 
researchers have begun to analyze epistemological aspects of knowledge organization 
using critical or postmodern theories. Mai (1999) discusses the shift in classification 
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theory from modern to postmodern, and the following year issues a call that “future 
research agendas within knowledge organization should focus on studying the social and 
cultural aspects of knowledge organization and show how insight into this could enhance 
theory and practice” (Mai, 2000a, p. 61). Similarly, Andersen & Skouvig (2006), analyze 
knowledge organization socio-historically, through the lens of critical theorists Foucault 
and Habermas, concluding that “An awareness of society and its social and political 
structures and their materialization in recorded discourses does not appear to be a fully 
formed trait of the study of knowledge organization in LIS” (p. 301). They contend that 
in using critical theory frameworks, “LIS may connect to other social science and 
humanistic fields addressing issues of the organization of power, knowledge, and texts in 
society and culture” (p. 303). The shift to postmodern analysis reflects an effort to point 
out assumptions entrenched within the discipline, practice, science, and wider research 
community. Over ten years since Mai’s call to action, virtually every paper in the 
proceedings of the International Society for Knowledge Organization (ISKO) 2010 
conference and a large portion of the 2014 conference proceedings relate to epistemology, 
and a collection on epistemology in KO has been recently published (Cultural Frames of 
Knowledge, 2012), demonstrating that Mai’s call was heard and that the cultural aspects 
have been deemed worthy of study by the field. 
Scope of the Literature 
The literature must be precisely defined, as much ground needs to be covered. 
Consequently, several related bodies of research will be omitted from this review. The 
literature on the classification of gender contains many difficult and contentious 
questions, for the delineation of sex and gender categories is central to determining who 
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is entitled to legal rights, political rights, and protection from discrimination. What comes 
first, commonality or politics? Can anyone be a woman? Are androgyny or humanism 
solutions? Who has the right to “author” gender? Since much of feminist literature refers 
at least tangentially to the characteristics of women and men, I will restrict the review to 
only research that’s raison d’etre is to grapple with the question of how gender is 
defined—following Hjørland’s (2010) notion of concepts as building blocks of 
classification—not those that critique women’s social roles or legal rights. Also excluded 
will be literature regarding the concerns of sexual orientation. Desire and sexuality only 
constitute a slice of overall gender identity, although gender identity and sexual 
orientation are often conflated. As Vade (2005) notes, “Gender identity is who one is. 
Sexual orientation is to whom one is attracted…As soon as we recognize that there are 
more than two genders, the terms ‘homosexual,’ ‘heterosexual,’ and ‘bisexual’ no longer 
make sense” (p. 270). A wide range of literature beginning in the late 1980s also refers to 
what is called “intersectional” locations; that is, categories that exist at the intersection of 
sex and another oppression, such as race and class, but many of these also accept the 
concept of woman, albeit not as a singular, “pure” category. However, this literature is 
also beyond the scope of the paper. 
Epistemology as a branch of philosophy has origins in ancient texts and is a 
discipline unto itself; therefore, only epistemology as it appears in knowledge 
organization literature, and more specifically, classification research, will be covered. 
Classification literature referring to gender will be covered, including the rare works 
where both gender and epistemology are considered. Finally, literature from women’s 
and gender studies that relate to the classification of gender are described. Though much 
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of the gender studies literature dips into metaphysics, the arguments are important to 
include since they affect epistemology.  
Epistemology in Knowledge Organization Research 
Epistemology is relatively new in knowledge organization research, emerging mostly 
in the 1990s and then exploding in the late 2000s. The added dimension of epistemology 
to the research base has echoed similar shifts elsewhere in the humanities as the liberation 
movements of women, LBGT, American Indians, and blacks challenged contentions that 
knowledge is stable and universal. According to Hartsock (1990), the main intellectual 
tasks of these movements were critique and construction: those who were “not allowed to 
be subjects of history, who have not been allowed to make our history, are beginning to 
reclaim our pasts and remake our futures on our own terms” (p. 163). Those movements 
challenged the universality of the knowledge named and proclaimed from the dominant 
perspective of the white, Western, heteronormative, affluent, Christian male. 
Concurrently in knowledge organization research, the social aspects of classification also 
were investigated, and classification schemes came to be diagnosed as products of their 
time (Foskett, 1971), of their disciplines (Hjørland, 1997), or of a dominant class (Olson, 
2007). Hjørland (2003) argues strongly for examination of philosophical assumptions 
through epistemology, “If you do not reflect on your theoretical assumptions, you cannot 
know if they are adequate and you cannot defend them. …It is simply a logical mistake to 
claim that it is possible to disregard philosophical assumptions” (p. 805). He also argues 
that any theories of knowledge organization are naturally connected to epistemic 
positions (Hjørland, 2013). 
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Mai (1999, 2000b, 2004), tracing the shift from universal, scientific-oriented 
classification to pragmatic, user group-oriented classification, finds that domain analytic 
approaches (a response to universalist epistemology) will be the future of classification. 
Thellefsen (2006) described the advent of the domain analytic approach as “a shift in 
paradigm, from objectivity to relativity” (p. 279). In other words, lest we believe that 
classifications reflect reality, we rather should look at whose reality it reflects, and how 
that reality is constructed by the discourses that constitute that reality, and who is being 
affected by the imposition of a particular epistemic stance, as manifested through 
classification. Similarly, Hansson (2013) describes that the epistemology underlying 
classification has remained relatively stable historically, but that the shift from 
knowledge to information as a product has changed ontology. Olson (2012) attributes the 
increase of epistemology in knowledge organization research to the recognition and 
acceptance of cultural difference and cultural knowledge, writing that the “classification 
community realized that to discuss knowledge is not sufficient. We must also recognize 
not only diverse epistemic stances; we must each recognize our own epistemic stance” (p. 
ix). Smiraglia (2012a), too, believes epistemology “is a form of self-reflection about the 
knowledge we have that allows us, each in our several domains, to build more or less 
enduring myths about that which we know” (p. 14). Epistemic pluralism also emerged as 
a common theme. Hjørland (1997, 2004a, 2004b), Smiraglia (2002) and Smiraglia & Lee 
(2012) recommend using multiple epistemic perspectives, and such works as Kaipainen 
& Hautamäki (2011) attempt to operationalize pluralism. Thellefson (2006) believes that 
semiotics holds the key to reconciling differences in epistemic outlook. The main 
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problem, in his view, is matching interpretants of the field to interpretants in the system. 
The answer, he believes, is to reflect the terminology of the domain. 
The knowledge organization literature will be organized first by epistemological 
works, i.e. those that concern the use of epistemological theory, and then loosely by 
epistemic school of thought. Following the general works will be those that include a 
feminist or otherwise gendered angle. Although feminist approaches at times could be 
subsumed in parallel general categories, they will be discussed in their own grouping.  
While the focus will be on classification, much of the research refers more broadly to 
knowledge organization systems as a whole, inclusive of classification, thesauri, 
folksonomies, and ontologies. Since epistemic positions supply a foundation for critical 
theories and therefore may be mentioned but not featured in articles, only those that focus 
mainly on epistemology will be mentioned here. Epistemology is comprised of so many 
nuanced positions that some works catalog the different stances relating to knowledge 
organization, such as Hjørland and Nicolaisen’s Epistemological Lifeboat website 
(http://www.iva.dk/jni/lifeboat/) and Budd (2001). 
 Epistemology in knowledge organization research manifests itself in two ways. 
One type of paper calls for an epistemological methodology in the study of knowledge 
organization systems, and the other actually applies the methodology. In the first group, 
Svenonius (2004) outlines the dominant epistemological theories of meaning that have 
influenced knowledge organization in the twentieth century. On the objectivist side of the 
spectrum, she finds operationalism, a theory derived from logical positivism that 
maintains that statements are only meaningful if they can be empirically verified. She 
moves to the referential or picture theory, which claims that there is a universal referent 
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that “contains” all the meanings of that word. Finally, she visits the subjectivist end by 
describing the instrumental theory of meaning, which holds that every word is a 
polyseme, or a word with numerous related meanings. Hjørland (1997, 2004a), for 
example, argues that including different epistemological stances in methodology has 
better capacity to explain the results of studies. Zins (2004) defines knowledge as used in 
the field of knowledge organization, starting with Popper’s “worlds 1, 2, and 3” as a 
foundation. He promotes the use of epistemology in creating scientific knowledge maps. 
Hansson (2006) recommends the use of an epistemological stance of institutionalism, 
which marries practical librarianship with the critical approaches. These theories reflect 
an emerging skepticism of “true,” scientific beliefs, and scientists tend to lean toward 
Popper’s view that theories are constantly being revised by new theories (Hjørland & 
Hartel, 2003). Olson & Fox (2010) recommend Gayatri Spivak’s feminist, Marxist, 
postcolonial approach as a theoretical framework to critically uncover evidence of bias 
and cultural imperialism in both knowledge organization and library and information 
studies in general. 
Little research attempts to speculate the epistemological stance underpinning 
existing classification systems. Olson (1994, 1999b) traces the Aristotelian, logical, 
classical and universal epistemology underlying hierarchical classification. Olson’s 
(1996) conference paper on a feminist deconstruction of the universalist, Cartesian 
epistemology underlying DDC signified the first feminist epistemology in knowledge 
organization research, as well as setting off the explosion in epistemological research in 
general. Ducheyne (2009) examines Paul Otlet’s archives to find his view of knowledge, 
and finds that Otlet took a humanitarian, cosmological and objective perspective that 
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questions his previously presumed association with positivism. Researchers studying 
comparative cultural epistemology in classification (discussed below) typically identify 
epistemic values of the particular cultural groups in relation to western epistemology. 
Most often, epistemological research relates to indexing, as vocabulary is easier to 
identify and change than fundamental, western classificatory structure. Hjørland (2002) 
and Hjørland & Hartel (2003) provide relevance factors associated with major schools of 
epistemic thought and applies them to the domain of psychology as it is represented in 
major databases. In 2013, Hjørland writes that the whole of a field’s literature gives 
insight into the epistemology. Lopez-Huertes (2006) believes that automated indexing 
can detect “terminological drifting” and determine whether a field has a language of its 
own or whether what we consider interdisciplinary are actually transdisciplinary. 
Analyzing the gender studies corpus in Uruguay, Lopez-Huertes found that language of 
gender studies has “penetrated many disciplines, altering their knowledge structures by 
creating new concepts and terms, modifying the traditional scientific structure” (p. 336-
337). Similarly, Rodriguez Bravo (2006) analyzes three indexing languages for treatment 
of gendered entries, finding great asymmetry resulting from the treatment of the 
masculine as the norm.  
Olson (1999b, 2004) on the other hand, detects epistemology through structure 
rather than vocabulary. Some of the problems Olson has identified are the classical, 
hierarchical structure of classification systems, classification and subject representation 
as power-wielding tools, and the binary, rigid principles of mutual exclusivity. Smiraglia 
(2012b) examined the methods used in various domain analytic works to extract the 
underlying epistemology of domain analysis. Bowker & Star (1999) describe three 
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classification systems historically and discuss epistemology but do not go so far as to 
determine a stance. Hjørland (2010) discusses how “Different epistemologies and views 
of concepts underlie all existing approaches to the construction of [knowledge 
organization systems]” and that different concept theories “do not produce similar results” 
(pp. 39-40). He then calls for research into the strengths and weaknesses of each 
approach, which is one of the aims of this project in the context of gender classification. 
Hjørland continues an ongoing debate with the phenomena-based epistemic stances 
endorsed by Szostak and Gnoli; this debate is discussed and documented by Fox (2012a) 
and argued further, suggesting a more sophisticated approach by Kleineberg (2013), 
where the knowing subject and the methodology are incorporated along with the 
epistemology. 
Specific Epistemic Stances 
Social epistemologies. Traditional epistemology concerns individual ways of 
knowing, but social epistemology relates to group knowledge and how it is generated and 
communicated. Social epistemology is both a specific school of thought and a label for 
common themes that arise regarding the social component of knowing. The paradigmatic 
belief in intemerate, independent knowledge that “reflects reality” has been destabilized, 
and tension has arisen from the potential that what was advertised as a natural 
classification is actually synthetic or anthrogenic. Consequently, much research has 
focused on how social groups, or groups perceived to be social groups, affect knowledge 
generation. The term “social epistemology” was coined in LIS when Egan & Shera 
(1952), defined it as “the study of those processes by which society as a whole seeks to 
achieve a perceptive or understanding relation to the total environment” (p. 132, 
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emphasis in original). Bliss (1929)  and Egan (1956) recognized knowledge organization 
as inextricable from social structures, and Smiraglia (2014a) describes a type of social 
epistemology he calls “cultural synergy,” that connects cultural institutions and also 
empowers them to shape how knowledge is maintained and disseminated. The types of 
epistemology below refer to the idea that collectives can generate and interpret 
knowledge similarly. 
 Standpoint theory. Standpoint is an epistemic stance originating from Marxist 
theory with the tenet that marginalized groups possess “dual vision” resulting from their 
situatedness in the margins. In this view, context truly colors knowledge generation and 
is inclusive of experience and emotion. From their positions, marginalized groups must 
be able to function within the dominant perspective, as well as within their own groups. 
In knowledge organization literature, standpoint approaches are best represented by user 
studies that examine the behaviors of social groups. A limited amount of user studies 
exist in the literature, but many take standpoint approaches because demographic or 
cultural groups are the easiest commonality to identify. Fox (2012b) studied social tags to 
find whether taggers on LibraryThing identifying as women or men used language 
differently. Though the study was preliminary and found little difference between the 
practices of the groups, suggesting that standpoint may influence the use and evaluation 
of knowledge organization systems. This approach assumes some sort of physical or 
cultural sameness, which does not necessarily exist, at least not in demographic 
categories. In other works, Campbell (2000, 2004) explores the challenges associated 
with addressing the complicated task of distinguishing “aboutness” from “meaning” in a 
poststructuralist paradigm as well as the difficulty of providing subject access for 
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fictional works when meaning loses stability. His specific concern involves identifying 
implicit gay and lesbian themes in literature not explicitly “about” those topics, and 
whether it is even possible to classify or index for such themes.  
 Domain analysis. Domain analytic approaches can be considered social 
epistemology in that they suggest that a particular group may use language similarly, 
although that group would be focused around a particular domain rather than 
demographic characteristic. Smiraglia (2012b) argues that a domain “must be a group 
with a coherent ontology, which implies a shared epistemology” (p. 111). Hjørland 
(1997) points out that universal classifications are problematic for their practice of 
placing a document in one place within a particular discipline.  He writes that each 
document “has several epistemological potentialities that are given priority based on 
disciplinary viewpoints,” but a universal scheme is forced to choose one (p. 42). Domain 
analysis is the outcome of the consideration of several epistemological angles. Hjørland 
argues that theories and concepts are products of particular domains, and that those 
domains should be analyzed to find them so that they are more easily accessible to the 
users of the domain. Hjørland & Albrechtsen (1999) argue that the “common knowledge” 
that social groups share, such as professional, academic or cultural groups, affects how 
subjects are named, and that to determine the vocabulary and practices of the group, the 
“domain” must be analyzed and are considered the warrant for inclusion in a system.  
One of the benefits of domain analysis is that the vocabulary comes from users 
themselves, not from cataloging professionals, who may not have appropriate expertise, 
and indeed, Sauperl’s (2004) research showed that catalogers more often use vocabulary 
more convenient to the cataloger than usable by searchers. A second benefit is the 
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creation of systems for specific disciplines or fields, which result from a close analysis of 
a field and its practices. Though it may seem like domain analysis would cause a 
proliferation of different systems, Hjørland believes that in the case of indexing, the 
vocabulary may not be dramatically different between and among domains, but rather the 
organizational structure of the thesaurus may differ. He often uses the example of 
chemistry and pharmacy. The domain of chemistry would use many of the same concepts 
as pharmacy, and the vocabulary would remain the same, but rather the classificatory 
position would reflect a different emphasis of how the concept is used. 
Hjørland & Hartel (2003), in support of the concept of domain analysis, 
summarize four epistemological approaches that must be addressed in domain analysis in 
order to capture all aspects of the domain: empiricism, rationalism, historicism and 
pragmatism, connecting them to the idea that domains, like classification systems, are 
dynamic and need constant revision. Empiricism relies on lived experience and 
rationalism uses logic to make a priori claims or theoretical models. Historicism, as the 
name suggests, uses historical developments and context in analysis (p. 240).  Hjørland 
(1992) defines several epistemological positions into which the concept of “subject” can 
be classified: subjective idealism, pragmatism, and realism/materialism. Understanding 
the categories will assist knowledge organization specialists in the document description 
process.  
Hjørland places much emphasis on the pragmatic aspects of analysis. Pragmatism 
attempts to add a practical component to philosophical claims, rejecting the division 
between theory and practice and the whole concept of metaphysical philosophy. 
Developed by such scholars as William James, C.S. Pierce and John Dewey, its goal is 
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tracing hypotheses to their practical consequences. Pragmatism relates to knowledge 
organization in its notions of meaning. Pragmatists do not believe in a universal reality 
and that theories are provisional and relative. Practical life and philosophical inquiry are 
inextricable (Kelly, 2004). Because no universal reality exists, meaning is socially 
created, placing it among social epistemologies. Concepts are defined in terms of their 
practical application, or how well they fulfill a specific need, and that function should be 
included in the structure of classification rather than classifying discrete items 
hierarchically. Thellefsen, Thellefsen, & Sørenson (2013) view the pragmatic aspect of 
knowledge organization as cognitively creating beliefs where there was once doubt. 
Hjørland (2009) admits that despite the impressive algorithms that have been created by 
search engines, context still easily gets lost. However, he trusts that information 
technology and information science classification specialists will eventually be able to 
include context in searching. Gallagher (1991) and Mai (2000b) describe the concepts of 
likeness with a pragmatic approach, and Jacob (2000) addresses postmodern criticisms of 
classification theory by suggesting a pragmatic understanding of knowledge. Dousa 
(2010) describes the differences between classical pragmatism and neopragmatism and 
the benefits of each in the context of knowledge organization. 
Wittgenstein/mentalism. Because of his ideas about meaning and language, 
Wittgenstein is often cited in knowledge organization literature. Although his oeuvre is 
diverse and evolved throughout his career, his theory of language and his revisions of his 
own theory significantly relate to knowledge organization in several places on the 
epistemological continuum. He rejects the claim that language consists only of words that 
represent objects. Language can only be understood in the context that it is being used, 
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and each context makes up a nebulous concept that he calls a language-game. Language 
games, although never clearly defined, relate to the idea that meaning is made in context, 
and fields all have their own context and play (Kelly, 2004, pp. 127-8). His discussion of 
family resemblance often is used in formulating definitions of “works” and “texts.” 
Beghtol (1986a) analyzed bibliographic classification theory in terms of mentalism. 
Christensen’s (2000) investigation of scientific discourse houses its semiotic analysis in 
Wittgenstein’s language games. Blair (1990), in his monograph Language and 
Representation in Information Retrieval, Hjørland (1998) and Frohmann (1990, 2004) 
use Wittgenstein’s language-games ideas to frame their definitions of the document and 
information in the context of information retrieval. Fox (2011) uses family resemblance 
as a framework for gender classification and Saldahna (2014) compares the theories of 
Wittgenstein with the Indian classificationist Ranganathan to show how pragmatics 
shaped their notions of language and knowledge organization. 
Individualist epistemologies. 
Cognitive science. Cognitive science studies the connection between intellect and 
the mind across many contexts, and it includes various disciplines such as education, 
philosophy, linguistics, psychology, and anthropology, as well as neuroscience and 
artificial intelligence. For knowledge organization, relevant inquiries of cognitive science 
include such questions as whether the brain has its own visual code or language when it 
thinks, how representations gain meaning, and if that meaning relates to the individual or 
the community (Thagard, 2010). Beghtol (1986a) applies the textual linguistic theories of 
van Dijk to bibliographic classification theory, using his ideas to define “aboutness.”  
Research from this area that has influenced knowledge organization is George Lakoff’s 
(1987) Women, Fire and Dangerous Things, which questions knowledge as abstract and 
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disembodied, and argues that categories are not uniform or transcendent of individual 
experience, but rather depend on the experience and cultural grounding of the knower. 
Lakoff calls his view “experiential realism,” which falls epistemologically between 
classical, universal views and the postmodern in that it assumes a stable reality exists. 
However, people’s experience of reality is based on their cultural context and physical 
beings. Tennis (2005, 2008) uses the experiential epistemology of Lakoff to enhance 
domain analysis. Farrow (1991, 1994, 1996) applies a psycholinguistic view to the acts of 
indexing, abstracting and classifying. Jacob & Shaw (1998) and Jacob (2004) bring the 
concept of cognitive scaffolding to classification. Campbell (2010) uses the linguistic 
theories of Ricouer to frame his discussion of local and universal knowledge. Fox (2011) 
uses prototype theory, a linguistic theory of categorization, as a potential framework for 
classifying sex and gender. 
Structuralism/deconstruction/poststructuralism. Structuralism and 
poststructuralism provide a popular context for knowledge organization researchers 
because of the subjectivist stance that no unchanging, universal reality exists. Though 
cognitive approaches are also individual, they are more empirically based. Originating 
with the semiotic principles conceptualized by Saussure, structuralism analyzes literary 
or cultural texts as signifying units (rather than working at the sentence or word level, as 
in semiotics). A signifying unit could be a myth, a literary work, a painting, a fashion 
trend or any other cultural product, including a classification system. Many of the same 
major figures from semiotics evolved their views toward structuralism, such as Barthes, 
Jakobson, Levi-Strauss, Todorov, Genette and Greimas. Poststructuralists challenged the 
notion that an author affixed set meanings into a text and believed that readers create 
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meaning themselves. Deconstruction, a method of poststructuralism, popularized in the 
1970’s, was Jacques Derrida’s response to what he perceived as major flaws in 
structuralism. Barthes, too, evolved toward poststructuralism with his “The Death of the 
Author” (1967), and along with Derrida, major theorists include Foucault and Kristeva.  
Foucault’s critiques of institutions (medicine, psychiatry, schools, prisons) and the 
documentation that defines their practices (medical charts, exams) constitute a socio-
historical critique of power, which makes his work a worthy framework for examining 
the library as a cultural institution. He is the most commonly cited structuralist/ 
poststructuralist in LIS literature, but less frequently in knowledge organization literature. 
Foucault’s wide range of writings and his ideas about representation, language, and truth 
make him a useful referent across a variety of disciplines. Hannabuss (1996) provides a 
detailed overview of Foucault’s notions about warranted knowledge and then argues that 
these concepts were critical for information professionals to understand. Olson (1997; 
2002) describes and advocates using the process of deconstruction, but with a feminist 
bent. She then uses a Foucauldian discourse analysis to uncover assumptions in classical 
logic (Olson, 1999b). Campbell (2005; 2007) uses a structuralist approach to 
representation, and later compares the evolution of the paradigm shifts within knowledge 
organization to Foucault’s analysis of the evolution of clinics. Frohmann (1992; 1994a, 
1994c; 2001) applies the theories of Foucault to research and pedagogy. Adler (2012, 
2015) uses Foucauldian frameworks to analyze the Library of Congress’s role in creating 
knowledge. Moulaison, Dykas, & Budd (2013) examine how authors are treated in 
descriptive cataloging, specifically in RDA, applying Foucault’s concept of the author-
function. 
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In other applications of poststructuralism, Jacob & Albrechtsen (1999) and Jacob 
(2004) apply elements of poststructuralism to discussion of classification and 
classificatory structures. Andersen (2002) and Paling (2004), apply Genette’s concept of 
paratexts, or extratextual materials such as tables of content and bibliographic records, 
and how they affect interpretation and meaning of the text. Shapiro (2002) suggests that a 
cultural symbol thesaurus could be developed that contains symbols across many fields, 
and Tredinnick (2007) relates poststructuralism to the idea of hypertext. Fox & Reece 
(2013) apply Derrida’s deconstructed notion of “hospitality” to social tagging. 
Samuelsson (2010) sees knowledge organization systems as discourses made up of words 
that reflect power relationships and shape meanings in external reality. Because the 
knowledge organization systems poorly “articulate” feminist perspectives, they are 
rendered invisible in external reality. Also, because of the context specificity of word 
meanings, she believes that domain-centric knowledge organization systems, such as 
those for feminist topics, should be used rather than universal systems. Olson (1999a, 
2000) and Bednereks (2007) both use the postcolonial concept of the Third Space to 
describe how LCSH serves as a translation of the meanings of works. 
Feminist epistemology in knowledge organization. As mentioned above, Olson 
and Fox (2010) recommend Gayatri Spivak’s feminist, Marxist, poststructuralist, 
postcolonial approach as a theoretical framework, and then Fox & Olson (2012) 
summarize the spectrum of feminist epistemic approaches and describe potential 
applications in knowledge organization. Olson & Fox (2013) also discuss the use of the 
feminist ethic of care in knowledge organization contexts. As the groundbreaking scholar 
of feminist epistemology in knowledge organization, Olson explicitly uses feminist 
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theory, often feminist deconstruction, in critiquing standards and subject access. Olson 
(1996) uses the poststructural epistemologies of Cornell and Nye to critique the 
oppositional concepts and structure underlying hierarchical classifications. She 
recommends feminist deconstruction as a research method (1997), uses feminist 
deconstruction on LIS discourse (1995; 2002), and analyzes the epistemic assumptions 
underlying classical logic (1999b, 2007). She continues her feminist epistemological 
approach in 2010, analyzing Hegel’s epistemic structure—which influenced DDC—
through the lens of Spivak, arguing that his conceptions of knowledge marginalize non-
Western and feminine cultures.  
Feinberg (2007) uses the “situated knowledges” epistemology of Haraway to 
support her concept of “responsible bias.” Tennis (2012a), critiquing standpoint 
approaches, uses Olson’s work and the feminist epistemology of radical feminist Mary 
Daly, using examples from her Wickedary dictionary to illustrate how feminism rejects 
patriarchal assumptions of universality (despite Daly being an essentialist). He addresses 
the perennial question of usefulness versus accuracy, concluding that the field should 
focus on creating useful rather than “correct” classifications. Samuelsson (2010), though 
not strictly applying feminist epistemology, uses discourse analysis to explore the 
difficulty of representing literature on feminist topics. Alexander (2012, 2014) applies 
feminist empiricist Longino’s theories to analyze the development of knowledge and 
language in taxonomic work. 
Non-western and indigenous epistemologies. A slice of the knowledge 
organization literature focuses on comparative epistemology in classification, describing 
how non-western or indigenous epistemologies influence the associated knowledge 
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structures and what western classification could learn from other perspectives. Olson 
(1999a) proposes indigenous knowledge structures to those of classical Western 
structures. Lee (2010, 2012a, 2012b) and Lee & Lan (2009, 2011) examine the epistemic 
values of ancient Chinese catalogers in their investigations of the first classified catalog, 
the Seven Epitomes. Lee (2012b) writes that social epistemology “resonates with 
traditional Chinese holistic thinking” (p. 67). Maina (2012) describes the indigenous 
epistemology of the First Nations communities in Canada and how librarians need to 
develop cultural competency with the characteristics of native knowledge and 
organization practices. Lee (2006) also takes a comparative approach in her investigation 
of how American and Taiwanese student search using knowledge organization systems. 
The epistemic assumption would be that the cultural groups have collective knowledge 
that causes them to search similarly. Neelameghan & Raghavan (2012) describe the 
nuances of the epistemic foundations including notions of time, knowledge authorities 
and conceptual relationships underlying several schools of Indian philosophical thought 
and the effect on both Ranganathan’s and western knowledge organization systems.  
Feminist, Transgender and Intersex Literature on the Definition of Gender 
Several overlapping debates, both implicitly and explicitly epistemic, persist 
within feminist and gender literature. The continuing debate of the essential or anti-
essential nature of woman, which is a metaphysical and ontological concern, will be 
loosely mapped on top of the rough categories of universalism, standpoint, and 
postmodernist epistemological viewpoints. Though the history and evolution of feminist 
categories are far more nuanced than is able to be presented here, the major shifts in 
thinking will be covered, insofar as they are relevant to my methodology. A growing 
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body of literature explores the historical and contemporary medical reactions to intersex 
phenomena. 
Feminist classifications of gender  
For most of history, gender and sex were synonymous, with gender referring only 
linguistically to masculine and feminine words. Prior to the use of the term “gender,” 
Mead (1949), in her classic anthropological study Male and Female, describes sexual 
difference from her perspective as a cultural anthropologist, recognizing societal pressure 
on the sexes that breaks down the notion of biological influence. Along with her other 
studies, Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies (1935) and Coming of Age in 
Samoa (1928), upended the supposed “naturalness” of a male-dominated society and 
introduced the notion of cultural constructivism. Her work garnered criticism for its 
methods and conclusions, but helped to establish the idea of the social construction of 
gender (without using the term as it is used today). In their research on transsexuality in 
the 1950s and 60s, psychiatrist David Cauldwell (1949) and psychologist Robert Stoller 
began distinguishing sex from gender to explain how people could feel mismatched from 
the sex of their bodies. Psychologist/sexologist John Money (1955) coined the terms 
“gender” and “gender identity” around that time.  
For the most part, in the early years of the second wave feminist movement, 
feminists generally accepted the notion of two separate sexes, but critiqued the “sex-
gender system,” or what Rubin (1975) described as a culture’s way of using certain facts 
about biological sex to derive a set of social identities and behaviors (i.e. gender). In 
other words, sexed bodies exist as a sort of palette upon which gender is constructed. Sex 
does not change, but gender is mutable. Versions of this view, lumped under “gender 
realism” have persisted, but not without serious criticism. Spelman (1988), Harris (1990) 
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and Stone (2007) all critique this view, arguing that no commonality connects all women 
across time and place. Radicals such as Firestone (1970) believe that the family 
structure—most notably reproduction and childrearing—was the root of women’s 
oppression and suggested that if reproduction could occur artificially outside the body, 
sexism would end. Meyerowitz (2008) argues that once the term “gender” was 
proclaimed to be artificial, then it was rejected by women because it is detrimental to 
retain a term that smacked of oppression. 
The concept of physical bodies and sexual difference, i.e. “sex,” has also come 
under scrutiny in feminist literature, where the assumption of dimorphism has been 
questioned (Blackless, et al., 2000). Medical-scientific literature looks more at physical 
attributes of sex organs, coming to the conclusion that sex dimorphism is not as clear cut 
as most people popularly believe. Dreger (1998a; 1998b) describes the medical history, 
treatment, and interpretation of the sexuality of intersex individuals beginning in the mid-
nineteenth century. Fausto-Sterling (2000) argues that sex has become an obsessional 
foundation to gender roles, but since the brain changes over time, any effort to attribute 
sex difference to hormones is undermined by cultural influences on brain development. 
Roberts (2000) recommends that the paradigmatic binary of social/biological be 
rethought in order to more thoughtfully address scientific claims of biological 
determinism. She suggests an “interimplication” approach to considering biology and 
social interactions and outcomes.  
Hester (2004) writes that, with a few exceptions, feminist and queer literature 
involving intersex or trans people de-emphasize the importance and agency of sexed 
bodies, preferring to focus on the political (p. 220). Hester provides a clear discussion of 
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how the binary sex paradigm appeared and was maintained in medical science, and 
medicine’s role in both acknowledging “a dizzying variety of sexes available,” as well as 
attempting to “eliminate the causes of variation and to intervene with surgical, endocrine 
and psychosocial methods to control the bodies of intersexed people” (p. 218). He 
critiques the conclusions of those who assert gender’s prevalence over sex, such as 
Kessler & McKenna (1978) or Fausto-Sterling (2000) because he believes their inclusion 
of desire requires a stable sex, and that sex, physiologically speaking, is not stable or 
even classifiable. He believes a “postgender” outlook would provide more subjectivity 
for bodies of ambiguous sex, rather than having a passive body on which culture ascribes 
its influence. He believes society needs to shake the need to “have a sex” (2004, p. 222).  
Though intersexuality, or non-dimorphic sex, was medically recognized and 
documented since at least the mid-nineteeth century (Dreger 1998a; 1998b), Garfinkel’s 
(1967) enthomethodological study uncovered a “natural attitude” that exemplified 
society’s view of sex, despite medical evidence. What came to be known as “Garfinkel’s 
rules” have been a point of frustration for transgender and intersex people:  
1. Society is populated by two and only two sexes; 
2. The dichotomy of sex is morally legitimate; 
3. Everyone counts themselves as a member of one sex or the other; 
4. All members are invariantly (i.e. ‘always have been, and always will be’) 
either male or female; 
5. The essential identifying ‘insignia’ for males is the possession of a penis 
and for females a vagina; 
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6. People will not willfully or randomly transfer from one sex status to 
another; and 
7. In the case of ‘ambiguous’ individuals whose sex status is not immediately 
obvious, it should still be possible, in principle, to classify them as either 
male or female. (pp. 122-128) 
The rules reflected the opinions of society rather than Garfinkel himself, who gathered 
the data. Speer (2005), following Kessler & McKenna’s (1978) formulation of the 
“gender attribution process,” or “the methodical procedures through which members 
come to identify others as male or female” (p. 67), describes her study where participants 
attempted to assign gender to images of ambiguous gender. In her study, she finds that 
when unclear, participants resorted to Garfinkel’s rules to disambiguate.  
Transgenderism and intersexuality  
Though trans and intersex people share the broad commonality of challenging the 
binary norms, they have distinct concerns that at times can be subsumed or overlooked. 
Members of each community disagree on whom best to ally with—lesbians and gays, 
feminists, disability advocates (for intersex), or each other (Greenberg, 2012), and in 
some cases, open animosity existed, such between radical feminists and transsexuals. For 
example, Raymond (2006) asserted in the 1970s that MTF transsexuals were more or less 
mutilated men who pretend to challenge gender norms but actually reinforce them (p. 
132). Transgenderism, newly renamed “gender dysphoria” in the most recent edition of 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) (2012), is an umbrella 
term that includes a range anywhere from transsexuals who may have had hormone 
therapy or surgery to people who simply cross-dress. The definition refers to a persistent 
discomfort with one’s assigned gender and identification with the gender opposite of the 
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assigned or living gender. This group generally is concerned with being allowed to live in 
their desired gender without discrimination or violence and began to organize around the 
1970s, but most effectively in the 1990s (Greenberg, Herald & Strasser, 2010, p. 13).  
Garber (1991) has said that transgenderism caused a “category crisis” (p. 16). 
Consequently, research on trans and intersex issues, more than any other related literature, 
focuses on formal gender classification, where categories cannot blur. The legal literature, 
in particular, has emerged most recently because the status of trans people in public life 
require a legal resolution, such as in use of restrooms, inmate grouping, right-to-marriage, 
sexual harassment (Alemzadeh, 2013) and identity document information that require a 
legal definition (Spade, 2008, 2011). Storrow (1997) describes how the courts grappled 
with the inconsistency of allowing gender to change for transsexuals with and without 
surgery. Holt (1997) and Kelly (2010) describe the precarity of transgender rights in 
employment discrimination. Allen (2008) compares the UK’s Gender Recognition Act to 
the US’s Real ID Act, both of which provide the state’s standards for “proving” gender. 
Lloyd (2005) applies Butler to analyze how legal rhetoric dehumanizes transgender 
individuals. Similarly, Taniguchi (2013) critiques the Gender Identity Disorder Act, 
which serves a similar purpose in Japan. George (2006) compares the legal status of 
intersex people to mulattos in the antebellum south, as does Ezie (2011). Gilden (2008) 
describes the fluid, Navaho “berdache” [term used in the article] model of gender relative 
to its potential to use for transgender legal classification. Faithfull (2009) outlines how 
the Prison Rape Elimination Act classifies transgendered inmates in relation to their 
likelihood to provoke sexual abuse by other inmates and prison staff. Faithfull (2010) 
questions how the rigidity of legal categories can accommodate “dynamic gender 
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performance” and “complex ways of existing” (p. 457). Nye (1998) has examined 
transgender jurisprudence, and Meadow (2010) has compared 38 juridical gender 
determinations 1967 and 2007, seeking the criteria the courts used to determine sex when 
a litigant was transgender. Meadow found that three purposes for classification were 
found: 1) sex as a personality trait meant for purposes such as identification; 2) as a 
“characteristic of gendered relationships” such as for same-sex marriage or parental 
relationships; and 3) power structures, such as in employment situations (p. 822). 
Kirkland (2003), has examined case law for medical necessity of sex reassignment 
surgeries. Ballard (2012) discusses the US State Department’s policies for gender on 
passports, and proposes using gender classification recommendations from the World 
Professional Association for Transgender Health to help form policy. Harris (2010) and 
Franson (2013) recommend that schools reexamine their dress code policies to help 
reduce bullying of transgender students. Enriquez (2013) critiques the standard of 
immutable identity characteristics by the court, arguing that characteristics such as sex 
and gender can change after birth. Mottet’s (2013) comprehensive article outlines the 
status of birth certificate change, comparing it to other countries’ policies and laying out 
the ramifications to the law. Ziegler & Huntley (2013) critique the NCAA’s 2011 policy 
on transgender and intersex athletes, and compare it to other governing bodies’ policies, 
such as the International Olympic Committee’s.  
 Much of the literature on transgender concerns, academic, legal, and popular, 
such as Vade (2005), Morgan & Stevens (2008) and Meadow (2010) includes testimonial 
to counteract the epistemic objectivity of scientific assignment of sex with subjectivity, at 
times employing unconventional writing methods within academic works, in order to 
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escape the strictures of dominant discourse (cf. Nye 1998; Ohle 2004). Testimonial has 
almost become conventional, as it most effectively works to gain empathy for those 
whose experience is beyond one’s own lived experience. Influential transgender 
testimonials emerging in the popular press, such as Kate Bornstein’s (1994) Gender 
Outlaw: Men, Women, and the Rest of Us, were ground-breaking in that they provided 
perspective from those who did not identify as one of the two genders. For example, 
Bornstein writes, “I know I’m not a man…and I’ve come to the conclusion that I’m 
probably not a woman either…The trouble is, we’re living in a world that insists we be 
one or the other—a world that doesn’t bother to tell us exactly what one or the other is” 
(p. 8). Similarly, the literature often invokes Butler’s notion of performativity, a 
poststructural theory described below that is considered a foundation of queer theory 
because it mostly divorces sex from gender. Though all of intersex and transgender 
literature cannot be covered, it is important to the classification of gender insofar as the 
stability of sex and binary gender are less certain than the attitudes expressed by 
Garfinkel’s sample. Ultimately, this set of literature attempts to give epistemic agency to 
those who have been denied it.  
Epistemology and Metaphysics in Gender Classification 
The most ubiquitous and foundational concern in the classification of gender 
involves essentialism, or the belief that necessary and sufficient essential characteristics 
define concepts. Though essentialism constitutes a metaphysical more than 
epistemological concern, the underlying mutability or immutability of concepts suggests 
particular epistemic outlooks. Metaphysical-realist views of essentialism assume that a 
reality exists separate from human cognition, which also then requires an epistemology 
friendly to universal knowledge. Whether this knowledge can actually be known by 
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humans varies by viewpoints, which originate from the philosophy of science, linguistics, 
literary theory and others. Major contributors include Wittgenstein, Quine, Davidson, 
Putnam, Goodman and Derrida (Nussbaum, 1992, p. 207).  Essentialism here will only be 
addressed in terms of gender classification, as a vast body of literature exists in 
philosophy arguing the relative merits and problems of essentialism in terms of all 
existence, not just gender. 
Classic essentialists. Positions that subscribe to essentialism are considered 
“gender realism” and generally accept absolute divisions of gender, or that all women 
share a common experience, characteristic or other criterion that differentiates them from 
all men, regardless of the identities they claim. Early studies took on the nature/nurture 
debate (cf. Tuana, 1983; Purdy, 1986), but the peak was the 1990s, with literature 
emerging from a multitude of fields. Mikkola (2006; 2009), arguing for gender realism, 
believes that “intuitive” definitions of “woman” are more powerful. Grosz (1994) 
describes the nuance between the gender realist views, including universalism, biologism 
and naturalism. She describes essentialism’s role in feminist thought: “Essentialism, a 
term that is rarely defined or explained explicitly in feminist contexts, refers to the 
attribution of a fixed essence to women. Women’s essence is assumed to be given and 
universal and is usually, though not necessarily, identified with women's biological or 
“natural” characteristics. ... nurturance, empathy, supportiveness, non-competitiveness, 
and so on (p. 84). The concept of woman, then, would include a set of characteristics that 
would be common to all women, across time and place, thus requiring belief in a 
universalist epistemology. Martin (1994) attributes the troublesome nature of essentialism 
to a transition in philosophy from naming the essence of “things” (de re) to the essence of 
48	  
	  
	  
	  
linguistic expressions (de dicto) (p. 632). The result is that essences are then applied to 
the whole of the linguistic category rather than individual members.  
Classic essentialists include Marilyn Frye, legal scholar Catherine McKinnon, 
radical Mary Daly, feminist poet Adrienne Rich, and more recently, Rosi Braidotti and 
Tanya Modleski. Other pseudo-essentialist views include psychoanalytic and care 
feminisms such as those of Gilligan (1988), Hekman (1995), Tronto (1994) Noddings 
(2003), Flax (1990) and Chodorow (1995). Psychoanalytic feminisms attempt to strike 
the balance between essentialism and constructivism, yet they dissolve into essentialism 
by creating psychological essentialism originating in early childhood. In psychoanalytic 
feminism, gender identity is formed in the mind shortly after birth. Similarly psychologist 
Sandra Bem (1981) found the same phenomenon, but attributed gendered behavior to 
cognitive response to pervasive “gender schema” that children encounter as they develop. 
Revisionist essentialisms. Those involved in the essentialism debate somewhat 
agree that language forces people to essentialize, but the bigger question is the nature of 
essences. Though many resist the notion that all women have a common essence, the 
overriding difficulty of rejecting an essentialist viewpoint is that without it, there is no 
category “Woman.” According to Schor (1994), the question that allows essentialism to 
continue is “can there be a feminist politics that dispenses with the notion of Woman?” (p. 
xiii). Without it, those who argue for women’s rights would not have an organizing 
category to gain political traction, and more practically, protection, such as Down’s 
(1993) article, “If ‘Woman’ is Just an Empty Category, Then Why am I Afraid to Walk 
Alone at Night?” Those who reject the possibility of losing “woman” as a unit of analysis, 
but are unwilling to accept eternal, immutable Aristotelian essences, have tinkered with 
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the concept of essences and the definition of essentialism. Some choose Lockian essences 
that are provisional and nominal, using such terms as “strategic” or “tactical,” 
essentialism (Spivak, 1988 and recanted 1993; Carr, 1993; Bordo, 1990; de Laurentis 
1994), including Irigaray’s (1985) concept of “mimesis” or a reflective consideration of 
stereotypes of women, with the intention of “jamming the theoretical machinery,” by 
questioning those views (p. 78).  
While most feminists do not advocate for the Aristotelian, metaphysical divide of 
essence/accident, those who do fall on the essentialist side argue for a more sophisticated 
understanding of essentialism or a specific type of essentialism, or at the least argue that 
no resolution exists so we all might as well get over it. Millett (1971) believes in essential 
gender roles, but that they are socially constructed. Women are conditioned into their 
subordinate roles, which perpetuate themselves because they are reinforced by society. 
However, the roles can be resisted as women change cultures perceptions of women and 
undermine the traditional views. De Laurentis (1987) shifts the focus from the difference 
between man and woman, to the differences in the definition of woman, writing that “the 
sex-gender system…is both a sociocultural construct and a semiotic apparatus” (p. 5). 
Fuss (1989) like Millett and others, takes a social view of essentialism in that she sees 
social constructivism as a complex interweaving of different essentialisms. She advocates 
for pluralizing essentialism, questioning whether “nature and fixity go together 
(naturally), just as socialiality and change go together (naturally)” (p. 6). She critiques 
both Lacan’s psychoanalytical and Derrida’s deconstructionist attempts to “transcend” 
essentialism, finding that essentialist assumptions underlie their antiessentialist 
arguments. 
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Nussbaum (1992) describes what she calls “internalist” essentialism, which she 
finds to be more defensible than the “externalist” metaphysical variety. She argues that an 
internalist account needs to be able to include historical and cultural differences, 
autonomy (to combat essentialist determinism), and avoid “prejudicial application” (pp. 
208-209). Her objection to extreme subjectivism is that without some sort of anchoring 
force, those without power are left to the market of social forces, which “are rarely 
benign” (p. 212). She restricts her non-metaphysical conceptualization to “actual self-
interpretations and self-evaluations of human beings in history,” sticking to the “broadly 
shared general consensus” of human life, such as mortality, bodily needs, capacity for 
pleasure and pain, cognitive ability, reason, humor, and others (pp. 215-220). The broad 
categories are class-, religion- and gender-free in order to maintain an equal distribution 
of goods, but it retains the Aristotelian sense of free will so that those who disagree with 
anything set forth by public policy are free to take or leave it. Similarly, Irigaray (1994), 
who is often cited as an example of an essentialist, advocates for separatism different 
from those of radical feminists—one that creates a community of women to separate 
them from men in order to find “the necessary condition for their identity,” formed 
without patriarchal influence seeping in (p. 75).  
Following in the tradition of Nussbaum, Sveinsdottir (2008) describes her own 
view of anti-realist “conferralist essentialism,” which accepts essential properties, but 
maintains that those properties are “conferred” by experts. Witt (2011; 2012) argues for 
“unification essentialism,” or “uniessentialism,” which she distinguishes from traditional 
views of essentialism by describing essence as social rather than biological. Essence, then, 
relates to socially ascribed norms which exist whether one is receptive to them or not, 
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making gender a “principle of normative unity,” or “a functional essence, the socially 
recognized engendering function (or the gender) unifies a heap of social role occupancies 
into an individual, a social individual (Witt, 2012, p. 8).  
Standpoint theory. Turning back to epistemology, standpoint epistemologists 
accept women as a group, and accept that some kind of commonality exists with the 
group because of their experience of being oppressed, not necessarily because of biology. 
Harding (1983) first proposed standpoint as a new epistemology to undermine the 
sex/gender system as described by Rubin (1975), arguing that empiricist, scientific 
epistemology promotes knowledge as a “true belief about reality.” As Jagger (2004) puts 
it, the pain caused by a ruling group “provides [the oppressed group] with motivation 
for…criticizing accepted interpretations of reality, and for developing new and less 
distorted ways of understanding the world” and can be considered “epistemologically 
advantageous” (p. 56-57). Though with slightly different takes, well-known theorists 
include Harding (1983; 1991), Hill Collins (1990), Hartsock (1995), and Haraway (1991). 
Reactions to essentialism. Many scholars have had forceful reactions to works 
that even hinted of essentialism. Spivak (1993) laments that anti-essentialism led women 
“to call names and to congratulate ourselves” (p. 157), and Martin (1994) attributed the 
argument to a “chilly research climate” (p. 630). Schor (1994) writes that anti-essentialist 
literature is that of “sarcasm, cold fury, and contempt” (p. vii). Though some argue the 
oxymoronic nature of anti-essential feminism, many believe that women benefit more 
from being judged as individuals rather than collectively. Analytic and continental 
traditions both critique essentialist or “falsely universalized conceptions of women,” but 
originate from different frameworks (Warnke, 2012). Analytic works tend to be Anglo-
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American approaches based on language or political theory, and continental works look 
to European theorists. Postmodern thinkers in general deny that any overarching 
universal reality exists, but rather reality is rooted in individual perspectives.   
Postmodernist epistemology 
In academic literature, much of the challenge to rigid sex and gender categories 
arose with structural, poststructural, and postmodern thinkers. These thinkers challenged 
not only conceptual essentialism, but also the dominant notions that unchanging, 
fundamental principles underpinned knowledge and existence, and that the noblest 
pursuit for scholars was to undercover these transcendent principles. Particularly in the 
field of philosophy, with social sciences also following suit, the “god’s eye view” was 
and still is considered ideal, only to be challenged by groups with a “perspective,” such 
as feminists, Marxists, and black and gay liberation scholars (Nicholson, 1990, pp. 2-3).  
The ongoing concern for postmodern scholars was that to define woman was to reify, and 
to reify is to subjugate. As Nicholson (1998) puts it, a fixed definition of woman 
“operates as a policing force which generates and legitimizes certain practices, 
experiences, etc., and curtails and delegitimizes others” (p. 293). But without a solid 
definition, no way to unite for political purposes exists, thus leading to such ideas as 
“strategic” or “provisional” essentialism. Fraser & Nicholson (1990) argue, “A 
postmodern reflection on feminist theory reveals disabling vestiges of essentialism while 
a feminist reflection on postmodernist reveals androcentrism and political naïveté” (p. 20). 
For this reason, feminism and postmodernism have a fraught but vital relationship. The 
most valuable contribution of postmodernism to feminism was to help call out the white, 
middle-class assumptions that dominated early feminist thought, leading to the 
emergence of intersectionality. As Haslanger (2000) points out, most provisional 
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definitions of gender reflect characteristics of middle-class white women. Hartsock 
(1990) argues that postmodernist theories most often critique universalist viewpoints 
“without putting anything in their place” and finds postmodernism “dangerous” for 
marginalized groups (p. 159). 
A hodgepodge of other works attempt to sidestep or explain the debate. Harding 
and Hintikka’s (1983) collection Discovering Reality includes chapters on feminist 
epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science and methodology, all of which overlap. 
Chapters relevant to gender classification include Flax’s essay on how the patriarchy has 
infiltrated seemingly neutral knowledge claims, Fox Keller’s description of how 
scientific objectivity is equated with a masculine viewpoint and the consequent effect on 
gender identity, and Harding’s “Why has the Sex/Gender System Become Visible only 
Now?”, and an assortment of essays critiquing Aristotelian essentialism (cf. Spelman; 
Lange). In other works, Barker (1997) blames Aristotelian metaphysics for linking 
definition to essence. In other words, metaphysical definitions cannot be provisional, as 
the conditions outlined are immutable. She then argues for using discursivity rather than 
metaphysical definitions. Gilbert (2009) argues to “defeat bigenderism,” first describing 
how ingrained the two-gender system is, then defining different levels of application and 
demonstrating how value gets applied to masculine or feminine traits. Finally, she 
proposes several models of genderism ranging from “strict bigenderism” to an ideal, but 
likely unattainable, “non-genderism” that includes no gender demarcation or value 
judgments. Butler (1999) famously has argued for the theory of performativity—i.e. that 
gender is a performance, with certain constraints. She “sought to undermine any and all 
efforts to wield a discourse of truth to delegitimate minority gendered and sexual 
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practices” (p. 7). She writes that gender performativity is a type of “enactment,” and that 
“the ‘appearance’ of gender is often mistaken as a sign of its internal or inherent truth” 
(2009, p. i). The constraints are caused by the condition of “precarity,” or the physical 
danger that accompanies not submitting to societal gender roles (p. ii). Morris (1995) 
describes performativity’s effect on anthropology, as sexed bodies have gained the ability 
to be manipulated through surgery.  
Middle ways: Concept theory, discursivity, and positionality. 
The stifling nature of the essentialism/antiessentialism universal/postmodern 
debates led many scholars to seek a middle ground, either by reluctant acceptance, such 
as through “strategic essentialism” or by attempting to find ways around it, usually by 
changing the unit of analysis or by changing the concept of a concept. Scott (1988) 
argues that methodologically, historians should analyze “gender” discursively in order to 
recognize how much representation and culture are involved in shaping the “definition” 
of women. Though not without controversy, Scott helped transform women’s history 
from a study of demographic groups to studies of representation (Meyerowitz, 2008). 
Barker (1997) also argues that terms such as “woman” and “feminine” should be defined 
discursively, following the traditions of Foucault and Derrida rather than metaphysically, 
with the belief that it would minimize the essentialism debate. She argues that the link 
between definition and essence fuels the debate. Similarly, Haslanger (2000) asks to look 
at concepts first before deciding how something is defined. She suggests that terms 
should be defined pragmatically to meet political ends. Goldenberg (2007) argues that 
categories of sameness do not work when constructing gender categories. She proposes a 
“new categorical logic” that works from difference rather than sameness as dictated by 
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Aristotelian set theory. This would permit the category “woman” to be inclusive of the 
individualism and exceptionalism disallowed by essentialist constructs.  
Gender nominalism, which follows the tradition of Wittgenstein’s family 
resemblance, argues that an array of features exist that can signal “woman,” but none are 
necessary and sufficient to group membership (Spelman, 1988; Fisher, 1992; Hale, 1996; 
Davidson & Smith, 1999; Fox, 2011). In a different take, Alcoff (1988) praises de 
Lauretis’s method of interpreting gender through “concrete habits, practices, and 
discourses, while at the same time recognizing the fluidity of these” (p. 450). She 
believes feminine subjectivity should be understood in the moment and place it is 
construed, without generalizing from that instant. Rather than being associated with other 
women through a constellation of common traits, such as in gender nominalism, (which 
she overtly objects to), Alcoff believes “positionality,” or constantly shifting context, 
defines women. Women have influence on perceptions of them, and can work to change 
phallocentric constructions of women. She writes, "the position that women find 
themselves in can be actively utilized as a location for the construction of meaning, a 
place from where meaning is constructed, rather than simply the place where a meaning 
can be discovered (the meaning of femaleness)” (p. 452). Positionality is not the only 
theory to occupy the middle road between essentialism and nominalism. Other feminisms 
define gender as those who share common conditions, such as submission or oppression 
(MacKinnon, 1987; Haslanger, 2000) or reproductive capacity (Firestone, 1970, 
Landweer, 2005). 
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Conclusion 
As demonstrated above, copious research has been done in a multitude of fields 
on the concept of “woman.” Most are looking for a way to provide flexibility in the 
definition without losing the unifying structure that provides political power and 
protection, while others argue that the unifying structure causes oppression in the first 
place. This is all accomplished through tinkering with the metaphysical, legal, linguistic 
or cognitive impressions of gender. The epistemic uncertainty puts into question 
collectivity of women as a group, women’s knowledge or ways of knowing, and 
women’s relationship to men, individualism, and other concerns. Is it even possible for 
gender classification to retain “woman” as a unit of analysis, without being encumbered 
by centuries of baggage? Furthermore, should “woman” still exist as a unit of analysis 
given the diversity of sexes and genders increasingly being acknowledged and 
legitimated? The themes evident across the literature show that most often, gender 
classification is critiqued in terms of cognitive perception or metaphysics rather than in 
legal or formal classifications, unless referring to transgenderism.  
However, where theory ends, practice begins in knowledge organization. In 
knowledge organization, the paradigm is tipping, though has not fully shifted, toward a 
more postmodern approach. Thus far, the angle tends to be analytical rather than 
operational, following Hartsock’s (1990) estimation that postmodern theory is limited to 
critique rather than construction. Despite the increase in identified epistemic frameworks, 
much opportunity remains to both operationalize the theoretical discussions of 
epistemology and analyze the epistemology of existing KOS’s. The literature shows that 
while a range of epistemic stances has been explored, most often it remains just that: 
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exploration. The research tends to show, with rare exceptions, “one-hit wonder” works, 
with few or no others expanding on the original explorations. Little work involves user 
perceptions of classifications. In chapter 6, the perspective is reversed to identify and 
critique the epistemolog(ies) already at play, rather than finding a new lens through 
which to critique the existing classifications. The reactions, perceptions and treatment of 
passers-by on the street, co-workers, and family members are fundamental to how gender 
of any stripe is perceived and treated, and they work in tandem with formal, sanctioned 
classifications that are the apparatuses of law and the state to regulate behavior. Next, I 
will look critically at how these ingredients discursively interact to construct gender 
classifications. A description of the methodology appears in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
	  
The gaps in the knowledge organization literature and the tendency for gender studies 
research to linger in metaphysics show a need to examine the epistemology behind 
formal classifications of gender. Though trans and intersex literature focus on formal 
classifications, epistemology only occasionally gets evoked. Historically, marginalized 
groups have been left out of defining themselves and have been defined by others. 
Epistemic analysis exposes how much agency is allowed in the knowing subject and the 
known object. As mentioned previously, Hjørland (2010) endorses the analysis of various 
epistemic approaches behind specific classifications as a crucial research question for 
knowledge organization researchers, as it helps reveal whose perspective is being 
privileged in the generation of knowledge structures ultimately imposed upon others. 
Undercurrents of power tacitly lurk in classification, which have historically 
reflected the values and teleological force in the culture, discipline, or institution from 
which they originate. Foucault argues that resistance is a type of power. Gendered bodies, 
as known objects, can be loci of resistance for gender categories. Feminist, trans and 
intersex literature demonstrate resistance to the often unnamed “power” that places 
people, by gender, into categories. A perfect classification may be impossible, but a goal 
is to make the most useful classification that results in the least conceptual violence (Fox 
& Reece, 2012). And, as scholars such as Bowker & Star (1999), de la tierra (2008), 
Greenblatt (1990) and the authors of the large body of trans and intersex literature have 
pointed out, classifications, including library classifications, have very real consequences 
to those using them that can result in physical, legal, medical, social, or psychological 
ramifications. Thus, this part of the dissertation entails first the identification of epistemic 
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outlook and then the strengths and weaknesses of the identified approach and how they 
potentially contribute to the ramifications above. 
The methodological framework for this project is a critical theory approach. 
Critical theory is both a specific school of thought within the social sciences and a 
broader philosophical methodology. In its original iteration, the Critical Theorists were a 
1930’s era group of German scholars known as the Frankfurt School who believed that 
theory could not be derived independently from historical and social contexts. 
Furthermore, theories, as products of the researcher, must not attempt to profess 
“objectivity,” but rather acknowledge the subjectivity of the theory’s author. 
Methodologically, critical theory reflects the movement’s values by questioning power 
structures as manifested by language, texts or other discourses, in particular, the 
relationships between culture, economics and “psychic life” (Buchanan, 2010, pp. 100-
101).  
Critical theory, writ small, includes methodological attempts to hear the voices 
and individuality of oppressed or marginalized groups and to question why society has 
not achieved enlightenment and equality. The particular critical theory methodology 
applied in this project is an adaptation of Foucauldian genealogical discourse analysis, as 
it provides methods of examining how the concepts underlying classification are formed, 
which in turn can assist in detecting the underlying epistemological outlook. The results 
of the discursive analysis are then analyzed to identify the approximate epistemological 
methodology used to generate the knowledge expressed in the discourse. The 
methodology section is organized in the following way: First, fundamental terms are 
defined. Next, Foucault’s variety of genealogical discourse analysis is outlined along 
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with its appropriateness for this research as well as how the methodology used here 
departs from strict genealogical discourse analysis. Additionally, the selection of the 
relevant medical, psychological, and legal discursive domains is justified. Next, the 
criteria for identifying the selected discursive activity are laid out, along with specific 
questions asked of the discourse in order to glean clues to the epistemology underlying 
each. The limitations of the study are also included in this section. Finally, the selection 
of the gender classification system to be analyzed, the Dewey Decimal Classification, is 
justified in its relationship to the selected discursive domains.  
Epistemological Assumptions  
As noted above, a tenet of critical theory is to acknowledge the subjectivity of the 
author. I have taken fallibilism as an epistemological approach, as outlined by Hjørland 
(2013), which states that knowledge is comprised of “inevitable estimates,” and “that it 
should always be considered provisional” (p. 170). To be sure, just the idea that concepts 
are fallible indicates a particular epistemic outlook; however, without committing to that 
perspective, this project would be impossible. Another potential cause for concern is that 
conventional understandings of postmodernism assume the rejection of classification 
because they qualify as “grand narratives” of legitimation (Lyotard, 1984, p. 60). 
However, Lyotard means that legitimation “becomes plural, local, and immanent” and 
that feminists, trans, and intersex advocates need not reject macrostructures, but rather 
view them pragmatically and fallibilistically as well (Fraser & Nicholson, 1990, pp. 143-
144). In the stance taken here, classifications are teleological and provisional, no matter 
how much they are professed to “reflect reality.” This enables analysis of the 
classification as products of discursive activity. 
61	  
	  
	  
	  
Definition of Terms 
A number of terms must be defined in order to provide a consistent understanding 
and usage throughout. Since this project takes a historical approach, the meanings of 
specific terms drift, overlap and change in different time periods; in those cases, the 
meaning appropriate to that time period will be explicated. The first pair of terms that 
need to be defined are sex and gender, as they are commonly used synonymously but 
have specific meanings. “Sex,” generally defined by biological evidence, typically comes 
down to the existence of sex organs, chromosomal patterns, sex hormones, and other 
bodily markers that signal one sex or the other. Sex is usually presented as binary, fixed, 
and unquestionable, but the existence of intersex individuals with variant markers as well 
as medically- and -surgically treated transsexuals demonstrates diversity not captured by 
the available language. Therefore, West & Zimmerman’s (1987) definition of “sex” as “a 
determination made through the application of socially agreed upon biological data for 
classifying personas as female or male” (p. 127) because of the acknowledgement that the 
criteria for “male” or “female” are indeed socially established and change through time. 
However, to reflect people with varying biological markers, “or intersex” is added to that 
definition. Karkazis (2008) writes that the category of “intersex” only exists “because 
these bodies violate cultural rules about gender” (p. 5, emphasis in the original). 
 “Gender” typically refers to the socially-constructed characteristics, behaviors, 
and self-markers loosely or strictly associated with the sexes. “Gender identity” generally 
separates people into man or woman, masculine or feminine, using “gender symbols, 
such as clothing, body decoration, mannerism, gait, occupational choice, and sexual 
orientation” (Bullough, 2000, para. 11). The degree of restriction falls on a continuum. 
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“Loosely” can mean such characteristics as occupational choice (e.g. more women than 
men are nurses), and “strictly” can mean behaviors that are taboo but not impossible, 
such as men wearing dresses (it occurs, but is considered rebellious, comedic, or strange). 
Women reject gendered expectations from occupational choice to lifestyle choice (e.g. to 
not have children), and appearance. While most people’s gender identities correspond 
with their sex, trans people can identify with the opposite sex category, a combination, or 
no specific gender. Trans people can pursue hormone treatments or less commonly, 
surgical procedures, to achieve the physical markings of the opposite sex, but “live” with 
the gendered symbols that signal the opposite gender. Often definitions of gender tend to 
use language indicating coercive measures such as “imposed,” but the increased—but 
still limited—agency involved in gender identity formation in contemporary western 
society should still be acknowledged.  
Children still are subjected to gendered “boxes” starting from birth, and 
discrimination and violence still exist based on pervasive stereotypes, and there is no 
denying these systems of control exist. For example, boys who wish to play with dolls or 
exhibit stereotypically feminine behavior can be teased, humiliated, actively discouraged, 
or even hurt. However, greater agency exists now to express gender in a way that 
diminishes the pervasiveness and rigidity of traditional conceptions of binary gender. As 
Meadow (2010) puts it, the trans phenomenon invites an opportunity to rethink how sex 
and gender have been considered in feminist thought (p. 819). For men and women who 
do identify strictly with their biological sex, gendered expectations can box them into 
certain behaviors as well as expose them to discrimination, both insidious and violent. 
While this increased agency exists and is beginning to be reinforced through the media, 
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academia, law, and popular culture, each person’s individual context, including all the 
broader ingredients, is what influences their decisions of how they express gender. 
Though women and transgendered people have suffered greatly from pervasive gender 
stereotypes, all genders can experience and benefit from liberation. As Talbot (2013) put 
it, “One can, after all, be a man who doesn’t like to work out or play Xbox” (p. 65).  
Regardless of gender expression, physical sex should not be ignored. Dreger 
(1998a) reminds us that knowing one’s own sex organs is medically important because of 
risk of disease. Furthermore, appearing “postfeminist” is also dangerous because, as 
Bornstein (1994) writes, the danger of a completely humanist philosophy is that it ignores 
that the “vast majority of the world buys into [the two-gender system],” and the women’s 
movement “must take global priority;” however, whatever work can be done to dismantle 
the two-gender system should be taken when it can (p. 245). Butler (1999), too, worries 
that feminist theorists “ought to be careful not to idealize certain expressions of gender 
that, in turn, produce new forms of hierarchy and exclusion” (p. viii). In other words, 
feminism needs to continue fighting for equity without marginalizing ambiguous, 
dynamic or neutral expressions of gender. Meadow (2010) writes that though “individual 
transgender people…bear the burden of gender’s impenetrability, there are central 
feminist concerns at stake in these determinations” (p. 815), and we must be conscious of 
the consequences. 
Foucauldian Discourse Analysis  
 “Discourse analysis” can describe any number of analytical strategies, and in 
Foucault’s work alone he describes archaeological, genealogical, self-technology analysis 
and dispositive analysis. A modified version of Foucault’s genealogical discourse 
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analysis is adopted for this project. Foucauldian discourse analysis differs from critical 
discourse analysis in that it analyzes larger units of discourse rather than only sentences 
or words because Foucault believes that discourse encompasses more than just text-based 
entities. Budd and Raber (1995) agree in that “discourse analysis is not concerned with 
minute linguistic entities, but with larger units that have meaning, especially in a 
particular context” (p. 217). They describe discourse analysis more broadly in its 
application to LIS, but it relates to Foucault’s version. The methodology below has been 
described in Martinez-Avila & Fox (in press). 
Foucault argued that social critique of a subject can be masked by pre-existing, 
motifs or “themes.” In other words, a subject is considered an external, transcendent 
“thing” that “evolves” through time. However, this structure obscures the moment-by-
moment treatment of the subject because it instead is constantly being related to the 
broader notion rather than in its individuality. To Foucault (1972), such grouping into a 
“subject” eliminates individualism and context of any given entity, object or event, 
rendering it impossible to analyze, as the individual instances meld into a whole, 
transforming it and losing its impact. More specifically, discourses transform the 
“permanence and uniqueness of an object as on the space in which it emerges” (p. 32). 
Foucault (1972) devised archaeological discourse analysis to counteract the thematic 
nature of historical research, where subjects are examined specifically in a time period, 
but not with evolving, transcendent meaning. His concept of “epistemes” or “discursive 
formations” describes paradigm-like knowledge formations that result in differing 
conceptualizations between time periods, but discretely, not as part of an overarching 
historical trend. The meeting of discourses defines the object and the perception of it 
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based on specific moments in time. This method, which he called “archaeology,” worked 
on a comparative rather than analytical level. Recognizing this limitation when he wrote 
History of Madness, he developed a more analytical approach that sought to recognize 
not just differences between discursive formations, but also the underlying epistemic 
reasoning or why subjects were conceptualized the way they are. To resolve this, he 
devised “genealogical” discourse analysis to show how and why historical events impact 
conceptualizations in their moments. 
Genealogical Discourse Analysis 
This project adopts a modified version of genealogical discourse analysis. In what 
he calls “genealogy,” instead of following the progress of a transcendent “subject,” 
Foucault (1977a) analyzes discourse to recognize the forces shaping the concept in its 
specific historical moment. In other words, no transcendent, constant concept of gender 
floats outside of the messiness of history, but rather, the concept is formed, pulled and 
shaped in the mire of history, affected by individual events and actions occurring within 
the immediate moments. Genealogy is not “fabricating a subject that evolves through the 
course of history,” but rather an examination of the discourse that “account[s] for the 
constitution of the subject…without having to make reference to a subject which is either 
transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout 
the course of history” (p. 117). Foucault (1981) describes how “the genealogical 
portion…applies to the series where discourse is effectively formed; it tries to grasp it in 
its power of affirmation, by which I mean not so much a power which would be opposed 
to that of denying, but rather the power to constitute domains of objects” (p. 73). He 
examines how discourses construct subjects rather than how they suppress them. 
Methodologically, archaeological and genealogical discourse analyses are similar, but the 
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genealogical amendments include a more purposeful investigation of the power that 
underlies the epistemology, rather than mere description. Budd (2001) warns that with 
discourse analysis, “there is seldom a neat, clean, straight line” (p. 13), and this is 
precisely what Foucault intended to reveal. 
Accordingly, this project examines how sex and gender classification in the DDC 
and legal and medical meta-narrative definitions of sex and gender were formed and 
epistemically justified. In other words, the subjects of sex and gender are considered 
defined by what the legal and medical discourse says they are at specific moments in time, 
and the following analysis attempts to reveal why these concepts are formed the way they 
are. The epistemic justification and relationship to power are what distinguish it from 
archaeological discourse analysis. Foucault (1978) writes that discourse analysis is meant 
to “discover who does the speaking, the positions and viewpoints from which they speak, 
the institutions which prompt people to speak about it and which store and distribute the 
things that are said” (p. 11). Power “doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no, but 
that it traverses and produces things” such as concept definitions and even pleasure 
(Foucault, 1977a, p. 119). In terms of classifications, Martinez-Avila (2012) writes that 
Foucauldian genealogical discourse analysis can “reveal the perspective, assumptions and 
goals that drive the organization of concepts and the development of knowledge 
organization systems through the analysis of the continuities/discontinuities in the 
relations of concepts and practices” (p. 108). The project examines how these discourses 
create concepts and how they do or do not support the existing hegemony through 
classification practices.  
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Foucault (1977b) describes discursive practices as those “embodied in technical 
processes, in institutions, in patterns for general behavior, in forms for transmission and 
diffusion, and in pedagogical forms which, at once, impose and maintain them” (p. 200). 
The power reveals itself in immediate, local microstructures, in the “daily struggles at the 
grass roots level…where the concrete nature of power became visible.” Though these 
individual, microlocations have “fairly limited importance” they “are undoubtedly 
essential to the general functioning of the wheels of power” (p. 116). In other words, no 
puppetmaster pulls the strings of power; instead, power “is rooted in a whole series of 
multiple and indefinite power relations that supply the necessary basis for the great 
negative forms of power” (p. 122). Thus, the concepts of a domain are comprised by this 
interplay of discursive activity.   
Sex and gender classification fits well with genealogical discourse analysis 
because the “subjects” of sex and gender are constituted by the classifications and the 
associated discourse, and also eschew clean, straight lines. Scott (1988) and Barker 
(1997) ask that gender be defined discursively so that it can reflect the historical moment 
and not be burdened by history or constructions of biology. The concepts of sex and 
gender, and ultimately those who are assigned a gender, are subject to the interplay of 
discourses and rules surrounding that object. The library catalog constitutes one of the 
microlocations that weave with other institutions’ discursive activities, and thus must be 
examined for assumptions embedded in classificatory procedures that intentionally or 
unintentionally or accidentally marginalize specific human groups or discourses. If 
systems intentionally or unintentionally favor the language or interests of the omnipotent 
ruling class, “hide” or make judgments about material that potentially threatens the status 
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quo, the system is not fulfilling its objective. Foucault (1981) writes that one of the 
systems of power attempts to “assimilate the others both in order to modify them and to 
provide them with a foundation” (p. 56). The two-gender system disciplines people to 
tailor behavior, suitable or not, to fit the pigeonholes of masculine and feminine.  
LIS researchers that have recommended discourse analysis include Frohmann 
(1992; 1994a) Budd & Raber (1995), Budd (2001, 2006), and Martinez-Avila (2012). 
Frohmann (1994c) uses discourse analysis to analyze how marketing tools can create 
consumer profiles, well before the “big data” trend, describing how these profiles “do not 
derive from self-reflexive acts of individual egos, but from traces of behaviour pertinent 
to the apparatuses of consumer and state surveillances” (p. 9). Frohmann (1994b; 1997) 
also conducts a discourse analysis on the writings of Melvil Dewey that reveal 
inconsistencies between his technocratic impulses and his inclination toward high culture. 
Additionally, Olson (1999b) employs it to “identifying and questioning underlying 
presumptions that operate to construct our realities.” These assumptions are “taken for 
granted as acceptable” (p. 66). She believes that classifications are also a product of 
discourse. 
Discourse 
Though discourse typically is thought of as communication, both through text or 
utterances, it can also include images and the thematic subtexts or “rules” issued through 
institutions, formally or informally. Foucault (1972) calls those who are entitled to speak 
“enunciative modalities,” which can include not only individuals, but also institutions or 
texts. Foucault (1981) believes these modalities control and reinforce how discourse is 
produced, “to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable 
materiality” (Foucault, 1981, p. 52). The purpose is to limit the threat of “others” who 
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may potentially reduce the power of those in charge. Budd & Raber (1995) call the 
implied subtext or “rules” the “implicature,” which may not be expressed directly, but 
which can indicate ideology or worldview (p. 219). Along with directly stated and 
indirectly stated discourse, silence also holds meaning. Foucault (1978) writes, “Silence 
itself—the things one declines to say, or is forbidden to name the discretion that is 
required between different speakers—is less the absolute limit of discourse…than an 
element that functions alongside the things said,” and the purpose is to “determine the 
different ways of not saying such things, how those who can and those who cannot speak 
of them are distributed, which type of discourse is authorized, or which form of discretion 
is required in either case” (p. 27). Martinez-Avila (2012) also recommends examining the 
silences: “Exclusions of any type—concepts, users, cultures and more—that are created 
with the choice of order and control strategies are all subject to the same critical process” 
(p. 108). Adler & Tennis (2013) describe “erasure” as omission, but “with greater 
purposiveness” that “requires a restoring or recovering” (p. 269). Nye (1998) describes 
the forces that influence transgender identity as dimorphically-rigid language, the 
medical establishment, the legal system, and the popular media. Of those discursive 
realms, medical and legal discourses are systematically analyzed, as described below.  
 Classification and Discourse Analysis. 
To avoid discourse analysis being misused by positivists, Foucault never precisely 
prescribed it. This provides some methodological freedom. Hjørland (2013) writes that 
“ontological theory commits us to identifying and classifying a number of phenomena in 
a specific way—and vice versa; a listing and classification of a number of phenomena 
may reveal the theoretical outlook of its creator (‘show me your classification and I’ll tell 
you what theory you subscribe to’)” (p. 171). With gender, however, despite the 
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ontological evidence, it is likely that any given selection of classifications may have two 
options: “men” and “women,” and possibly, “transgender” or “other.” Consequently, the 
discourse itself will have to be interrogated in order to detect that particular theoretical 
outlook.  
The methodology here follows the notion of the discursive construction of 
concepts or subjects at specific moments in time; however, it departs from strict 
genealogical discourse analysis by providing historical connections relating to the 
development of the concepts of sex and gender that occurred between each timeframe. 
This is presented as the “social context” for each timeframe and provides historical 
events in gender and sex research or social or political events outside of the specific 
medical, legal and bibliographic discourses and leading up to the timeframe. Though the 
timeframes should be presented discretely if adhering strictly to genealogical discourse 
analysis, I felt that the landscape of other discourses were also helpful for seeing a wider 
view beyond the medical and legal discourse. Additionally, the standard practices or 
notions of sex and gender resulted from breakthroughs or events that occurred outside the 
particular timeframes here, and without an explanation would be confusing. 
This project only examines formal classifications, not cognitive perceptions of 
gender. Formal classification affords or denies people legal rights, which ideally lead to 
legitimation and ultimately wider social acceptance. The classifications themselves will 
be a type of text for examination, as will be the associated documentation that includes 
justification of decisions within that particular classification.  For each edition of the 
DDC examined, the epistemic values are sought for the classificationist body, as the 
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epistemology is projected by the classificationist, not the classifier or cataloger (although 
they can be complicit), user group of the classification, or the group being classified.  
Epistemology in classification can be detected in a few ways. Classifications are 
comprised of concepts and the relationships between them, and the way concepts are 
defined can reveal an epistemic stance (Hjørland, 2009). Lakoff (1983) says, “To change 
the concept of a category itself is to change our understanding of the world” (p. 9, 
emphasis in original). In linguistics, a similar structural relationship exists between 
langue (vocabulary) and parole (rules of grammar), which Budd & Raber (1995) see as 
discursive indicators of meaning in a text. Both aspects will be considered, using Code’s 
(1995) concept of rhetorical space (explained in more detail below), in determining the 
epistemic treatment of sex and gender as objects.  
As a tool for maintaining power, classifications are products of a wider cross-
section of discourses that dictate ideas of truth (Foucault, 1981). Therefore, the available 
discourse will be considered with two sets of questions, one set concerning internal 
procedures and the other on the external discourses. The “internal” discourse includes the 
DDC and its associated discourse: the text of the classification as well as scope note, 
introductory material, or any other textus found in the pages. A limited amount of related 
discourse is discussed, such as reviews of the system and Dewey’s other writing but the 
focus remains most intent on the DDC itself. The external discourse, which is described 
in more detail below, includes primary and secondary legal and medical texts. The 
answers to questions posed are documented and mapped to the epistemic stances listed 
above or that have been identified elsewhere in academic literature. However, I 
acknowledge that epistemic stances, too, are a classified human invention, and thus a 
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pure and exact match to a particular articulated stance is unlikely. Rather, the professed 
and enacted epistemologies may share characteristics with several articulated stances.  
Classification for Analysis 
Dewey Decimal Classification 
As the story famously goes, during a “long sermon” one Sunday in 1873, twenty-
one year old college student and library assistant Melvil Dewey puzzled over some 
problems with his nascent library classification scheme. He recalled, “the solution flasht 
over me so that I jumpt in my seat and came very near shouting ‘Eureka!’” (cited in 
Wiegand, 1996, p. 21). The scheme dreamt up during that sermon appeared in 1876 and 
went on to become “the world’s most widely used classification scheme,” the Dewey 
Decimal Classification (DDC). Over the years, the DDC has offered abridged versions, 
summaries, and expanded packages and a constantly-updated electronic version, 
WebDewey. DDC was overseen by Dewey until he died in 1931, but had other editors 
starting with the fourth edition in 1891. It has been published by The Library Bureau, the 
non-profit Lake Placid Club Educational Foundation and eventually Forest Press, which 
was bought by OCLC, the library services vendor, in 1988. With it came an association 
with WorldCat, the union catalog, as well as Connexion, a package of cataloging tools. 
All publishers have maintained the tradition of Melvil Dewey’s fierce protectionism of 
the system.  
The DDC was chosen for several reasons. As the most widely-used bibliographic 
classification scheme in the world, the DDC has had an oversized influence in library 
classification. According to recent promotional materials, the DDC “has been translated 
into 30+ languages and is currently used by libraries in 138 countries” (OCLC, n.d., p. 2). 
It also formed the basis of the Universal Decimal Classification (UDC) shortly after the 
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turn of the century; though their paths have diverged since. Additionally, a great deal of 
internal discourse surrounds the DDC, whether historically through the comments of 
Melvil Dewey himself or the editors or more recently through the Dewey Blog, as well as 
prodigious external commentary and critique by scholars and practitioners, including 
Frohmann’s (1994b, 1997) discursive analyses of Dewey’s writings. This facilitates 
analysis of decision-making by the editorial team. Finally, like most institutions, it has an 
uneven history with the concept of “woman,” which will be explicated in the following 
chapter.  
The editions examined were selected because in each a major change occurred in 
the way the concepts of sex and gender were classified. It is important to note that 
throughout the DDC sex and gender are treated synonymously and use the word “women” 
(which indicates gender), but under the class of “the sexes.”  As part of genealogy, 
Foucault is interested in moments of transition, and each edition represents a shift in the 
classification of women. As discourse changes externally, as does the classification, 
which enables analysis of the “ontogeny” of the subject, or what Tennis (2007, 2012b) 
calls, “the life of the subject over time.” This research asks whether the classification 
changes align with the external discursive changes. The chosen editions are the 1876 first 
edition, which was the brainchild of Dewey himself; the 1885 second edition, where the 
category “women” first appeared; the 1965 seventeenth edition, when men gained a 
category and sex became a social grouping; and the nineteenth edition of 1979 when 
moved again within social groups. The current edition, the twenty-third from 2011, is 
briefly mentioned to provide a contrast to how sex and gender are categorized today; 
however, it will not be fully analyzed. Though the concepts of intersex and transgender 
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are also analyzed, the editions were selected based on the ontogeny of the concept of 
woman.  
Internal Procedures. The following areas are used as guidelines to scrutinize the 
“internal procedures” found in the DDC and associated discourse: 
Establishment of authority/subjectivity. How does the discourse implicitly or 
explicitly establish the authority—the “enunciative modalities”—on the concepts of sex 
and gender? Is it “transcendental criteriology” or that which is established exteriorly 
(Kearney, 2004, p. 169), or does the subject have some authority in the definition or 
creation of the classification? Who are the experts, and how do they “know?” Foucault 
(1972) asks, “who is speaking?...Who derives from it his own special quality, his prestige, 
and from whom, in return, does he receive if not the assurance, at least the presumption 
that what he says is true?” (p. 50). If the classification is meant for a wider audience 
rather than a specific domain, Hjørland (2013) asks, “why should one particular authority 
be chosen without argument?...When an authority is chosen, the classifier has made an 
important choice among the different competing views in the field. Therefore a 
classification cannot be neutral” (p. 170). This is preceded by the classificationist, also 
choosing an authority from which to make ontological decisions in the classification 
structure. 
Any statement of neutrality would also be an indicator of epistemic stance. As 
Code (1991) explains, epistemology is usually thought of in terms of “S knows that p,” 
yet “The questions ‘Who is S?’ is regarded neither as legitimate nor as relevant in these 
endeavors” and that it is commonly assumed that legitimacy comes with “certain 
standards of purity” (p. 2, emphasis Code’s). By “purity” Code means that the knowledge 
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is unsullied by individual experience or politics. Experience or politics can also be 
domain or group-specific.  
“Necessary and sufficient conditions” for concepts. Concepts are typically 
thought of in terms of set theory, with a combination of “necessary and sufficient” 
conditions that serve as minimum qualifications for inclusion in the set. Are the necessary 
and sufficient conditions metaphysically rigid or graded? Are social or contextual details 
included or is the definition epistemically “pure?” Are definitions based on 
Wittgensteinian “family resemblance,” or Platonic universal forms? Are objects 
considered real “things” or linguistic entities? Hierarchical force in a classification 
typically indicates these conditions. 
Rhetorical space. As mentioned above, Budd and Raber (1995) recommend 
examining both langue and parole in analyzing discourse. Code’s (1995) concept of 
“rhetorical space” accomplishes this task. Fox (2012c) writes that classifying “constitutes 
a rhetorical act that explicates an intentional or unintentional power strategy of the 
classification scheme’s editors as perpetuators of the dominant culture” (p. 59). The 
topics surrounding each subject within a larger class create a space that can dictate 
perceptions of that topic. To Code (1995), a rhetorical space is “locations whose (tacit, 
rarely spoken) territorial imperatives structure and limit the kinds of utterances that can 
be voiced within them…with an expectation of being heard, understood, taken seriously 
(p. ix). In these spaces, “it matters who is speaking and where and why, and where such 
mattering bears directly upon the possibility of knowledge claims, moral pronouncements, 
descriptions of “reality” achieving acknowledgement (p. x). The names and definitions of 
concepts and how they relate to each other can indicate power relationships. Olson (2007) 
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operationalizes the idea of rhetorical space by setting the following questions to help 
determine how the topic is being treated within the structure of the classification:  
• What other topics share the class number? Do the allied or related topics 
devalue others in the same category? 
• How is the class described in the scope notes?  
• What is the hierarchical context? Is it higher or lower in a hierarchy? 
• What other topics are adjacent to the topic? (p. 246). 
Olson’s use addresses the parole of classification; however, rhetorical space can also be 
applied to langue. For example, how is the gender category “other” considered when 
referring to trans people? The categories of oppression discussed in Chapter 1, including 
those of Frye (1983), Young (1990), Olson & Schlegl (2001), and Adler & Tennis (2013) 
are included here. 
Code asks how knowledge is created and by what authority, and how that authority 
allows or silences others. Code refers generally to classification as a method of naming 
knowledge, but the issues she identifies are relevant to library classification. By 
attempting to represent knowledge, name new knowledge or rename or reposition 
existing knowledge, a classification system appropriates the voice of the authority. A 
classification, by definition, categorizes by objectification, but where a concept is placed, 
the relationships with neighboring concepts and the name it is given allow respect to be 
shown or denied. Whose knowledge is it? In Code’s view, editors and editorial boards of 
classification schemes are moral actors who have a responsibility to have empathy for the 
people and concepts they name (Fox, 2012c). Users of the library who do not share the 
vocabulary or conceptualization of themselves, or topics for which they are searching, 
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will adopt the language and rhetoric of the system. Olson (1996) considers classification 
to be a “mapping of recorded knowledge” that “determines positionality,” a concern of 
feminist scholars (pp. 303-304). The rhetorical space gains importance in a classificatory 
text because of its influence on how users create their own knowledge structures. 
Classification systems dictate how concepts are represented, and users of the library who 
do not share the vocabulary or conceptualization of themselves or topics for which they 
are searching will adopt the language and rhetoric of the system. 
Fallibilism and universality. As mentioned above, Hjørland (2013) endorses the 
doctrine of fallibilism, which considers scientific knowledge “inevitable estimates,” and 
“that it should always be considered provisional” (p. 170). Furthermore, Hjørland (2009) 
concludes that knowledge organization systems should not attempt universality, but 
rather be “linked to different discourses and interests” (p. 1529). He sees concepts as 
placeholders that help stabilize meaning, so that there is common ground on which to act 
and communicate, even though concepts may have differing meanings within different 
domains. Does the discourse show that the classification is rigid or meant to be applied 
across all domains regardless of context? Does a feedback method exist to imply 
fallibility? Do the classification’s constructions of gender suggest determinism for the 
members of the category or allow individualism? 
Ontological considerations. Philosophically, ontology is the study of what “is” or 
what “exists.” Ontology manifests itself in classification by how it is linked to what it is 
classifying. Does it deviate from what “is” in the “collection” (such as by ignoring 
literary warrant), or does it define concepts in a particular way that reveals a bias toward 
or against that concept? As an example, in response to A.C. Foskett’s claim that 
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classifications reflect the biases of the time, a representative of the Library of Congress 
insisted in 1972 that classificationists “did not establish usage” but rather, classifications 
merely reflect knowledge as society defines it (Wolf, 1972, p. 41). In this statement, the 
Library of Congress takes a Foucauldian view of how concepts are formed, but then 
relinquishes its own responsibility in shaping ontology, effectively blaming society. 
Classifications are created for specific domains, and Smiraglia (2012b), writes that a 
domain is “a group with a coherent ontology, which implies also a shared epistemology” 
(p. 111). Is the classification based on literary or some other warrant of a specific domain, 
or is meant to be general and thus applied universally? Does the classification establish 
the vocabulary externally or take it from the language of those being classified? 
Beghtol’s (1986b) classic definition establishes bibliographic warrant as the “authority a 
classification invokes first to justify and subsequently to verify decisions about what 
classes/concepts to include in the system, in what order classes/concepts should appear in 
the schedules, what units classes/concepts are divided into, how far subdivision should 
proceed, how much and where synthesis is available, whether citation order are static or 
variable and similar questions” (p. 110). All of these considerations are ontological in 
nature and in application.   
Literary warrant is determined through searches in WorldCat for the relevant 
topics in English, limited to English as the language of the cataloger, during the specified 
timeframes, as well as through the use of Google Books’ Ngram Viewer, which traces the 
appearance of particular terms or phrases in its corpus (https://books.google.com/ngrams). 
These are used to establish trends and estimates in warrant rather than exact numbers of 
items. A precise total would be difficult and likely inaccurate because of repetition of 
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records in WorldCat, multiple meanings of search terms (for example, literature on 
“hermaphrodites” can refer to humans or animals), and that Ngram only refers to textual 
literature that has been scanned and appear in Google Books. 
Ultimately, these criteria were chosen to help determine who has the power to 
speak, what they are saying, in what way they are saying it, on what basis they are saying 
it, and whether they believe it to be true or provisional. These five criteria seem to most 
efficiently encompass the basic concerns of an epistemic outlook. To further match the 
findings of the criteria above to specific, named epistemic stances, Hjørland’s (2002) and 
Hjørland & Hartel’s (2003) summaries of the values of schools of epistemic thought are 
used as a starting point. 
External Discourse. Following Foucault, the external discourse occurring at the 
point in time where the classification exists is examined for prevailing metanarrative.  
Prevailing metanarrative. Frohmann (1992) rightly points out that discourse 
analysis is not a search for “truth,” but rather a search for the existence of discourses that 
shape the way ideas are discussed, or what Foucault (1972) calls the “major narratives” 
(p. 267). Since the turn toward “truth” that occurred as Plato and Aristotle dismissed the 
sophistic notion of multiple truths, society tended toward “major narratives, which are 
recounted, repeated, and varied; formulae, texts, and ritualized sets of discourses” 
(Foucault, 1981, p. 56). What overarching metanarrative exists regarding sex and gender 
at the point in time of the classification’s existence, and does it align with the 
classification? This “will to truth” is supported by institutions, including pedagogy, “the 
system of books, publishing, libraries; learned societies in the past and laboratories now. 
But it is also renewed, no doubt more profoundly, by the way in which knowledge is put 
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to work, valorized, distributed, and in a sense attributed, in a society” (Foucault, 1981, p. 
55). The commentary and major narratives make up “the whole framework of knowledge 
through which we decipher” speech (p. 54).  It can include individual apparatus as 
“speech-acts…religious or juridical texts…literary…and scientific texts” (p. 56). Lyotard 
(1984) was skeptical of Foucault’s notion of meta-narrative, defining “postmodern as 
incredulity toward meta-narratives” (p. xxiv, emphasis in the original). But Foucault 
sought to determine what episteme was at play in any particular time to show how it 
impacted conceptualizations. This can be additionally construed through relevant mass 
media, commercial depictions, and popular culture signals. Though such institutions as 
media and religion certainly influence societal attitudes as part of the “interplay of rules,” 
relevant discourse from those areas is only included to provide context or when it directly 
relates to a medical or legal decision.  
Additionally, it is important to acknowledge the connection between methodology 
and epistemology. The methodological approach to ontologically defining sex and gender 
holds clues to epistemology in that it shows the legitimacy in “how” knowledge is 
determined before evaluating the actual products of its definition. As Kleineberg (2013) 
argues, the “ontological dimension should be seen as inextricably interwoven with the 
epistemological (including methodological) dimension” (p. 341). The methodology is 
related to the process of knowing and is revealed by what type of ontological evidence is 
deemed credible or valuable (e.g. logic, induction, observation, etc.), who is the authority 
(e.g. researcher, subject, outside authority, etc.), the fallibility of the authority, and for 
humans, the degree of subjectivity granted the object. The methodology identifies how 
that classificationist, physician or judge came to decide what criteria were used to define 
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sex and gender and any other concept. A related concern to address is that of professed 
and enacted epistemic beliefs. Professed epistemology is compared to actual 
epistemology, as the values of the domain in theory can differ in practice, particularly 
with the lens of history to make that more clear. In other words, particular disciplines 
may hold an epistemic ideal, but what is actually espoused in observed practice may 
differ greatly (Louca, et al., 2004, p. 59). Here, that observed practice is the discursive 
analysis. 
Medical metanarrative. Medical knowledge encompasses classification, causal, 
experimental, theoretical, practical, and clinical, with a general definition of knowledge 
as “justified true beliefs.” Here the focus will be on classificatory knowledge and its 
relationship to clinical knowledge. Unlike the physical sciences, which seek to create 
generalized laws, medicine focuses on deviations such as disease and abnormality 
(Kimsma, 1990, p. 45). Medicine, however, focused mostly on physical traits, and thus 
avoided “defining” women’s gender characteristics except in cases of intersexuality or as 
non-clinical discourse, discussing why women are not suited to be physicians. Though 
within the field, medical epistemology is a necessary but unexamined concept, scientific 
knowledge has been evaluated by philosophers (e.g. Kuhn, Popper, Kant, Foucault, etc.) 
more than medical professionals (Roex & Degryse, 2007). 
Because of significant influence and overlap with psychology and sexology, the term 
“medical” here is expanded to encompass discourse in those disciplines insofar as they 
contribute to clinical definitions and decisions. Psychology generally began to be taken 
seriously as a science in the mid-century and became a crucial element of sex 
determination (Reis, 2009, p. xiii). Ashcroft (2004) argues that a major problem for 
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clinical knowledge is the positioning of medicine “as an autonomous science, (as 
opposed to a collection of knowledge drawn from diverse more basic sciences)” and that 
medicine’s knowledge claims occur within “a web of theoretical and empirical 
commitments” (p. 133). Meadow (2010) notes that medical categorizations of sex are just 
as contested as legal configurations and are consequently historically dynamic (p. 816). 
What does the medical establishment consider the biological psychological underpinning 
of gender and sex roles? Though mostly descriptive, Gray’s Anatomy represents a current 
level of understanding of anatomy and occasionally betrays a hint at social influences. 
What physical or psychological characteristics are associated with the sexes, and in 
particular, when gender or sex is contested? 
Gray’s, as a textbook, presents normative representations of sex. However, when 
sex is unclear or conflated with gender, the medical establishment is forced to “define” 
the characteristics of each sex. In terms of treating intersex newborns, Fausto-Sterling 
(2000) describes how medical practice varies widely, depending on the training of the 
physician and the beliefs held, as “No national or international standards govern the types 
of intervention that may be used” (p. 48). Thus, the most useful discourse in this regard 
are those that discuss cases of intersexuality or transsexuality. Meta-analyses of intersex, 
transsexual, and transgender history were found in Dreger (1998a), Fausto-Sterling 
(2000), Meyerowitz (2002), Hester (2004), Karkazis (2008), Greenberg (2012), and 
others that provided historical perspective for Western medical conceptions of sex in 
contested bodies. These sources were used to identify the medical metanarrative as well 
as to direct to primary sources for closer examination. Finally, it is important to note that 
the discourse describing sex and gender tended to be on the edge of a research front. 
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Legal metanarrative. What is the legal status of sexes, and variant and non-
conforming people in the United States? Legal status only partially means the rights and 
recognition that are afforded women, men, trans or intersex at the time of the 
classification’s creation or revision through statutory law or through the courts. Rights 
that are recognized based on sex require that the courts in cases of dispute define sex, 
such as with trans or intersex people. More importantly, gendered justification for the 
rights or lack of rights that reveal the reasoning behind the decisions provides clues to 
epistemic stance. For example, “natural” characteristics of women were used to justify 
exclusion from contracts and consequently property-owning, which funnels down to 
voting rights.  
The major legal sources used include a variety of law dictionaries and medical 
jurisprudence texts created and revised during the selected timeframes, as well as case 
law and legal codes relating to sex and gender. Each dictionary definition contains 
references to the case law or statutory law the definition is derived from, along with 
telltale editorializing. Black’s Law Dictionary, now in its ninth edition, is the definitive 
dictionary of American law, but the first edition was published in 1891, after the 
timeframe had passed. Consequently, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary’s fourteenth edition 
(1870-1871) was used for the first timeframe, and other editions were used as a 
comparison for the other timeframes, although Black’s from mid-century is the most 
commonly used dictionary in the field, cited by the attorneys, legislators, and the judicial, 
including the United States Supreme Court.  
Though the medical metanarrative can be separated from the legal narrative, 
extricating the medical from the legal proves more difficult in gender-related cases. In 
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litigation involving women identifying as women, medical input usually is downplayed in 
favor of what is perceived to be “natural” and within the experience of those making the 
decisions. For those definitions, legal dictionaries help summarize the current legal 
thinking on those topics. However, in cases of gender variance or non-conforming gender, 
the medical input becomes central. Thus, the following chapter combines the two, using 
medical jurisprudence texts, which offer guidance to attorneys in the medical aspects of 
their cases and relate somewhat to what we would call forensic investigation now. Dean 
(1866) defines “medical jurisprudence” as “that science which teaches the application of 
practices and principles of Medicine to the elucidation and settlement of doubtful 
questions arising for investigations in courts of law” and relies heavily on earlier medical 
jurisprudence texts for descriptions of different cases (p. 1). Typically these texts include 
chapters on toxicology, wounds, rape (usually regarding conception disputes), impotence 
and sterility (for divorce cases) and other medical issues that wind up in the center of 
litigation. Medical jurisprudence texts and legal dictionaries are considered secondary 
sources, as they do not serve as precedents; they are only persuasive and not definitive. 
However, their purpose is to provide an overarching sense of a law, which corresponds 
with the purpose here of seeking a metanarrative. 
Limitations 
The limitations of this methodology relate to the limits of discursive analysis and 
the epistemic evaluation. The looseness of discourse analysis constitutes both its 
strengths and limits as a methodology. However, Foucault’s views change throughout his 
work and he makes a point in particular not to be prescriptive. Thus a certain license is 
taken with discourse analysis that serves the purposes of the project. Moreover, discourse, 
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by nature, is messy and presents in many forms. Consequently, any attempt to quantify or 
limit it fundamentally violates the notion of discursive analysis. Additionally, drawing 
conclusions for the discourse results in codification of it, which then, despite best 
intentions, results in a “grand narrative” of which Lyotard and others criticize.  
As for the epistemic evaluation, another limitation is that epistemology usually is 
discussed or recommended in an ideal form.  Interpreting its operationalized form is 
difficult because people sometimes, but not always are thinking of preserving the purity 
of their knowledge creation. Philosophers who have defined various epistemic stances 
define them in terms of ideals: in other words, they describe stances as they believe they 
ought to be or how humans should strive to them; however, in reality, enacted 
epistemologies do not follow these idealized version, or do so for perverse motives, as 
people acting in their own self-interests and adjust their epistemology to support them. 
This leads down the philosophical rabbit hole of ethics and explanations for moral 
(human-inflicted) evils in the world. It is of course acknowledged that epistemic stance is 
not uniform across every member of a discipline; the intention is to attempt to recognize 
dominant approaches to knowledge creation about gender. Epistemic stances are nuanced, 
conflicted, and thus necessarily reductive main principles will be presented, as a detailed 
history of the origins of any given stance is beyond the scope of the project. 
Conclusion 
For Foucault, the concept of “resistance” is crucial to the understanding of power. 
In order for power to be evident, resistance must occur. The vast amount of academic and 
popular discourse on gender demonstrates that some sort of power is being resisted. 
However, in Foucault’s (1977) view, no overarching, monolithic “power” exists pulling 
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the puppet strings, but rather a multitude of discursive apparatuses interacting to limit by 
defining. This project is needed in order to single out small apparatuses of power for 
analysis. In my specific context, classifications are the apparatuses of power, “linked in a 
circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain” them” (p. 133), or the 
DDC serves as an apparatus, with the legal and medical discourse partially sustaining it. 
Foucauldian discourse analysis is an appropriate research methodology for investigating 
both gender and classification. The elimination of standing assumptions about women, 
men, binary or even multiple gender or sex, will allow individual analysis of particular 
classification schemes in their cultural context and discursive activities. The changes that 
occur over time can be revealed genealogically, but as Budd (2001) warns, “The process 
of interpretation may be selective, or reactionary, or it may be obstructed by some other 
force. The outcome may be a lineage with a number of bends and breaks in it, but one 
that illustrates precursors, whether they be abstracted either purposely or accidentally” (p. 
13). 
The neatness required for classification conflicts with the messiness of reality, and 
therefore, compromise between accuracy and effectiveness is required in any 
classification system. The sticking point is what that compromise means to the user 
groups or social groups represented in the classification scheme. Regarding gender, it is 
important to stress that, say, acting feminine as socially prescribed, such as wearing a 
dress, is not a bad thing. To be sure, even if gender disappears tomorrow, people will 
continue to paint their toenails and wear pink. However, these gendered traits should not 
be considered compulsory and should be extended more widely to those who wish to do 
so regardless of the gender assignment. In particular, those who reject gendered 
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expectations for appearance, occupation or behavior, or those who physically are intersex, 
transgender or asexual should have formal and informal classificatory spaces because 
classification provides legitimacy. With legitimacy comes (we would hope) a reduction 
of the more frightening aspects of the violations of compulsory gender roles: hate crimes, 
harassment, and violence as well as more subtle forms of oppression. A classificatory 
structure that enables flexibility can allow for the construction of the self, by the self. 
Alcoff (1988) writes “women who have been eternally construed must seek a means of 
articulating a feminism that does not continue construing us in any set way” (p. 410), and 
this should be true of anyone. Although the two-gender system currently dominates, 
Alcoff advises that it is not static: “Can we conceive of a future in which oppositional 
gender categories are not fundamental to one’s self-concept? Even if we cannot, our 
theory of subjectivity should not preclude, and moreover, prevent, that eventual 
possibility” (p. 452, emphasis mine). Subjectivity must not fall victim to failure of 
imagination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
88	  
	  
	  
	  
Chapter 4: Findings, External Procedures 
 
“There is no legal or medical definition of sex” 
C.N. Armstrong, from Intersexuality in vertebrates including man, 1964 
 
Although medical-scientific research possesses an air of objectivity and authority, 
it still represents the current state of human understanding of whatever phenomena are 
being studied, as shaped by peer review and current technology. Similarly, legal 
discourse indicates a provisional status that represents the opinion of a particular court or 
legislative body. Spade (2011) writes, “We must also be cautious not to believe what the 
law says about itself since time and again the law has changed, been declared newly 
neutral or fair or protective, and then once more failed to transform the conditions of 
disparity and violence that people were resisting” (p. 27). In terms of sex and gender 
classification, Meadow (2010) argues that formal classification “denigrat[es] the status of 
individuals while reinforcing the neutrality of the system” and consequently that law “an 
institutionalized piece of gender accountability” (p. 816, 818). Thus, this chapter 
identifies the changing views of gender in the medical-scientific (to include psychology) 
and legal discourses. Substantial discussion of the epistemic impact is reserved for the 
final chapter. 
  Legal discourse, particularly capricious, relies alternately or simultaneously on 
research and the instinct—such as Garfinkel’s rules—of those involved in the decision-
making. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s (1881) famous introduction 
to The Common Law describes this phenomenon: 
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of 
the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, 
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avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices judges share with their fellow-men, have 
had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men 
should be governed. (p. 1) 
The capriciousness, inconsistency and non-linearity of legal rulings and legislation 
associated with gender perfectly illustrate his words, even to this day. Court cases 
document one court’s interpretation of existing law and different decisions result from 
similar facts, thus the terms “decision” or “opinion.”  
Some of the earliest written law cases involving sex and gender asked whether 
conception could occur when a woman was raped, as for some time people believed that 
orgasm was required for conception. As an example of how an outdated notion can 
persist in the face of all evidence, as recently as 2012, Senate candidate Todd Akin 
remarked that a woman’s body cannot get pregnant from “legitimate rape,” though the 
consent-proved-by-pregnancy notion was considered legally “absurd” by 1820 (Laqueur, 
1990, p. 162). Legislators hold significant power, despite how inaccurate, outdated, or 
ideological their beliefs. Not that attorneys are beyond reproach, but legislators can come 
from any professional ilk, and thus may not have a background knowledgeable of the 
impact of legal protections. In recognition of this instability, sex and gender have been 
determined by a changing set of criteria through history and the dynamicity buttresses 
West and Zimmerman’s (1987) definition of sex as “a determination made through the 
application of socially agreed upon biological criteria for classifying person as females or 
males” (p. 127).  
This chapter addresses what Foucault calls the “external” procedures, which 
identifies the status of sex and gender classification attitudes expressed in medical and 
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legal discourse. Assuming that change in the classification is influenced both by literature 
as well as research and societal attitudes, the timeframe between revisions of the DDC is 
where the external discursive analysis will take place (See Table 1 below).  
Edition Publication 
date 
Period of analysis for 
external discourse 
Editor DDC gender 
classes 
First 1876 1871-1876 Melvil Dewey none 
Second 1885 1876-1885 Melvil Dewey 396 
Seventeenth 1965 1958-1965 Benjamin Custer 301 
Nineteenth 1979 1971-1979 Benjamin Custer 305 
Twenty-third 2011 2003-2011 Joan Mitchell 305--0 
Table 1: DDC versions analyzed 
 
As mentioned previously, this chapter identifies “major narratives, which are recounted, 
repeated, and varied; formulae, texts, and ritualized sets of discourses” (Foucault, 1981, p. 
56) that occur in the relevant discourse. Also, to avoid the error, pointed out by Budd, 
Hill and Shannon (2010) of taking the Humean approach of applying every “individual as 
fully representing society” (n.p.). I acknowledge that I am identifying emergent themes, 
not necessarily the opinion of every member of the discursive community and applying 
them collectively. Thus, the following does not exhaustively identify every obscure 
mention of sex and gender in the scientific and legal discourse, but rather follows the arc 
of influence that impacted broad, paradigmatic ways of thinking in each timeframe listed 
above. Discussion of the DDC and its “internal procedures” follows the discussion of 
external procedures in chapters 5 and 6. 
The “definitions” of sex and gender in medical and legal discourse appear most often 
in two forms. First, defining occurs when a distinction must be made between those men 
and women who identify with their sex, usually in the context of explaining why women 
cannot do the things men do, and later explaining the differences between men and 
women, with women usually coming out unfavorably. This most pointedly occurs with 
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legal or medical explanations as to why women cannot practice law or medicine. In legal 
literature, this form is particularly prevalent prior to the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which legally ended sex as a differentiator in employment. However, 
where differentiation cannot be avoided, such as with concerns surrounding pregnancy, 
the solution has been to place pregnant women in a protected class, which is also not 
without controversy (Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978). Outside of employment, 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which had been designed to 
protect blacks, was changed to also protect from sex discrimination elsewhere, in the case 
of Reed v. Reed, (1971) where “males must be preferred to females in appointed estate 
administrators” for divorces. 
The second focus of defining occurs when trying to fit transgender practices or 
intersex bodies into a binary conceptualization of sex. For example, the medical discourse 
on intersex people provides insight into what criteria are used to classify normatively 
sexed and gendered people. Because of the implausibility of non-binary sex and gender 
categories, physicians needed to provide clear definitions of man, women, male, or 
female. A byproduct of this “defining” in medical literature is that the expectations are 
also laid bare for those who identify with and perform the gender associated with their 
physical sex. In their quest to find the “true sex” of individuals, the expectations are set 
for what constitutes “true sex” including many social markers and sexual practices.  
Civil rights for intersex people had long been a discussion in topic both medical and 
legal discourse. As early as 1741, James Parsons was writing about the legal rights of 
intersex people, asking, “What, but Ignorance and Superstition could urge Men to make 
laws for [hermaphrodites’] Destruction or Exclusion from the common Benefits of Life?” 
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(p. xvii), and goes on to catalog the ways various civilizations had tortured, executed or 
exacted laws on intersex people, including being “shut up in a chest, and thrown into the 
Sea” or being prohibited from “unlawful Copulation” or “convers[ing] with Men alone in 
any private place” (p. xxvi). In his treaty, Parsons brings up questions that are still 
debated in the public domain over two and a half centuries later, such as whether an 
intersex individual have a man’s or woman’s name or whom an intersex can marry (pp. 
xxxiii-xxxvii). Moral concerns crop up regularly, such as the fear of women “abusing” 
what were perceived to be oversized clitorises (p. 13). To those posing the questions, the 
answer comes down to whether hermaphrodites are predominantly male or female—their 
“true sex.” Based on Parsons’s (1741) summary, clearly a robust discourse on 
intersexuality existed throughout history. Though these questions were formulated over 
250 years ago, those same questions are still being asked and form the basis of medical 
determinations and legal decisions made about gender today.  
Sex and gender-related legal and medical concerns of women, trans and intersex 
people are often lumped together, but they differ. Some issues common to all include 
discrimination in employment, bullying, and denial of other privileges such as property 
rights, suffrage or military conscription. However, women struggle for rights and non-
discrimination, but have difficulty with the essentialist aspects of being a protected class 
as well as the reality that legal protection does not offer blanket equality (Kirkland, 2003, 
p. 4). For intersex people, the concerns largely involve the legal requirement for surgical 
alteration of genitals, in order to “normalize” them or place them unquestionably in one 
of two categories. Intersex people find themselves in the same legal predicaments as trans 
people if, at a certain age, they feel their parents reared them in the wrong gender and 
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want to change. Is surgery considered “cosmetic” or “corrective?” Since intersexuality is 
now most often detected at birth, legal consent can be disputed, as parents may or may 
not have the child’s best interests in mind or even know what the child’s best interests are. 
Who decides which sex to choose, parents, the child, the endocrinologist, or a surgeon? 
Conversely, transsexuals, throughout history, have fought for the right to have surgery or 
other non-surgical medical treatment, which proved difficult at times when the medical 
establishment was doubtful or under pressure not to allow it whether legally, ethically or 
socially. Insurance coverage of these procedures also can be inconsistent, which leads 
back to economic concerns and privilege. Additionally, medical education around trans 
health has been notoriously lacking. 
Because of the wide array of methods in which laws are passed and interpreted, as 
well as the influence of personal opinion and ideology, it is difficult to provide a linear 
trajectory for legal reasoning. Legislation serves as a starting point for issues that 
eventually are interpreted by the courts, which can be appealed and overturned. 
Governmental laws and regulations may differ between states and between the state and 
federal governments and agencies. For example, the Social Security Administration 
(federal agency) may have different legal requirements for proof of gender than the 
individual state Departments of Motor Vehicles (state agency) (Spade, 2011, p. 145).  
Adding to the jumble is that conflicting rulings in case law may be made simultaneously 
in different states on the same issue. Medical discourse seems to experience paradigmatic 
change with emphasis on different groups, depending on the era. A brief description of 
the social context will introduce each timeframe below, followed by the identification of 
the medical and legal narratives, and finally the discursive analysis of the DDC editions. 
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Analysis of the Discourse 
Social Context 1871-1885 
 
As Dewey was devising his first edition of the DDC, the U.S. was at the tail end of 
reconstruction after the civil war, though the discrimination experienced by black 
Americans was a long time from legally ending. The first wave of white feminism was 
cresting, mainly focused on legal rights, specifically suffrage, education, and property 
rights. The first women’s rights convention at Seneca Falls occurred in 1848, and only 
Wyoming, in the hopes of attracting women to the state, had passed women’s suffrage in 
1869. Both Democratic and Republican party platforms in the 1868 elections vowed to 
keep suffrage to men (Republicans) or to the decision of the individual states, which 
meant men (Democrats). Susan B. Anthony (illegally) cast her vote in Rochester in 1872, 
but the Nineteenth Amendment of Constitution allowing women to vote would not be 
passed for nearly 50 years. During this time, the medical field began to professionalize in 
the United States. The discourse included English medical journals. The first American 
edition of Gray’s Anatomy had been published in 1858. The first woman doctor, 
Elizabeth Blackwell, graduated from medical school in 1849, Sarah Hackett Stevenson 
became the first woman member of American Medical Association. The legal profession 
was well-established as a masculine institution, though Arabella Mansfield was the first 
woman lawyer admitted to the bar in 1869 (in Iowa). Varying untraditional partnerships, 
such as where women lived in as husband and wife, with one cross-dressing, arose often 
as a literary trope in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which were based on 
occasional news items that critics argue were embellished to titillate (Coontz, 2005). 
However, these partnerships typically did not appear in legal or medical discourse unless 
95	  
	  
	  
	  
one partner was intersex or if the partnership was identified as a fraud to commit 
homosexual acts. 
Though conventional wisdom tells us the Victorian Age was buttoned up with 
sexuality not discussed, Foucault (1978) notes that the “hypothesis of repression” led to 
assumptions about the erasure of these topics from discourse. Conversely, he found that a 
“steady proliferation of discourses occurred,” starting in the seventeenth century, and 
from the institutional level, not just ‘illicit,” underground sources (p. 18). He found 
“Rather than a massive censorship…, what was involved was a regulated and 
polymorphous incitement to discourse (p. 34). The nineteenth century also brought an 
incessantly-discussed new understanding of the concept of sex (gender was not yet 
conceptualized in its current usage). 
Medico-legal Metanarrative 1871-1885  
The following sections will discuss first legal depictions of sex, and then move to 
intersex, where much of the medical defining occurs, within medical and medical 
jurisprudence discourse. Not much is written about trans people in either discourse during 
this timeframe, as it was not considered a medical issue, psychology was not developed 
enough to pay attention to it, and legally no justification existed to prosecute, unless some 
sort of criminal fraud was involved. 
Men and women. In the 1870 fourteenth edition of Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, an 
authoritative Anglo-American reference still in use, the definition of the term “sex” notes 
the “physical difference between male and female animals,” without explicating what 
those physical differences are. However, whatever those differences consist of, they 
result in legal differences: “In the civil state, sex creates a difference among individuals,” 
listing the same incapacities in the definition of “woman” and “wife” discussed below. 
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The omission of the actual differences serves as a telling reminder of the weak 
justification for these legal differences. Gray’s Anatomy (1862) provides a detailed and 
mostly bland description of sex organs, but proclaims in the first sentence, that “the Penis 
is the organ of copulation” (p. 740). The description of the hymen notes that because of 
variation, “it cannot, consequently, be considered as a proof of virginity” (p. 751).  
Gray’s falls into the medical discourse as classificatory knowledge, which focuses on 
norms rather than variation. 
In Bouvier’s, the term “women” is defined as “All the females of the human 
species; all such females who have arrived at the age of puberty,” demonstrating that sex 
and gender are unsurprisingly interchangeable at that point in time. The term “mankind” 
is legally termed “Persons of the male sex; the human species,” with an afterthought that 
“females as well as males are included,” and also hastily notes that it is a felony “to 
commit sodomy with mankind or beast” (p. 99), thus reinforcing legal discrimination 
toward gay men. A wife is obligated to “love, honor and obey her husband, and bound to 
follow him wherever in the country he may choose to go and establish himself…She is 
under obligation to be faithful in chastity to her marriage vow” (p. 661).  As for 
“husband,” the dictionary implies that men are legally entitled to reject the inevitable 
henpecking of their wives. It makes clear that he must “love his wife, and to bear with her 
faults” (no such faults in men are mentioned in the definition for “wife,”) “and if possible, 
by mild means to correct them” (p. 675). Twice in the definition, it is mentioned that he 
can make decisions without his wife “controlling” him.  
The definition for women in Bouvier’s occupies a full page, mostly referring to 
the property and contractual capability differences from men. The definition of “wife,” on 
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the other hand, adds an additional two pages of differences by state, mostly referring to 
what happens to marital property if the wife is abandoned, adulterated against (adultery is 
criminal at this point, and continues to be in some states) or the husband becomes insane. 
The sections are prefaced by a note stating “A great change in favor of the wife has been 
produced by recent statues in a majority of the United States” (p. 661). The general 
definition declares, “For her protection, the wife is rendered incapable of binding herself 
by contract” (p. 661). The key term used is “incapacity,” which is legally defined as “The 
want of a quality legally to do, give, transmit, or receive something.” What this means is 
that the person has some deficiency that renders her unable to properly make decisions. 
“In general, the incapacity ceases with the cause which produces it. If the idiot should 
obtain his senses, or the married woman's husband die, their incapacity would be at an 
end” (Bouvier’s, 1871, p. 695), thus, marriage brings on a state similar to idiocy. In New 
York, the Married Women’s Property Act had been passed in 1848, overturning 
incapacity, with all states following suit by 1900, but the legal dictionaries maintained 
married women as an example of incapacity, along with idiots, at least until 1948. No 
urgency for revision seemed to accompany the changes. Also telling is how legal rights 
are recognized:  
Single or unmarried women have all the civil rights of men; they may therefore 
enter into contracts or engagements… but they are generally, not possessed of any 
political power; hence they cannot be elected representatives of the people, nor be 
appointed to the offices of judge, attorney at law, sheriff, constable, or any other 
office, unless expressly authorized by law. (p. 679) 
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If women are prohibited from appointment as a judge or attorney, they by definition are 
excluded from defining their own legal rights. Additionally, women could not serve on 
juries by law until the turn of the century, and were not consistently included until well 
into the 1970s. Here lies a literal embodiment of the metaphor expressed in the 
seventeenth century by a feminist cited by de Beauvoir (1949) in The Second Sex: “All 
that has been written about women by men should be suspect, for the men are at once 
judge and party to the lawsuit” (p. xxv). Hence, the dictionary, if not the greater legal 
environment, becomes an epistemological echo-chamber in which men make laws by and 
for the interests of men. The reasoning is justified through difference for which she has 
no recourse to dispute: “The principal reason of this exclusion is to encourage that 
modesty that is natural to the female sex, and which renders them unqualified to mix and 
contend with men; the pretended weakness of the sex is not probably the true reason” 
(Bouvier’s, 1871, p. 517).  
The legal dictionaries, though sprinkled with editorializing, are less useful than 
legal opinions, which include often lengthy and editorializing justifications for decisions. 
In the case of women, that reasoning was often to explain why women could not do 
things that men could do, usually deferring to the “law of nature.” According to legal 
theory of the time, the phrase “law of nature” or “natural law” were code for divine law, 
or the law of God (Austin, 1832, p. 2). As a typical example, in his 1869 refusal of 
Lavinia Goodell’s first application to the Wisconsin State Bar, Chief Justice Edward 
Ryan laid out exactly why sex was a barrier for success in the legal profession, repeatedly 
citing “the law of nature,” and when women are interrupted from their destinies, “the 
bearing and nurture of the children of our race and for the custody of the homes of the 
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world and their maintenance in love and honor” disrupt this order, “and when voluntary, 
treason against it.” The characteristics he assigns to the female sex include “its gentle 
graces, its quick sensibility, its tender susceptibility, its purity, its delicacy, its emotional 
impulses, its subordination of hard reason to sympathetic feeling.” The legal profession is 
“selfish and malicious, knavish and criminal, coarse and brutal, repulsive and 
obscene…It would be revolting to all female sense of innocence and sanctity of their sex, 
shocking to man's reverence for womanhood and faith in woman, on which hinge all the 
better affections and humanities of life, that woman should be permitted to mix 
professionally in all the nastiness of the world which finds its way into courts of justice 
(In re Goodell, 1876); another way of saying “for her protection.” Yet, her second 
application, in 1880, was accepted by the majority with the dissent only of Ryan, who 
had issued the original decision.  
We are satisfied that the applicant possesses all the requisite qualifications as to 
learning, ability and moral character to entitle her to admission, no objection 
existing thereto except that founded upon her sex alone. Under the circumstances, 
a majority think that the objection must be disregarded. Miss Goodell will 
therefore be admitted to practice in this court upon signing the roll and taking the 
prescribed oath. By the Court.-So ordered. (In re Goodell, 1880, emphasis in 
original) 
The decision’s progressive tone and brevity contrasts Ryan’s lengthy original points. 
Similarly, in the Supreme Court’s denial of Bradwell’s application to practice law, the 
court argued that:  
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the civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in 
the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be, 
woman’s protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy 
which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of 
civil life…The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble 
and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. And the 
rules of civil society. (Bradwell v. State of Illinois, 1873)  
Throughout the decision, the phrases such as “the nature of things” and “destiny and 
mission of women” contribute to the deterministic appeal to the “law of nature.” 
 The decisions above are typical of one approach to denying rights to women, but 
the other approach relies on the circular argument that women cannot participate in 
whatever public realm to which she attempts to gain entry because it is illegal. For 
example, in the trial of Susan B. Anthony for casting her illegal vote in 1873, the court 
sidesteps the issue of why a woman should not vote and relies instead on the fact that it is 
illegal. In the opening argument, the prosecuting attorney says little more than “Conceded, 
on the 5th day of November, 1872, Miss Susan B. Anthony was a woman” (United States 
v. Anthony, 1872). Similarly, the Supreme Court, in denying Virginia Minor’s right to 
vote, argued, in a tortured manner, that it was possible to be a citizen, but not be allowed 
to vote because it was illegal in her state (Minor v. Happersett, 1874).   
Unlike law, which could be self-taught through books, medical education during this 
time period required resources inaccessible outside of medical colleges. Though a full 
discussion of women’s entry into the medical profession is beyond the scope of the paper, 
some discussion of the justification for barring women represent the profession’s view of 
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women as a sex. The initial influx into the profession began with the first wave feminist 
movement, but interestingly was also supported by more conservative movements that 
advocated for women’s gynecologists because the delicacy of women could not tolerate a 
pelvic exam by a male physician. Yet, it was that same “delicacy” that was used to bar 
women in medicine, where it was argued that women’s constitutions were too fragile to 
withstand repugnant medical knowledge and that menstruating left them unfit for the 
responsibility (Justin, 1978, p. 42). The Boston Medical and Surgical Journal reports that 
Elizabeth Blackwell “is a pretty little specimen of the feminine gender” with a “fine 
phrenology” who maintains an “unchanged countenance,” perhaps assuaging notions that 
women would be disgusted by medical knowledge (“Females attending” 1847, p. 405).  
However, those types of hypotheses disappear over the course of the nineteenth century 
with the establishment in 1847 of the AMA, standardizing the profession in an effort to 
diminish “quackery” and folk remedies. 
Delicacy, too, extended to the toll any physical or intellectual exertion would take on 
a woman’s reproductive organs. In a grand statement that cited everyone from 
Shakespeare to Virgil to the Bible, Dr. Edward H. Clarke, M.D. (1875) threatened that if 
women continued to educate themselves, their reproductive abilities would become so 
weak that men would be forced to seek their wives overseas: 
It is not asserted here that improper methods of study, and a disregard of the 
reproductive apparatus and its functions, during the educational life of girls, are the 
sole causes of female diseases; neither is it asserted that all the female graduates of 
our schools and colleges are pathological specimens. But it is asserted that the 
number of these graduates who have been permanently disabled to a greater or less 
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degree by these causes is so great, as to excite the gravest alarm, and to demand the 
serious attention of the community. If these causes should continue for the next half-
century, and increase in the same ratio as they have for the last fifty years, it requires 
no prophet to foretell that the wives who are to be mothers in our republic must be 
drawn from trans-atlantic homes. (p. 63) 
Despite the professed protection of women and their reproductive organs, looking closely 
at the discourse, the actual issues seem to be competition, exploitation, credibility, and 
even more so, humiliation. The assumptions of medical institutions change depending on 
need. For example, in the western states, where more physicians were needed, the 
medical associations were more accepting of women physicians, but in the eastern states, 
women had difficulty attaining opportunities for internships and procuring licensure. 
Similarly to law, the circular argument was made that women made poor doctors because 
they had not trained with the best teachers; yet, they were barred from attending those 
institutions. Additionally, there seemed a fear that patients would not accept women 
physicians. For example, Dr. Elizabeth Blackwell was listed as “E. Blackwell” to obscure 
her sex (“Our Lady Members,” 1959, p. 297).  
Most tellingly, in an 1869 joint statement of the professors of the University of 
Pennsylvania and Jefferson Medical College, along with an assortment of physicians 
throughout Philadelphia, the male doctors expressed their opposition to women attending 
mixed-sex medical courses. Their major reasons included that no male patients “should 
be subject to inspection before a class of females,” that during operations, male patients 
may be exposed in a way “unfitted for the observation of students of the opposite sex” 
because they are “shocking to the sense of decency, and entail the risk of unmanning the 
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surgeon, of distracting his mind, and endangering the life of his patient.” Referring back 
to the “law of nature” along with a higher morality, they grandly end with “that high 
estimation of womanly qualities, which should always be sustained and cherished…is 
lost by an inevitable and positive demoralization of the individuals concerned, thereby 
entailing most serious detriment to the morals of society” (as cited in Marshall, 1897, pp. 
22-23). This resulted in a disdainful response from the dean of the Women’s Medical 
College of Pennsylvania that “science is impersonal, and that the high aim of relief to 
suffering humanity sanctifies all duties; and we repel as derogatory to the profession of 
medicine, the assertion that the physician who has risen to the level of his high calling 
need be embarrassed, in treating general disease, but the presence of earnest women 
students” (as cited in Marshall, 1897, p. 26).  
Similar to the Philadelphia physicians’ concerns, the issue had little to do with 
women’s ability to perform, but rather the male physicians’ prudery in their presence, 
appealing to moral “decency” as justification. A vigorous debate ensued for weeks in the 
Times’ letters-to-the-editor column following an article about mistreatment of women 
medical students mostly by male medical students at Bellevue Hospital, arguing how the 
law of nature makes women both appropriate and inappropriate for medicine, depending 
on the perspective.	  One letter, from an admitted “old school” of thought, responds that 
“The profession of medicine is too high a one for woman to aspire to; too great in its 
bearings for her to grasp,” but then gets to the real issue, writing that a male physician, 
while “lecturing at Bellevue, his cheek has blushed to find women as his auditors, 
listening to lectures most unfitted for them to hear. With such feelings a lecturer cannot 
give true scope to his subject, his manliness is insulted, and if he possesses any delicacy 
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of sentiment, he naturally must be obliged to study his language and clothe his sentences 
in a way the least offensive to the ear of woman” (“Medical Women,” 1864, n.p.). The 
cited physician betrays that it is really his embarrassment, not the women’s, that leads to 
discomfort in his lectures. However, this is secondhand account, and a multitude of letters 
directly dispute this viewpoint, admitting that women have an appropriate sphere, as set 
forth by the creator, which is their natural role for caring. Also, the letters mostly appear 
to be written by women medical students or their supporters. The silence of the male 
physicians could indicate a lot of things; however, they were at risk if they spoke out. 
Despite the willingness of the medical schools to admit women, the professional and 
licensing organizations fought women’s entry into the field. For example, the 
Philadelphia Medical Society ejected male physicians who taught in women’s medical 
colleges or even consulted with women doctors (Justin, 1978, p. 42). This exemplifies the 
“implicature” or non-text rules and subtext that accompanies discourse. 
The “law of nature” was also supported by the surge in popularity in the 
pseudoscience of phrenology in the nineteenth century in the United States. Though now 
considered quackery, phrenologists believed that the size and shape of the brain indicated 
the development of particular characteristics, called “faculties” that can be detected by 
“reading” bumps on the head. They positioned themselves as a sort of moral police, in 
opposition to doctors. The Fowler brothers popularized phrenology in the United States, 
particularly in New York around mid-century before emigrating to England in 1860. The 
Fowlers more or less adapted the theory from Gall, who founded the “science” in 
England, and they lectured and published extensively on the subject, with religious and 
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moral overtones: “Who will…stand up for God and humanity in this war with evil at its 
root? Doctors should, but will not” (Fowler, 1843, p. 31).  
Albany, New York, was a hotbed for phrenologists. Coincidently, the Fowlers 
attended Amherst College, the same nearby Massachusetts college from which Melvil 
Dewey graduated in 1874. Wiegand (1996) writes, “nothing Dewey encountered at 
Amherst induced him to question the dominant culture…his college experience 
constituted an immersion in Anglo-Saxonism” (p. 24), which based on the literature of 
the time, apparently included phrenology. Medicine and law had ties to phrenology in 
Albany. Amos Dean (1834), a prominent medical jurisprudence author who founded 
Albany Law School and the Albany Medical College and later went on to be the 
president of the State University of Iowa, delivered lectures on phrenology to the Young 
Men’s Association for Mutual Improvement of the City of Albany, describes the 
characteristic of “philoprogenitiveness” or the “instinctive feeling of attachment to 
children” or of “regret at the death of a friend” to be particularly developed in women, 
but “Reason is not its parent” (pp. 79, 88, 80). Additionally, children confirm that this is 
true because “While the boy cracks his whip and rolls his marbles, the girl is displaying 
her excellent taste in the dress of a doll” (p. 81). On the other hand, men’s brains show 
more of a propensity “to destroy inanimate objects,” and deliberately “wounding the 
feelings of others” (p. 94). Men are bestowed with more self-esteem, and to compensate, 
women have more benevolence and amiability (p. 117). Development of each faculty or 
activity of faculty depended on the exercise of them, and the “progression of the race 
results from the joint efforts of all its members” (p. 202). The size of the brain “indicates 
its power” (p. 223). 
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Epistemically, phrenologists vigorously denied the social construction of behaviors. 
They believed that “the disposition and mental powers of mankind, are innate—are born, 
not created by education, and that the human mind, instead of being a blank on which 
education and circumstances write the whole character, has an inherent constitution and 
character of its own” (Fowler, 1843, p. 4, emphasis in original). More specifically, they 
believed that the qualities in a child were only passed down from the mother, and she had 
complete control over the character of her child. They wrote several publications giving 
mothers guidance to how to carry her baby in order to create the best product toward 
advancement of mankind. “Treatments” were restricted to physiological activities, rather 
than medical (such as getting fresh air, bathing in cold water, etc.).  
Phrenologists connected particular gender traits to sex and noted their absence 
through visible clues. Fowler (1848) cites Gall’s description of subjects who have a 
“depraved” sense of amativeness, a faculty indicating their capacity for love: “Almost all 
the women abandoned in this propensity have at the same time a robust and masculine 
constitution. The men, on the contrary have an effeminate body; their limbs are rounded, 
fat, motled [sic] and small, and their breasts very conspicuous” (p. 87). A full chapter is 
devoted to the faculty of philoprogenitiveness or “love of offspring” in women, and is 
often referred to as “maternal” fondness, as if it cannot occur in a man. Some bits of 
support he offers are that male servants are never chosen to watch children, a poem 
written by a woman about saving her baby in a snowstorm, and his examination of a 
baboon brain (pp. 90-91). On the reverse, if men or women have small bumps in this area, 
often the result is infanticide. Women and the Irish are also more highly developed in the 
faculty of “adhesiveness” which refers to “friendship, attachment, sociability” (p. 98). He 
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mentions the habits formed by young women to include “their attention…to fashion, their 
artificial airs, their studied hypocrisy, their idleness, irregular habits, false and imperfect 
ideas of beauty and perfection; their tight-lacing and their wrong standard of character,” 
whereas young men have more “expensive, unhealthy, and demoralizing” habits, 
including “idleness, intemperate use of intoxicating drinks, smoking, chewing, and 
snuffing tobacco, the taking of opium, licentiousness in every form, gambling, swearing, 
prodigality, and the keeping of late hours at night” (p. 131).  Though he calls these 
“habits” and “customs,” he worries that they will be passed along to their offspring, in 
which case those in possession of them should not get married.  
An 1868 phrenology-based maternity guide states that “Maternity is the one destiny 
and function of woman—that alone for which she was created…And she is the most 
beautiful and perfect woman, who is fitted by nature to bear the best children; while those 
who are least fitted for this end, are, THEREFORE, the most homely” (Fowler, 1868, p. 
50). He addresses objections by saying “Fair reader, pout and poh at this institute of 
nature as you will, it is nevertheless true, AND YOU KNOW AND FEEL IT. It accords 
with your inner consciousness” (p. 54). The language of gender in phrenology echoes the 
vague “law of nature” referred to in the legal discourse. The differences between genders 
did not seem to be physical, but physicality seemed to be the only embodiment upon 
which the gut-instinct “difference” could be projected. Since difference could not be 
explained through physiology or psychology, it was chalked up to divine law or God’s 
rules. 
Intersex.  As mentioned above, the medical discourse steered clear of gender 
differentiation, and focused on sex-differentiation, usually in cases of deviation from 
108	  
	  
	  
	  
norms. As late as 1912, texts were still being written defending the evolution of the sexes 
from one superior “bi-sexual” being, with bi-sexual referring to a two-sexed body rather 
than in current usage relating to sexuality (Buzzacot & Wymar, 1912), which means the 
two-sex model was still considered controversial. Where sex differentiation became most 
problematic for physicians was intersexuality, or then called “hermaphrodites,” or those 
of “doubtful sex.” In the medical sex classifications of the late nineteenth century, the 
structure of gender was binary (male-female/man-woman), with hermaphrodites either 
denied or present as a confounding curiosity.  
Intersex people were written about by St. Augustine in The City of God in the fifth 
century and Aristotle in the fourth century BCE. Parsons (1741) sympathetically notes 
how “the learned among men…follow the Path of vulgar Errors rather than taking the 
Trouble to think seriously about such subject” as hermaphrodites,” although Parsons was 
arguing that many people were being mistakenly identified as hermaphrodites when they 
just had variant organs such as enlarged clitorises (p. vi). As gynecology formalized in 
the nineteenth century cases began to proliferate of people with variant anatomy, and thus 
an increase in discourse as physicians attempted to puzzle out which sex they “actually” 
were. They were canonical topics in medical jurisprudence literature; a sample chapter 
title in a textbook: “Hermaphrodites, doubtful sex, monsters” (Dean, 1866). Physicians 
generally were asked to decide the “true sex” so that their patients could legally get 
married, vote, or practice heteronormative sex (Reis, 2009). Despite the ubiquity of 
intersexuality throughout historical discourse, hermaphroditism was not included in 
Gray’s Anatomy, perhaps an indication that it was considered a condition or disease, not a 
variation. 
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Dreger (1998a) calls this time period the “Age of the Gonads” because gonadal tissue 
was considered the determining factor for sex. For example, if a man with normative 
genitalia and masculine behaviors was found to possess, say a stray ovary, he was 
considered a female pseudo-hermaphrodite. Leading up to that time, physicians mainly 
used gendered visual, behavioral and social clues to make decisions on sex differentiation 
(Reis, 2009, p. 54). Parsons (1741) describes a case where a man was mistaken for a 
woman merely because he sat down to urinate due to an unperforated penis, showing a 
case of variation that did not result in gender confusion for the subject (p. 30). 
Legal discourse involving intersex people relies heavily on medical interpretations of 
sex, with the physician as the authority. In Bouvier’s 1871 law dictionary, 
“hermaphrodites” were defined as “Persons who have in the sexual organs the appearance 
of both sexes. They are adjudged to belong to that which prevails in them” (p. 665). The 
term “adjudged” demonstrates the lack of subjectivity for the intersex person. Reis’s 
(2009) research shows that medical discourse tended to host debates about intersex 
patients, despite that the information could be second or third hand. The prose is littered 
with exclamation points and communicates a gossipy and incredulous tone. Taylor (1873) 
recounts the story of Levi Suydam, an intersex person who attempted to vote in a 
contested election, where two doctors squabbled for weeks as to whether Levi could vote 
or not, subjecting him to repeated, invasive physical examinations. Ultimately, it was 
decided that the physical evidence was inconclusive, so he was determined to be a 
woman due to his sexual attraction to males, his “aversion to” and “inability to perform 
bodily labor,” and the clincher, that he had “a fondness for gay colours, for pieces of 
calico” (p. 676). One case note describes a woman who consulted an attorney wanting to 
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find out if she could legally marry. He described the physical examination in vivid detail 
and wrote that the decision to raise her as a female was made by a nurse “though doubtful 
of the real nature of the case, advised female costume, which was adopted ever since” 
(Mann, 1853, p. 720). 
If patients objected to the physicians’ determinations they were accused of practicing 
deception to gain privileges or commit perversions such as same-sex intimacy.  Legally, 
concerns revolve more around property rights and fraud (such as the alleged voter fraud 
suspected above), rather than the same-sex intimacy that is guarded against in the medical 
discourse. In the same year, Taylor, in his influential medical jurisprudence text, A 
Manual of Medical Jurisprudence, using the terms “abnormal,” “defective,” “deformity,” 
and “the beings” to describe hermaphrodites, writes that it is “not easy to assign a sex, but 
this is of minor importance.” He goes on to say that the more important issue lies in just 
identifying the degree of malformation, as that determines potency, which then can 
uncover fraud in paternity or provide grounds for divorce (Taylor, 1873, pp. 696-697).  
 Cases such as Levi Suydam’s voter fraud case highlight the arbitrariness of 
prohibitions based on sex. The legitimacy of a vote hinged only on the disputed 
determinations of physicians. An earlier edition of Bouvier’s from 1856 describes the 
story of a Dr. William Harris, who had delivered a lecture about a “supposed 
hermaphrodite,” who “till the age of eighteen, wore the female dress, when she threw it 
off, and assumed the name of Rees, with the dress and habits of a man; at twenty-five, 
she married a woman, but had no children. Her clitoris was five or six inches long, and in 
coition, which she greatly enjoyed, she used this instead of the male organ. She lived till 
she was sixty years of age, and died in possession of a large estate, which she had 
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acquired by her industry and enterprise” (n.p.) Given the gendered behaviors of marrying 
a woman, dress and habits of a man, and being in possession of masculine industry and 
enterprise, the use of the feminine pronoun shows the supremacy of the physical body at 
the time in determining rights.  
 Contradictions arose regularly whenever physicians attempted to assign necessary 
and sufficient conditions to a sex. In Bouvier’s, the definition for “hermaphrodite” goes 
on to explain, “The sexual characteristics in the human species are widely separated, and 
the two sexes are never, perhaps, united in the same individual,” and refers to a 
physiological text as the source. This “wide separation,” then is immediately contradicted 
in the following sentence: “Cases of malformation, however, sometimes are found, in 
which it is very difficult to decide to what sex the person belongs” (1870, p. 665). For 
example, Taylor (1873) offers that women can be identified by breasts, vaginas, uterus 
and ovaries (p. 675), are “irritable and vain” and have “shrill and squeaking voices” (p. 
679). Males can be identified by “a grave tone of voice, the presence of a beard, the width 
of the shoulders and the narrowness of the pelvis” (p. 669), although he describes a 
woman who had an “abundance of beard and profuse whiskers,” but no other external 
variation and a Roman countess he knew “had so much hair upon her chin she was 
obliged to shave like a man” and finally admits, “in some cases external examination will 
entirely fail to indicate the sex” (p. 671). He describes a person with no external sex 
organs, and concludes, coldly, “this person must be placed among those monstrous 
subjects, in which there is, properly speaking, no sex, and which therefore cannot enter a 
marriage contract with either a male or a female” (p. 281), but it is not grounds for being 
denied inheritance (p. 282). 
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 The binary division of sexes that in more recent history has been exacerbated 
through sex classification on identification documents had not yet become a controversy. 
During this timeframe, no common identification documents existed in the U.S. except 
passports, which the federal government took over processing in 1856. Regardless, few 
people possessed them, as foreign travel was rare (Spade, 2008, p. 774). Consequently, 
sex on ID cards had not yet arisen as a problem; however, it led to other problems, as 
when people with uncertain gender (that is, someone cannot tell by looking) could not 
simply show an ID when voting or claiming other rights, such as Levi Suydam. Sex-
segregation in prisons was fairly new, beginning in 1830, with only Mount Pleasant 
Female Prison that opened in 1839 in New York, and The Indiana Reformatory 
Institution for Women and Girls (men, women and children were housed together until 
separate facilities began to be built) (Spade, 2008, pp. 780-781). Prior to the Civil war, 
rural and poor people could cohabitate in “self marriages,” or unregistered marriages 
where two women might marry with one cross-dressing as a husband, with neighbors 
either expressing no suspicion or perhaps just ignoring it. After the Civil war, however, 
the legality of marriages were monitored more closely (Coontz, 2005).  
Trans people. At this point in time, the concept of transgender was lumped into a 
category called “concealed sex.” Despite their gender identification, trans people 
generally could be matched to male or female genitalia and other physical markers 
(hormone therapy was still 60 years off and gender was generally expressed through 
cross-dressing), and the psychological aspects of gender were yet to be acknowledged; 
thus, little medical literature refers to it. Concealed sex does not appear in the legal 
dictionaries and only in the medical jurisprudence texts in passing, as no one could 
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identify any illegality unless fraud was committed. Taylor (1873) writes that it “belongs 
in the annals of imposture rather than medical jurisprudence” (p. 678). Despite the 
relative inattention at this time, in the next century trans people would come to dominate 
gender-related discourse. 
Social Context 1958-1965 
Though no change occurred in sex and gender classification of the DDC until 
1965, between 1885 and 1958 conceptualizations of sex and gender dramatically 
transformed, especially concepts related to sexuality. Though the amount of discourse 
likely did not change, it took on a different tenor based on advances in medicine and 
psychiatry. Psychiatry, which had previously been relegated to “curing” marginalized 
prisoners in insane asylums, began to be viewed as a public health benefit and, informed 
by psychology and psychotherapy, was applied more broadly to a wider array of contexts 
(Schmeiser, 2013, p. 179). Phrenology had lost favor by this point and had faded away. 
Early in the century, the discovery of chromosomes influenced how “true sex” was 
determined (Rosario, 2007, p. 266), thus leading to the genetic age, still a factor in 
determining sex. Krafft-Ebing’s landmark medical jurisprudence text, Psychopathia 
Sexualis, was published in English in 1906, and it focused on “sexual deviance,” 
outlining hundreds of sexual practices, including cross-dressing, which he calls 
“effeminization,” and restricts to homosexuals. Though it refers to “sexual crime,” the 
preface notes with sympathy “suffering and affliction” and wishes “solace and social 
elevation to its readers” so they did not feel alone (p. viii). In 1910, “transvestite” was 
coined by German sex activist Magnus Hirschfeld to mean someone who wore the 
clothes of the other sex, distinguishing it from homosexuality, for which he energetically 
advocated decriminalization and rights. Havelock Ellis (1936) coined the term “eonism” 
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to denote cross-dressing, also to distinguish it from homosexuality. He had originally 
used the term “sexo-aesthetic inversion,” but decided it confused the concept with 
homosexuality, then called “inversion” (Bullough, 1997). Kinsey’s research on sexuality 
began in 1938 and continued through the early 1960s, with (best-selling) major reports 
published in 1948 (Sexual Behavior in the Human Male) and 1953 (Sexual Behavior in 
the Human Female), surprising the public with the revelation of a variety of sexual 
practices.  
Following this period, research was dominated by the theories of Freud, and most 
sought a “cure” for what were considered deviant practices through psychotherapy or 
aversion therapy, which involved pairing cross-dressing behavior with negative 
experiences such as shock therapy or forced vomiting (Green, 2010, p. 1458). Freud and 
his followers generally argued that cross-dressing resulted from the anxiety a boy 
experienced once he realized his mother did not have a penis (Bullough, 1997). Robert 
Cauldwell (1949) wrote about the rehabilitation of transvestites in his paper Psychopathia 
Transexualis:  
Although heredity had a part in producing individuals who may have 
psychopathic tendencies, such pitiful cases as that described herein are products, 
largely, of unfavorable childhood environment and overindulgent parents and 
other near relatives…Progress is being made. Within a quarter of a century social 
education may serve as a preventive in all but a few cases and social organizations 
may be able to rehabilitate the few who fall by the wayside. (p. 280) 
During this period, experimentation with transsexual surgery and therapy increased. 
Sexologist and endocrinologist Harry Benjamin, who had been working on transvestism 
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and transsexuality since the early 50s, arranged a symposium on the topics in 1953 where 
he argued that rehabilitation is fruitless, thus positioning himself as a patient advocate 
and the receiver of an avalanche of referrals for hormone therapy. The first failed sex 
assignment surgery—the intersex patient, Lili Elbe, died—was performed in Germany in 
1931 and the “true story” was published in English in 1933. The news of Christine 
Jorgenson, the most widely publicized American to undergo a sex change, was first 
announced in 1952 with a resulting media circus, and it inspired a mass of inquiries into 
sex reassignment surgery referrals and had resounding effects throughout the 60s and 70s 
(Meyerowitz, 2002).  
The Civil Rights Movement and the second wave of the Women’s Movement also 
were taking shape. During World War II, law firms were forced by necessity to hire 
women to replace men who had gone to war, yet they were hired provisionally, were 
segregated from men, were hired as legal assistants and secretaries (Bowman, 2009, p. 6). 
This led to a surge of legal discourse that defined women in terms of why they should not 
be practicing law. Harvard Law School’s dean, when asked about how bad the shortage 
of men was on law school enrollments, replied that it was not as bad as they expected, as 
“we haven’t had to admit any women” (as cited in Bowman, 2009, p. 7). Despite having 
access to the profession and potentially a speaking part in the legal discourse, without 
legal protections, they could not advocate for themselves. Epstein (2012) calls the 1950s 
and 1960s the “dark days” for women lawyers, citing a study where women were rated 
the least desirable candidates for law jobs, even lower than Catholics, Jews, or blacks and 
since they were legally unprotected, they had no recourse (p. 84). For example, during 
this timeframe, Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Geraldine Ferraro, Elizabeth Dole and Janet Reno 
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were all also rejected from employment at major firms solely for being women, and 
Sandra Day O’Connor was offered only a legal secretary position, despite all graduating 
from elite law schools (Bowman, 2009, pp. 9-10; Epstein, 2012, p. 85).  
In 1949, anthropologist Margaret Mead had distinguished “sex” from “sex role.” 
Margaret Sanger began seeking researchers to develop a birth control pill in 1950, and 
the pill went on the market first in 1957 as treatment for menstruation problems and then 
in 1960 as a contraceptive, although remaining illegal in 8 states as of 1964. Its legality 
was settled as a privacy issue by the U.S. Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut 
(1965). The Second Sex had been published in the US in 1953, with de Beauvoir’s 
famous exhortation, “One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman” (1974, p. 301). 
Mary Tyler Moore first wore pants on television in 1961, Sex and the Single Girl was 
published in 1962, and The Feminine Mystique was published in 1963, causing the 
advertising and mass media industries to begin self-examination of its depictions of 
women. Books such as The Natural Superiority of Women (written by a man, Ashley 
Montagu) began to appear. Television ownership was becoming more widespread, with 
the first television commercial appearing in 1941 (Stewart, 1941, p. 129).  
The discourse over this time period suggested that American masculinity had 
been compromised (Courdileone, 2000). In 1958, Arthur Schleshinger’s “The Crisis of 
American Masculinity” was published in Esquire, and a series appeared in Look 
Magazine called “The Decline of the American Male” (p. 522). The corresponding tail 
end of the McCarthy era of the early 50s had focused on communists and others with 
loose morals—namely, homosexuals—resulting in the “lavender scare,” where gays were 
rooted out of government positions through a series of executive orders and mass firings 
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starting in 1953. Legislation and the resulting legal challenges, led by the Mattachine 
Society, focused more on sexual orientation than gender as the ousted gay workers fought 
back (Johnson, 2004). In the media, when referring to the curious phenomenon of 
transsexualism, most of the attention was paid to male-to-female (MTF) rather than 
female-to-male (FTM) trans people, and they were often sexualized, which led to further 
fear about homosexuality. Pulpy entertainment outlets capitalized on the popularity of 
Christine Jorgenson, including publishing novels about sex-changes and a producing a B-
movie called Glen or Glenda?, directed by Ed Wood (Meyerowitz, 2002, p. 89). Often, 
the transgender/transsexual publicity materials described MTF performers such as 
Christine Jorgenson and the many Vegas performers she inspired as former G.I.s or other 
“manly men” who had suddenly changed, again fueling the fears of the decline of 
masculinity. 
Courdileone (2000) identifies the common motif as inspired by the communist 
threat, where “American males had become the victims of a smothering, overpowering, 
suspiciously collectivist mass society—a society that had smashed the once-autonomous 
male self, elevated women to a position of power in the household and doomed men to a 
slavish conformity” similar to those living in communist regimes (pp. 522-23). The 
undermining of monolithic masculinity resulted in both fascination with and persecution 
of trans and intersex people. The public’s now-shaken belief in “natural” sex and gender 
categories caused anxiety for those who identified with their gender and great relief for 
those who did not. 
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Medico-legal Metanarrative 1958-1965 
The questioning of masculinity, the rise of attention on women’s and gay and lesbian 
rights, and the intense publicity on Christine Jorgenson were accompanied by a burst of 
research as doctors, psychologists and scientists worked on concepts of sex and gender in 
the 50s and 60s. Because researchers could not identify a physiological cause for such 
behaviors as transvestism or transsexuality, sex psychology gained credibility, originating 
with Freud’s theories of sexuality and fetishism, morphing into the field of sexology. The 
Johns Hopkins psychologist John Money and his ideas most significantly influenced 
concepts and treatment of sex and gender throughout the latter half of the twentieth 
century and are still cited today, despite intense criticism. 
Men and women. Money (1955) first used the linguistic term “gender” for a more 
nuanced distinction between what Mead had called  sex and the sex role, or in other 
words, to distinguish “male” from “masculinity” and “female” from “femininity.” 
Consequently, definitions of sex and the newly-minted term “gender” started to consider 
psychosocial factors and minimize the influence of biology. His concepts of gender and 
gender identity were embraced by feminists because they eliminated the possibility of 
biological determinism, where one’s destiny was determined by sex. By this time the 
psycho-social had become a standard ingredient in sex. Stoller & Rosen (1959) include 
“chromosomes, gonads, hormones, sex organs, and psychic pattern” in their definition of 
sex, writing that “the essential criterion is the strength of the patient’s identification with 
one sex or the other” or their gender identity (p. 261).   
While these developments were occurring in medicine and psychology, the legal 
scene remained relatively quiet. The legal dictionaries had not been revised since the 30s 
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and 40s. In the newer editions of Black’s, which gained dominance that has continued to 
the present day, the definitions were shorter, whereas Bouvier’s dictionary, which was 
predominately used prior to 1940, was expanded into an encyclopedia. Consequently, 
Bouvier’s contained more opportunities for editorializing, although the editors note, 
“there must necessarily be some imperfections,” and just hope it is “useful” (“Preface,” 
1948). In the 1951 edition of Black’s, the definition for “sex” was taken from Webster’s 
Dictionary rather than case law, statutes, or medicine: “The sum of the peculiarities of 
structure and function that distinguish a male from a female organism; the character of 
being male or female” (p. 1541). “Character” seems to indicate an acknowledgement of 
gender role, but “women,” remain biological, as merely “all the females of the human 
species…who have arrived at the age of puberty” (p. 1779). Entries for “Husband,” and 
“Wife,” note that they are correlatives of each other (thus excluding any notion of same-
sex marriage). The entry for “Husband and Wife” proclaims it “one of the great domestic 
relationships,” where “the legal existence of a wife is incorporated with that of her 
husband” (p. 875). Bouvier’s contains many of the same elements as the previous edition; 
however, an acknowledgement of growing women’s rights begrudges, “formerly, he 
might use such gentle force to restrain her of her liberty…but now this is otherwise” 
(1948, p. 512). However, he may restrain her from “committing a crime” or interfering 
with the exercise of his parental control over his children.” It also warns that “any 
chastisement inflicted on the wife renders him guilty of assault and battery” (p. 512), 
which had not had been a concern in the past.  
“Marriage,” however, newly notes twice that it is the “relation of one man and 
one woman” and that it is “founded on the distinction of sex,” cementing 
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heteronormativity (p. 1123). Bouvier’s (1948) makes great pains to indicate that marriage 
“is something more than a civil contract” despite several states considering it such, and 
more than mere “temporary agreement to dwell together for a time for the gratification of 
sexual desires” (p. 758). “Married woman” as opposed to “wife” has much more 
extensive definitions, two full pages’ worth, mostly indicating specific direction for 
property disputes with husbands.  
However, since social norms were shifting, more women were educated and 
expected to use their educations in a profession. The circumstances that women met in 
their workplaces underscored the condition of inequality. During this timeframe, World 
War II had caused shortages in both physicians and attorneys (as well as other male-
dominated fields), which provided unprecedented opportunity for women to enter 
practice (Bowman, 2009, p. 3). Women joined the discourse of their respective fields, 
providing them somewhat of a voice, yet during this timeframe prior to the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, they had access and more voice, but few legal protections, being offered 
lower salaries, no partnership opportunities, and general disrespect and discrimination in 
their workplaces. Women’s rights elsewhere followed suit. Though they had access, they 
were made to feel unwelcome and incompetent in institutions previously restricted to 
men. Though women were legally allowed to serve on juries, they were rarely called 
because although the U.S. had experienced the “enlightened emancipation of women 
from the restrictions and protections of bygone years, and their entry into many parts of 
community life formerly considered to be reserved to men, woman is still regarded as the 
center of home and family life” (Hoyt v. Florida, 1961), which allowed the automatic 
exemption of women from jury duty because of presumed family responsibilities.	  The 
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legal discourse took a vicious and insulting turn in tone compared to the nineteenth 
century discourse, which, however misdirected, celebrated so-called “women’s 
characteristics.” 
With women’s admission to the medical institution no longer an issue, the debate 
shifted from whether to admit them to the field to the competence of those in the field. 
Echoing conditions in the legal field, a 1959 editorial in the Journal of the National 
Medical Association, the journal of the organization for African-American physicians, 
points out the insidiousness of discrimination against women physicians—that it is worse 
than that against black physicians—and that in the NMA, “equal recognition is extended 
to all members based on merit” rather than sex or race (“Our Lady Members,” 1959, p. 
306). In the AMA, one woman served as a delegate from 1958-1968, but an official 
antidiscrimination statement from the AMA would not appear until the 1970s. 
The impact of the Civil Rights movement was felt in legislation for women’s 
rights. The Equal Pay Act of 1963 stated:  
No employer … shall discriminate…between employees on the basis of sex by 
paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at 
which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for 
equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and 
responsibility. 
The next year, the 1964 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act was passed, which prohibits 
discrimination for specific protected classes, including sex, race, color, religion and 
national origin and established the EEOC. Section k read:  
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The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but are not limited to, 
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; 
and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. 
However, inclusion in the Civil Rights Act was not considered a foregone conclusion for 
women. The process of getting the Civil Rights Act passed pitted white women against 
people of color, and “sex” was added as a last moment addition, some argue in an effort 
to kill the bill (Menand, 2014). Eight civil rights acts were passed between 1866 and 
1991, and the 1964 act was the only one that mentioned sex. The second wave struggle 
for women’s rights was just beginning and would accelerate into the 1970s.  
Intersex. Intersex people continued to attract attention, even more publicly than in the 
past. Money’s 1952 Harvard dissertation, Hermaphroditism: An inquiry into the nature of 
a human paradox, studied the psychological aspects of intersexuality and led to a 
partnership with psychiatrists Joan and John Hampson. In a study of 105 intersex people, 
they found that 95 percent identified with the gender under which their parents had raised 
them (Money, Hampson & Hampson, 1957). This led them to believe that sex could be 
surgically created and gender could be psychologically reinforced. Though the 
predominant term used was “hermaphrodite,” an increasing amount medical texts such as 
Hermaphroditos: the Human Intersex, an endocrinology text from 1946 and a urology 
text from 1962, Human Intersex, show the current usage of “intersex” emerging. 
Highly prolific, Money published dozens of articles over this timeframe and made 
several television appearances, advocating for the “neutrality-at-birth” viewpoint, arguing 
that intersex babies could be assigned a convenient sex at birth, the sex surgically 
reinforced and the gender socially reinforced. He was heavily influenced by Freud and 
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consequently the presence or absence of a penis weighed heavily on the decision making. 
For example, Money and his followers would recommend boys born with a small or no 
penis to be “assigned female sex, undergo surgical feminization, and be raised as a girl” 
to avoid the “intolerable psychic burden” of possessing a small penis (Rosario, 2007, pp. 
263, 267). Since constructing a vagina rather than a functioning penis is surgically easier, 
the particular circumstances were often dictated by the convenience of the medical team. 
This development led to the rise of the influence of psychiatrists, as they became experts 
in determining “optimal sex,” and thus provided recommendations to surgeons and 
endocrinologists. “True sex,” then, was abandoned, and the “best” sex for the 
circumstances became what was sought. Thus began what Dreger (1998a) calls “The Age 
of Surgery” because surgical “correction” advanced to a point where it became the 
standard of care for intersex people.  
In Bouvier’s Legal Dictionary, a “hermaphrodite” was called “A person of doubtful or 
double sex; one possessing, really or apparently, and in more or less developed form, 
some or all of the genital organs of both sexes” and had no referent (1948, p. 860). A 
medical jurisprudence article from 1960 used surprisingly current terminology—intersex 
and sex variation—for the first time describing medical rather than social methods of 
sustaining a particular sex. It describes how, historically, intersex people “were allowed” 
to choose their desired sex, but dismisses the value of self-authorship. Echoing John 
Money, the authors recommend a more “common-sense” method where the “physician 
consult[s] with the parents to decide which physical and psychic sex the individual 
resembles more closely and then, by surgery and endocrine treatment…help the 
individual develop as far as possible as a member of that sex” (Bowman & Engle, 1960, p. 
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295). The urge to uncover “true sex” continued, under the auspices of finding “optimal 
sex.”  
Trans people. The term “transgender” still would not be coined until the 70s and not 
used widely until the 1990s, but the concept was gaining prominence, and the nuances 
began to be differentiated during this time period, including separating it from 
homosexuality. “Transvestism” and “transexualism” (with one “s”), in Cauldwell’s 1949 
usage, were overlapping concepts respectively referring to occasional cross-dressers and 
those, usually men, who felt they were in the wrong gender. A column in the LA Times, 
written by an emeritus consultant at the Mayo Clinic, points out that “transvestites aren’t 
homosexuals,” and either way, as a physician, he did not “see how a youth could be 
injured by having a homosexual experience” (Alvarez, 1957, p. B28). The terms 
eventually separated themselves as sex reassignment surgeries became more common and 
the term came to mean those who had actually transitioned beyond cross-dressing. 
Throughout the 60s, transsexuality was considered “an intense, usually obsessive, desire 
for a complete sexual transformation” through surgery or other means (Bowman & Engle, 
1960, p. 306). Burchard (1965) completely separated the concepts into two distinct 
syndromes, arguing that transvestism usually occurred in the home, transvestites typically 
identified with their birth sex in the course of everyday life, and that no further 
progression to transsexuality typically occurred. In his categorization of transvestites, 
Benjamin (1954), an endocrinologist, echoing language used about women, noted the 
feminine “constitution” of transvestites, but unable to pin it on a physical cause, suggests 
a “chromosomal sex disturbance” and calls it “psychic hermaphroditism” (p. 223).  
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Freud’s influence resonated when speculating on the causes of transsexuality. Brown 
(1960) notes that biogenetic explanations for trans behavior were popular because 
subjects recall feeling mis-gendered from as long as they can remember; however, he 
writes that conditioning from parents caused an “imprinting-like process to occur” when 
parents praise children during early cross-dressing experiences (p. 221). Psychotherapists 
appeared to have taken up the mantle of mother-blaming from phrenologists. Brown goes 
on to blame “immature, narcissistic, selfish, chronically unhappy” women for 
encouraging transvestism in their children. Fathers contribute through either absence or 
active dislike of their children (p. 221). Stoller’s views, too, changed from initially 
crediting biological influences to parenting, and in particular drawing a connection 
between mothers and the effeminacy of boys (Rosario, 2007).  
American physicians felt the impact of Christine Jorgenson’s 1952 sex 
reassignment almost immediately, though it was conducted in Denmark. Now that it was 
a realistic possibility, potential patients rushed to doctors to request sex reassignments 
with a sense of urgency that took them by surprise. Jorgenson’s Danish surgeon, 
Christian Hamburger, received 765 letters from 456 people requesting the surgery, nearly 
half from the U.S. (Hamburger, 1953, p. 363). Worden and Marsh (1955) wrote, “After 
the publicity in recent years about such operations, there have been increasing numbers of 
these men banging on the doors of surgeons insisting that they have the operation” (p. 
1292). On the referrals of Hamburger, Stoller and others, hundreds of potential patients 
were triaged by Harry Benjamin, the endocrinologist and sexologist who had argued 
against rehabilitation of transsexuals. Benjamin (1954) argued, “All therapy, in cases of 
transsexualism—to the best of my knowledge—has proved useless as far as any cure is 
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concerned. I know of no case where even intensive and prolonged psychoanalysis had 
any success” (p. 228). Thus, he prescribed hormone treatment and referred them to 
sympathetic surgeons, wherever they could be found, but warning that “castration 
produces a eunuch and not a woman” (p. 229). Meyerowitz (2002) describes how 
transsexuals offered themselves as research subjects, partly in an effort to get free 
treatment, but also to educate physicians, promote understanding and disassociate 
themselves with deviancy (p. 155). 
During this time period, the U.S. had begun a movement toward standardization 
as a means for the state to measure and regulate its economic interests. By 1954, driver’s 
licenses were required in all 50 states. Birth registry, though existing in some form or 
another since the 18th century, rose to 98 percent of births registered in 1950 because 
birth certificates became newly required for such activities as collecting social security 
benefits and ration books, school registration, and citizenship verification (Spade, 2008, 
pp. 765-766). All of these documents require sex to be identified, with only two options: 
M or F. Since this corresponded with the rise in sex reassignment, Benjamin and other 
doctors began to provide letters to certify that transsexuals were undergoing medical 
treatment to transition and that they should be legally treated as their new sex so that they 
could change their birth certificates (Meyerowitz, 2002, p. 165). At this point, the legal 
codes did not provide direction for amendment of documents specifically related to sex, 
so it was up to the discretion of the agency clerks to allow or disallow. Often, policy must 
be administered and enforced by low-level bureaucrats with personal biases or ignorance 
of the policies they must uphold, which leads to inconsistency. 
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Though not explicitly illegal, trans behaviors were subsumed under the umbrella of 
other crimes through creative interpretation of the criminal code. The English common 
law crime of “mayhem” was threatened to surgeons to prevent them from castrating their 
MTF transsexuals. Mayhem, legally defined as “Unlawfully and violently depriving the 
use of such of his members as may render him the less able in fighting,” and the law 
considers one who “disables, disfigures, or renders [a member] useless, or cuts or 
disables the tongue, or puts out an eye, or slits the nose, ear or lip” guilty of mayhem 
(Black’s, 1951, p. 1131). However, for mayhem to legally be committed, it must be 
“malicious and willful” (Brown v. United States, 1949), which did not apply to 
consensual surgery. A medical jurisprudence article mentions that mayhem laws were 
“extended to include any willful disfigurings of the body” to include castration or 
removal of healthy organs or tissue (Sherwin, 1954, p. 243). Though no doctors were 
ever charged with this, many were sufficiently threatened to prevent them from doing 
surgery, despite doing the same to intersex patients without hesitation. In many cases, 
surgeons required evidence of intersexuality to justify surgery (Meyerowitz, 2002, p. 
122).  In medical jurisprudence, Bowman and Engle (1960) admit that the mayhem laws 
are a stretch, but that it is all that is available “for want of a suitable modern law” (p. 307). 
They could only pull together a few instances of particular cases, rather than a body of 
work indicating a consistent view.  
A similar stretch was needed to convict people for trans behavior. For example, public 
cross-dressers were often subject to vagrancy statutes such as New York’s 1958 Criminal 
Code, which defined a vagrant as “a person, who, having his face painted, discolored, 
covered or concealed or being otherwise disguised, in a manner calculated to prevent his 
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being identified” in public places (New York Code of Criminal Procedures, 1967). In 
pointing out the need for reform in American sex laws, Ploscowe (1960) writes that 
“sexual activity is largely private” and thus the unenforceable, inconsistent illegality of 
private, consensual acts were indications of American naiveté vis-à-vis the more liberal 
English law and needlessly harmed such people as transvestites and adolescents (pp. 217-
218). 
Also showing the influence of psychology, the courts began to include psychological 
evaluations or personality inventories to measure masculinity or femininity through a 
multitude of methods, from figure-drawing, to list-making to scales. However, they were 
also commonly used to detect perversion in the form of homosexuality, such as in the 
case of People v. Barnett, where a man was accused of pedophilic behavior. Rather than 
being called a pedophile, his supposed feminine qualities were identified as products of a 
“congenitally bad brain and glandular makeup under the influence of the bad habits of a 
corrupt environment.” Because his body was womanly, as was his mind, as proven by 
psychological survey:   
Just as nature has broadened his pelvis . . . so has nature made him associate 
words one with the other in a feminine rather than masculine way. Given him the 
visual imagery of a woman, caused him to seek and retain knowledge that is 
feminine, caused him to respond to anger provocations more as a woman than a 
man. Given him likes and dislikes of a great number of sorts, which are common 
to the female rather than the male. Forced him to choose material for art work, 
writing, studying, travelling, in a female manner in the ratio of 10 to 2. Nature has 
so built him that authoritative scientific tests of the total masculinity or femininity 
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in his nature given him a score 85 points away from the average masculine score. 
(Male average 52: female average 70: Barnett's score — feminine 33) Such a long 
list of abnormalities, variations or perversions of mind indicate ‘certain elements 
of mental disorder.’ (People v. Barnett, 1946) 
Though the inclusion of self-reported data is an important move toward agency, the 
scores pointed to the stereotypical behaviors associated with each gender, implying that 
those behaviors were somehow inherent to men and women. As an example of the many 
personality inventories that sprung up during that time, the Guilford-Zimmerman 
Temperament survey (1949) measured masculinity by positioning femininity as a failure 
of masculinity. The questionnaire asks questions such as, “The sight of ragged or soiled 
fingernails is repulsive to you,” and “The sight of large bugs and spiders gives you a 
‘creepy’ feeling.” “You would rather be a building contractor than a nurse,” “You would 
rather go to an athletic event than a dance.” “You would rather be an interior decorator 
than an architectural engineer,” “You cry rather easily,” and “Odors of perspiration 
disgust you.” The characteristics listed below describe what personality traits make one 
masculine, according to the survey:  
Masculine Feminine 
Interest in masculine activities and 
vocations        
Interest in feminine activities and 
vocations 
Not easily disgusted                                 Easily disgusted 
Hardboiled Sympathetic 
Resistant to fear                                       Fearful 
 Romantic interests 
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Inhibition of emotional expressions Emotional expressiveness 
Little interest in clothes and styles Much interest in clothes and styles 
 Dislike of vermin 
Not only is femininity positioned as a deficit of masculinity, but also the “feminine 
activities and vocations” reinforce stereotypical behaviors and desires as an inherently 
female and does not acknowledge the social limitations at play.  
Social Context 1971-1979  
The upswing of second-wave feminism, as well as momentum in psychiatry, 
psychology, and sexual medicine led to some of the most influential advances in medical 
and psychological research relating to sex and gender in the 1950s and early 60s. 
However, these advancements in combination with legal blowback from the 1950s were 
just the nascent beginning of a torrent of activity in the next decade. During the 1970s, 
conservative forces pushed back against many of the liberalities of the1960s. The 
Vietnam War was winding down; the Kent State shootings occurred in 1970. The Equal 
Rights Amendment finally passed in 1972 (but failed to be ratified). The Joy of Sex was 
published in 1970. Ms. magazine launched in 1972, and in that same year, Shirley 
Chisholm, a black woman, ran for U.S. President.  
The women’s movement became a central theme in advertising, and Bradley 
(2003) describes how the industry found itself the target of vocal critique by women’s 
groups such as NOW, who focused shaming campaigns on the agencies behind sexist or 
exploitative advertisements. In 1968, Virginia Slims’ “You’ve come a long way baby” 
campaign was launched, and though it purportedly celebrated feminism, it was criticized 
for adopting the movement for commercial gain. An airline campaign caused outrage by 
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suggesting businessmen “fly” airplanes with female names (Bradley, 2003). Starting with 
Friedan’s critique of mass media in The Feminine Mystique, the industry began to look 
inwardly by evaluating its practices related to women and encouraging more women to 
the industry. An ad in Advertising Age in 1970 proclaimed “The Lady of the House is 
Dead” and asked that women be treated with more respect in advertising campaigns, 
rather than as silly, sexual housekeepers (27 April, p. 86).  In 1972, AT&T depicted a 
female telephone line installer, and in 1978, the Enjoli perfume ads debuted, featuring a 
woman who could “have it all:” be feminine, run her household, and work outside the 
home.   
Radical feminism also responded to the idea of assimilation by positing 
separatism and androgyny as solutions. Throughout the 1970’s, a number of writings 
about androgyny were published. Radical Kate Millet (1970) argued in Sexual Politics 
that the patriarchy maintains control by emphasizing biological difference. Millett 
advocated for a style of androgyny that took on the strongest traits of masculinity and 
femininity. Also in 1970, Shulamith Firestone’s The Dialectic of Sex appeared, also 
arguing for androgyny, but an all-encompassing physical androgyny that relied on 
technology to remove the burden of reproduction from women. Heilbrun’s (1974) 
Toward a Recognition of Androgyny also appeared during that timeframe. At the same 
time, radical feminists regularly debated transsexualism’s relationship to feminism. Trans 
people were active in the Stonewall riots of 1968, and MTF trans individuals attempted to 
participate in the feminist movement, but were not fully embraced by feminists or the gay 
rights movements (which were also suspicious of each other) (Greenberg, Herald & 
Strasser, 2010, p. 15; cf. Raymond 1977, Raymond, 1979). The Combahee River 
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Collective issued their statement on black feminism in 1974, articulating the complaint 
that academic feminism presumed affluent whiteness and leading to later recognition of 
intersectionality.  
The period shortly after the seventeenth edition of the DDC was published was one of 
the most active times for medical sex and gender research. In 1965, the Gender Identity 
Clinic at Johns Hopkins University opened, propelled by John Money and surgeon 
Claude Migeon, and surgeons there began performing experimental sex change surgeries, 
although clients found that the clinic’s focus was more on sexuality rather than gender 
identity (Buckley, 1966; Witkin, 2014). John Money published prolifically prior to and 
throughout this time period, (amassing almost 1,200 publications in his lifetime) as he 
refined the conceptual distinction between “sex” and “gender” “gender identity” and 
“gender role” first articulated by him in 1955. Though Money’s theories changed the 
paradigm or episteme of sex and gender conceptualizations, critics abounded. In 1965, 
the first article by Milton Diamond, another sexologist who became Money’s lifelong 
gadfly, rival, and eventual debunker appeared. Another critic, Armstrong (1966) argued 
that gender reassignment at any point, not just at birth, was psychologically feasible, and 
included a testimonial, written by a patient.  He pointedly writes:  
1. Psychological sex and sexual behaviour are not solely dependent upon 
environmental psychological factors such as the sex of rearing but also upon physical 
aetiological factors, and both physical and environmental conditions play a part. 
2. Reassignment or "change of sex" is not necessarily an extreme psychological hazard 
and psychologically injurious. (p. 1256) 
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Undeterred, in 1967, John Money undertook his most famous project, in which he 
engineered the sex and gender of Bruce Reimer, an identical twin whose penis had been 
burned off in a circumcision accident as a baby. As a non-intersex, infant twin, Reimer 
presented the perfect opportunity to test the neutrality-at-birth hypothesis since his 
brother could serve as the control group and he was still unaware of his gender. Money 
had a surgeon castrate the infant so that he could no longer produce sex hormones, and 
began therapy to raise him as a girl named Brenda (John/Joan, in the parlance of Money’s 
research). As required by his neutral-at-birth hypothesis, Money instructed the Reimers 
never to reveal that Brenda had been a boy, or the gender change would fail. According 
to Money’s research reports, Brenda responded well to being a girl, thus proving his 
theory, although this would be eventually disputed. 
After the relative legal quiet of the 1950s and 60s, the 70s brought on an explosion of 
jurisprudence and finally a revision of Black’s Legal Dictionary (Bouvier’s had begun to 
recede in popularity). The introduction to Black’s recognizes the fallibility and 
temporariness of the law in the introduction: “A word, in the often quoted dictum of Mr. 
Justice Holmes, is ‘the skin of a living thought,’ and the words of statutes and judicial 
opinions reflect the contemporary thinking of legislators and jurists” (Black’s, 1968, p. 
III). Legal decisions regarding sex and gender made during this timeframe have been 
influential even until the present day. 
Medical-legal Metanarrative 1971-1979 
Men and women. Money’s influence was at its peak during this timeframe. Both 
sex and gender came to be considered learned behavior. Money and Ehrhardt (1972) 
announced the success of the Reimer case in their landmark and best-selling book, Man 
& Woman, Boy & Girl, stating that children who have undergone surgery and hormone 
134	  
	  
	  
	  
therapy will unproblematically transition to the chosen gender, as long as they remain 
ignorant of their original sex. They write, “For the ordinary little boy growing up, 
everything pertaining to the female gender role is brain-coded as negative and unfit for 
use” (p. 19). But “brain-coded” means that they are following a gender “template” set 
forth by the models in their life. No consideration was given for their chromosomal or 
anatomical sex. Money (1973) described how androgen “instructs” the nervous system to 
lean toward gendered behavior, such as “vigorous, competitive energy,” “dominance 
assertion,” and “parentalism” in children’s play (p. 7). Once the genitalia are developed, 
the next set of “instructions” comes from the social input of the people around the child 
who react to the external genitalia by shaping gendered behavior.  Inconsistencies in this 
behavior lead to behavioral confusion, but can be changed by “social or cultural decree” 
(p. 8). Parents of intersex children were required as part of the treatment to strongly 
reinforce the gender roles. He writes, “The less the experience of ambivalence in the sex 
of rearing, the less the chance of developmental ambiguity of gender identity/role” 
(Money, 1976, p. 154).  
More shifts in thinking occurred elsewhere about traditional gender roles, 
particularly as women entered institutions where they had previously had little voice. 
Though the Civil Rights Act had been passed, the legal discourse had not changed the 
behavior of the major law firms, or other employers, for that matter, who were still 
openly making hiring decisions based solely on sex, asking applicants if they were 
planning on having children, telling them outright that women will make less than men, 
or stating flatly that they do not hire women (Bowman, 2009, p. 14). In the 1970s, black 
women lawyers had a better chance of being hired than white women and black men 
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lawyers. As one black woman lawyer in 1972 put it, “I’m a show woman, and a show 
nigger, all in one salary” (as cited in Epstein, 2012, p. 88). Their intersectional identities 
provided showpieces for law firms to demonstrate their compliance with diversity hiring. 
In 1975 a class-action suit was filed based on this conduct by women law school 
students as well as the miserable treatment for those actually hired. The case was by 
chance assigned to a black woman judge, to the dismay of the defendants, who moved 
that she recuse herself because as a woman she would exercise “extrajudicial bias.” In 
other words, they wanted a woman’s subjectivity removed from the discourse about 
women. The case was settled in 1977 in favor of the women plaintiffs after a long, bitter, 
and childish struggle, with the judge writing that the defense’s “squabbling and hostility 
impeded the progress of the litigation and unduly burdened the court counsel” and 
reprimanded the defense for calling the women’s attorney a “Yahoo” (Blank v. Sullivan 
& Cromwell, 1975). This resulted into a surge of women gaining entrance into the 
profession; however, the “othering” was successful, and the result was that more 
acrimony ensued within firms as the discrimination went underground, and women began 
to leave after an average of three and a half years due to poor treatment, incompatibility 
with the climate set by the men (golf, dirty jokes) and the perceptions of them as 
incompetent because of commitment to family (Bowman, 2009, p. 15). They could not 
accept their role as “other” and left. Equal treatment was not addressed until 1977 with 
the first sexual harassment case. This case echoes many other sex-discrimination 
employment cases of the era, such as Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive (1967), in which 
Colgate-Palmolive terminated a group of women from their factory jobs in order to 
protect them from the physical conditions, but kept all the men. Jury duty was finally 
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compulsory for women with Taylor v. Louisiana (1975), where difference is still 
admitted, but for the purpose of inclusion instead of exclusion: 
The thought is that the factors which tend to influence the action of women are 
the same as those which influence the action of men—personality, background, 
economic status—and not sex. Yet it is not enough to say that women when 
sitting as jurors neither act nor tend to act as a class. Men likewise do not act as a 
class. But, if the shoe were on the other foot, who would claim that a jury was 
truly representative of the community if all men were intentionally and 
systematically excluded from the panel? The truth is that the two sexes are not 
fungible; a community made up exclusively of one is different from a community 
composed of both; the subtle interplay of influence one on the other is among the 
imponderables. To insulate the courtroom from either may not, in a given case, 
make an iota of difference. Yet a flavor, a distinct quality, is lost if either sex is 
excluded.  
In 1974, psychologist Sandra Bem, an advocate for androgyny, complained about how 
psychological research and the multitudes of sex inventories that had sprung up in the 
previous decades treated masculinity and femininity as “bipolar ends of a single 
continuum,” which resulted that an individual had to be one or the other, but could not be 
both (p. 155). Thus, she created her own inventory, the Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI), 
that acknowledges feminine traits, masculine traits and a new addition of androgynous 
traits, or those not associated with a particular gender. Bem also acknowledges that the 
characteristics listed in the inventory are not meant to be considered inherent to men or 
women, but rather what society deems desirable in men or women. Additionally, the 
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scores are independent of each other, which means that the scores do not “artificially 
force a negative correlation between masculinity and femininity” (p. 159). This signified 
a change in how sex difference was measured in relation to societal expectation rather 
than through overarching, universal traits that indicated that femininity was somehow a 
failure of masculinity. Additionally, the BSRI allows for an option of being a mix of 
feminine and masculine rather than having to be one or the other. The BSRI went on to 
be wildly popular, cited significantly more than other inventories in sex research (Beere, 
1990, p. 74). 
Some advances in women’s rights, however, resulted in the entrenchment of 
stereotyped ways of thinking. Though women were not included in combat or the draft, in 
the 70s the military had opened to women, starting with the all-volunteer service, starting 
in 1973 when the draft ended, and the admittance of women to the military academies 
starting in 1976. In 1971, several men filed a complaint charging unlawful gender-based 
discrimination because they had been drafted to fight in Vietnam. The exclusion of 
women from the draft was based on their exclusion from combat, which was a 
Department of Defense policy and had the force of law. Military officials justified their 
policy with “military need, rather than ‘equity,’” arguing that women, even in noncombat 
roles, would be “positively detrimental to the important goal of military flexibility.” 
Though it was not resolved until the 80s, the decision was justified by the male military’s 
authority (an echo chamber similar to the all-male bar in 1869) and popular opinion, 
which also echoes the “law of nature” invoked so often in the nineteenth century.  
Along with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, several anti-discrimination laws were passed 
in the early 1970s specific to medical education—Title VII of Public Law 92-147, the 
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Health Manpower Act and Title IX of the Higher Education Act—that resulted in a 
dramatic increase of women into medical school. In other legislation, the 1978 Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act added wording to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 stating that “on the 
basis of sex” also referred to pregnancy and pregnancy-related conditions. Between 1971 
and 1977, the amount of women graduating from medical school increased from six 
percent to about 30 percent (Bluestone, 1979, p. 760). Following the passage of these 
laws and the subsequent influx of women into the field, women physicians were studied 
intently, with many of the topics related to the hostile environment in medical schools 
(echoing the situation at Bellevue in the 1860s), the high suicide rate of women 
physicians, the work-life balance, and discrimination encountered by male doctors. Most 
of this discourse acknowledges that the difficulty of women in the profession relates to 
social circumstances (e.g. discrimination; family pressures) rather than women’s ability 
to perform.  
Intersex people. The term “intersex” came into common usage during this timeframe. 
As Money continued to develop his neutrality-at-birth hypothesis, he abandoned intersex 
research to focus on the John/Joan case. Additionally, few accounts of intersex 
psychotherapy exists beyond Stoller’s work because of the requirement, set in place by 
Money, that the gender assignment and corrective surgery kept hidden from the patient 
(Rosario, 2007). Furthermore, Young, et al. (1971) recommend that a team diagnose and 
present a physician-assigned sex “if this can be done before the parents are aware of the 
problem and they are presented with a united decision, whatever it is, there will be 
greater acceptance” (p. 86). Echoing Money, Young, et al. write, “The child’s confidence 
in his gender identity will stem from his parents” (p. 86). Consequently, intersex people, 
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particularly infants and children, were non-consensually subjected to developments in sex 
reassignment surgery that transsexuals fought for the right to undergo. Thus, intersex 
people were not usually aware or apprised of what they had undergone.  
The convenience of the team was still paramount. Young, et al. (1971) 
recommend that specific types of intersex children be raised as girls, as “they are less 
subject to the close scrutiny of their genitalia…both in early childhood and later in locker 
rooms and public rest rooms” (p. 87). Money (1976) argues that “Surgery is, without 
exception, imperative. The success of masculinizing corrective surgery is proportional to 
the size of the organ to begin with” (p. 153). The imperative to ensure a “normal” penis 
size seems to be an anxiety shared by those that had a penis. Rosenblum & Turner (1973) 
report a case note of a man living in rural South Carolina who lacked a penis because of a 
rare congenital condition. He reported a “’satisfactory’ marital relationship with his wife, 
finding sexual gratification through means other than penetration (p. 178). Rosenblum 
and Turner conclude that he displayed “no additional anomalies and by psychological 
testing was noted to adjusted to his situation in a reasonable fashion” (p. 179).  The 
patient’s rural upbringing likely contributed to his confidence and saved him from a life 
of confusion. Had he been presented at birth in a hospital without a penis, according to 
Money’s imperative, he would have had his testicles removed and been raised as a girl. 
Trans people. Discourse on trans people remained the province of psychoanalysis, 
endocrinology and the hybrid field of sexology. Harry Benjamin and Robert Stoller 
began their run of significant work on transsexuality in the late 60s. Though these works 
were written prior to the timeframe of 1971-1979, their influence extended well into that 
decade. Benjamin published his book The Transsexual Phenomenon in 1966 and 
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referring to “The symphony of sexes,” he articulated the changing understanding of sex: 
“The more sex is studied in its nature and implications, the more it loses an exact 
scientific meaning. The anatomical structures, so sacred to many, come nearer and nearer 
to being dethroned. Only the social and legal significances of sex emerge and remain” (p. 
6). Stoller’s book Sex and Gender appeared in 1968, in which he announced his 
conceptual division of sex and gender: 
The word sex in this work will refer to the male and female sex and the component 
biological parts that determine whether one is male or female…this obviously leaves 
tremendous areas of behavior, feelings, thoughts, and fantasies that are related to the 
sexes and yet do not have primarily biological connotations. It is for some of these 
psychological phenomena that the term gender will be used. (p. vi) 
Money’s voice, as elsewhere, was present here, too.  He credited chromosomes, but also 
traumatic experiences as causes of transvestism and transsexualism (1967). Benjamin, 
skeptical both of Money’s claims of the learnability of gender and psychotherapy, wrote, 
“a prenatal, neuro-endocrine disorder” likely underlies transsexual behavior, which 
explains “why psychotherapy cannot cure the transsexual, why the emotional distress 
goes to such depths as to demand surgery, and why endocrine therapy often brings such 
dramatic relief” (p. 136). Yet, even Benjamin’s sympathetic approach relies on deep-
seated ideas of feminine and masculine behavior. In a conference panel, he places the 
“hippy movement, with its long-haired boys and trousered girls” as one end of the 
transsexual spectrum (Benjamin, 1969, p. 135). This tension between the psychological 
and biological continues throughout the literature of the period.  
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Despite increasing sympathy for those seeking transition, researchers often still 
looked for “cures” or rehabilitation for transsexualism through various methods. 
Typically, psychotherapists opposed surgery because they felt transsexuality was a 
disorder or condition that could be cured through psychotherapeutic techniques (Green, 
2010, p. 1459). As a psychotherapist, Stoller (1968), too, opposed surgery, but he was 
one of the few that admitted that patients often were “less depressed an anxious, more 
sociable and affectionate” once they had reassignment surgery (p. 249). He only 
recommended sex changes for what he called “true transsexuals,” which were males who 
had been feminine since childhood, lived as women and did not use their penises for 
sexual pleasure (p. 251); however, his surgeon colleague acknowledged that patients 
quickly learned his requirements and began to present “the winning socio-sexual history” 
that would get his permission (Green, 2010, p. 1460). Rekers, et al. (1976) announce 
what they believe to be the first case of preventing transsexualism through parental 
reinforcement of gendered behaviors. Benjamin, in an addendum to The Transsexual 
Phenomenon (1969), though still advocating psychotherapy only as a means of helping 
trans people accept themselves as they are, tentatively recommends a drug used in 
epileptics as a “cure,” reported that it helped transvestites but that transsexuals remained 
unchanged (p. 137). He saw surgery or hormone therapy as the only “real” cure to 
transsexuality. Green, Newman, & Stoller (1972) recognize, as many did at the time, that 
a “cure” was less an effort to fix a disorder than to protect them from the persecution. 
They write, “While privately, one might prefer to modify society’s attitudes toward cross-
gender behavior, in the consultation room with an unhappy youngster, one feels far more 
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optimistic about modifying the behavior of that one child than the entire of society” (p. 
217). 
   The legal climate was a concern for researchers and clinicians, who combatted 
hysterical media reports of sex reassignments gone wrong. Benjamin (1969) describes 
how the New York Times overblew a case where two reassigned women developed breast 
cancer, defending his and other research and calling the cases mischaracterized and 
misleading. In the same article, he describes the fear and agony of the physician that the 
patient will either regret the decision or be denied beneficial surgery, resulting in 
unhappiness to the point of depression and suicide. To combat the chance of making a 
poor decision and slow down the patients who lied about their histories, Benjamin 
advises a year of therapy prior to any surgical intervention, which Money coined as the 
“Real Life Test,” and it eventually became standard practice. He recommends this not 
only for the patient’s health but for the physician’s protection as well. Since sex 
reassignment surgeries were considered cosmetic rather than medically necessary, they 
were not covered by insurance and the cost was prohibitive to most trans people, but as 
Benjamin (1969) notes, “Too often, transsexuals make their own decisions, find their 
surgeon and, under the driving and blinding force of their sex and gender confusion, act 
without anyone's consent or recommendation” (p. 137). Money & DePriest (1976) also 
recognizing the urgency of trans people to change sex, reported on several cases of trans 
people self-castrating but write that “the present climate” prevents cooperation between 
psychiatrists and surgeons to find out if rehabilitation of the transsexual anxiety had been 
relieved because of the removal of the organs (p. 294), indicating a fear of conspiracy.  
143	  
	  
	  
	  
In 1979, after a research study claimed that surgically-altered transsexuals were not 
better off after the surgeries, Johns Hopkins discontinued sex reassignment surgeries. It 
was widely considered to be an excuse to shut down the clinic by a new, more 
conservative administration (Brody, 1979; Witkin 2014). In her 1994 edition of the 
Transsexual Empire, Raymond credits Money’s position that pornography and incest 
were not necessarily damaging to children as part of the reason the Gender Identity Clinic 
at Johns Hopkins closed (p. xi). Despite this, around 25 hospitals around continued to 
conduct sex-reassignment procedures.  Richard Green, a surgeon and colleague of Robert 
Stoller, describes his experience assessing his legal risk for conducting a sex 
reassignment surgery around 1968: 
[The university attorney] conceded that I would be vulnerable to prosecution for 
mayhem. The penalty if convicted was up to 10 years in prison. Furthermore, since 
this proposed act involved two of us, a psychiatrist and a surgeon, it constituted 
conspiracy. The penalty was now up to 14 years. But, the university counsel reassured 
me, the University would pay our legal bill. [The patient] had her surgery. We were 
not prosecuted. (Green, 2010, pp. 1459-1460) 
The advances in surgical medicine resulting in a surge of sex reassignments in the 1950s 
resulted in legal aftereffects for trans people in the 70s, as those who had sought sex 
reassignment encountered the legal barriers for which no precedent existed. A 
sympathetic article in the Maryland Law Review stated:  
A sex reassignment operation may solve the transsexual's medical problem, but it 
is potentially the source of legal problems, because the law has not faced the 
question of defining an individual's sex. The paucity of legal precedents for 
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transsexuals leaves a void that is likely to be filled with inappropriate medical or 
moral judgments until laws are changed or interpreted so as to recognize this 
human phenomenon. (“Transsexuals in Limbo,” 1971, p. 236) 
Therefore, only tangentially-related laws were consulted as precedent. Matto (1972) notes 
a case of where a transsexual’s arrest invoked a century-old law intended to prevent 
farmers from dressing as Indians to protest rent laws (p. 104).  
Generally, in legal literature, transsexuals were treated more sympathetically than 
gays, who were still prosecuted under “perversion” and “unnatural acts” statutes. The 
Maryland law review article argues that transsexuals are subjected “to arrest whenever he 
appears in public wearing the clothes of his choice, but also forces him to face potential 
harassment and ridicule.... Although his behavior not in any way disruptive or destructive, 
the transsexual is subjected to legal and emotional punishment because his psychological 
development does not match his chromosomal makeup” (“Transsexuals in Limbo,” 1971, 
p. 253). The article argues the importance for a transsexual to be classified in the desired 
sex to avoid being cast as a homosexual. Though no legal reason existed to arrest trans 
people, they were often associated with homosexuality, treated as vagrants, or practiced 
prostitution, all of which were illegal (though Black’s restricts prostitution to women 
only) (Black’s, 1968, p. 1386). A psychological study on transsexuals passing notes that 
transsexual prostitutes were considered “double deviants” by the police, who constantly 
harassed them, including regular strip searches (Wojdowski & Tabor, 1976, p. 201). An 
article in Criminology writes that transsexuals’ greatest crime is “the possession of an 
undesirable unique characteristic that is sanctioned by society in general,” but that 
tolerance would grow because it “does not represent any real threat” (Matto, 1972, p. 98). 
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In medical jurisprudence, Holloway (1968) notes that he could not find any legal 
definition of sex, and writes that “the judiciary has relied exclusively on medical 
determinations of sex” (p. 289 note 42). “Transvestite,” “Transsexual,” and “Cross-dress” 
did not appear in Black’s 1968 edition, but “Hermaphrodite” hedged a bit more than in 
previous editions. “In medical jurisprudence. A person of doubtful or double sex; one 
possessing, really or apparently, and in more or less developed form, some or all of the 
genital organs of both sexes” (p. 860, emphasis mine).  A following definition of 
“Hermaphroditus tam masculo quam feminie comparatur, secundum prievalentiam sexus 
incalescentis” translates as “An hermaphrodite is to be considered male or female 
according to the predominance of the exciting sex” (p. 860). The originating references, 
to Henry de Bracton, and Coke’s Commentary on Littleton, are from thirteenth century 
and sixteenth century English law respectively, and are the same references used for the 
term “monster” (p. 1158). Clearly, the legal dictionaries did not rely on current medical 
determinations. Holloway (1968) referenced both John Money and the Bible as authority 
regarding trans people. In particular, Deuteronomy 22:5 (“A woman shall not wear that 
which pertaineth unto a man, neither shall a man put on a woman’s garment; for all that 
do are an abomination unto the Lord thy God) and Genesis 1:27 (“male and female he 
created them” are most often referenced (Holloway 1968; Brown 1960). However, often 
they are considered a factor to consider, not a final authority. 
As the number of sex-reassignments grew, sex designation on identification 
documents became an area of increasing legal cloudiness. Since birth sex is determined 
by a glance at the genitals, a birth certificate is legally considered prima facie evidence, 
which means only tenuously legally binding, rebuttable by other proof (“Transsexuals in 
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Limbo” 1971, p. 243). As of 1968, Illinois was the only state with a provision for 
amending birth certificates, and specifically referred to sex reassignment surgery (Vital 
Records Act, 1967). Some others provided for “correcting” errors (which generally meant 
a clerk would cross out the original designation and write the new one above it) and 
others for “altering,” which meant a new certificate was issued (Holloway, 1968, p. 288-
289). One New York case in 1966 allowed a “corrected” birth certificate to be reissued 
(Anonymous v. Weiner, 1966). The argument was that fraud could be committed if birth 
certificates could be changed, thus concealing one’s “true” identity. The legal test of 
fraud requires “intent to deprive another of his right, or some manner to do him an injury” 
and that damage needed to be shown (Black’s, 1968, p. 789). In 1965, the New York 
Board of Health asked for recommendations from the Committee on Public Health of the 
New York Academy of Medicine to help decide whether to grant requests to change sex 
on birth certificates.  The response recommended to deny such requests: 
1. Male-to-female transsexuals are still chromosomally males while ostensibly 
females. 
2. It is questionable whether laws and records such as birth certificates should be 
changed and thereby used as a means to help psychologically ill persons in their 
social adaptation. The Committee is therefore opposed to a change of sex on birth 
certificates in transsexualism. (cited in Swartz, 1997) 
But by the early 1970s several states’ statutes allowed individuals to change the sex 
designation on their birth certificates (i.e. Arizona Revised Statute, 1969; Louisiana’s 
Revised Statute, 1971). Despite the potential legal complications, Wojdowski & Tabor 
(1976) found that most trans forged ahead with medical treatments and “ignored possible 
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legal problems, planning to tackle a legal change of sex designation after surgery had 
been completed” (p. 202). 
Along with birth certificate amendment, the validity of marriage became one of 
the most common legal disputes of the 1970s (and still is). Though marriage was defined 
in Black’s as between a man and a woman, some states did not specifically outline this in 
their own codes. In some cases, the issue at hand was divorce, where one party wanted 
the marriage to never have existed and used the conditions of marriage as between a man 
and a woman as leverage when one partner was trans or intersex. In others, property or 
inheritance disputes arose from either a disgruntled spouse or the family. In all cases, the 
question revolved around whether the marriage was valid or not because of the 
impossibility of same-sex marriage. Thus, the courts needed to explicitly determine the 
sex of both spouses. In 1970, an influential English case, Corbett v. Corbett, established a 
standard that gonads, chromosome patterns and genitals determined “true sex,” and 
consequently post-operative transsexuals would legally still be considered their birth sex, 
despite their presentation or desired sex. Additionally, the consideration that the marriage 
could not and was not consummated (because of an “artificial vagina”) led the court to 
decide the marriage was invalid. This determination was meant for the purposes of 
determining whether a marriage was legitimate (hetero) or invalid (same-sex), and the 
consummation aspect pointed toward heteronormativity and “normal” sexual practices. 
Though it was a British law, in the lack of U.S. precedent, it was cited in U.S. cases. 
Several subsequent cases invalidated marriages where one spouse changed sexes 
following the marriage ceremonies based on the illegality of same-sex marriage, even 
though the pair was heterosexual (Anonymous v. Anonymous, 1971). In B v. B (1974), the 
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ruling followed Corbett by invalidating the marriage between a woman and a trans man. 
M.T. v. J.T. (1976), New Jersey was the first court to evaluate sex during marriage, not at 
birth, reasoning that the marriage had been consummated. The decision stated: 
It is the opinion of the court that if the psychological choice of a person is 
medically sound, not a mere whim, and irreversible sex reassignment surgery has 
been performed, society has no right to prohibit the transsexual from leading a 
normal life. Are we to look upon this person as an exhibit in a circus side show? 
What harm has said person done to society? The entire area of transsexualism is 
repugnant to the nature of many persons within our society. However, this should 
not govern the legal acceptance of a fact.  
During the 1970s, women’s rights were largely legally recognized, but the decade 
was spent attempting to litigate social change, fighting depictions of their gender based 
on social norms and a presumed biological imperative. Similarly, the publicity and 
research attention paid to trans people in the 1950s and 60s also found its way to the 
courts in the 1970s as trans people fought to have their rights recognized in their new 
sexes. During this time, the focus seemed to be on finding the causes for and “fixing” 
transsexuality through two extreme methods: rehabilitation or sex reassignment. Intersex 
people continued to be an area of interest, and were treated even more as objects as 
experimental gender-assigning therapy and “corrective” surgeries based on parent and 
medical and psychological expertise. The next chapter examines the genealogy of the 
three concepts of women, trans and intersex people as represented in the DDC during the 
same three timeframes. 
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Chapter 5: Findings, Internal Procedures 
	  
Prior to Melvil Dewey’s innovation with the decimal classification, libraries had typically 
used “fixed location” schemes that classified books in broad categories that ordered the 
books according to the day they were added to the collection. This was a holdover from 
closed stacks, where librarians retrieved books for users rather than allowing them to 
browse the stacks. In the late nineteenth century, libraries came to be seen as instruments 
of self and societal improvement and with that came open access to stacks and a host of 
organization problems (Satija, 2013, p. 2). Dewey, from the start, recognized the 
imperfection of the DDC and expected and expressed that it would continually change. 
Furthermore, in terms of subjectivity, though it came to be a women-intensive profession, 
the first woman librarian was not hired in the United States until 1871 (Maack, 1994, p. 
229). This chapter identifies the changing views of gender and sex in the gender- and sex-
related classes in the DDC through the appropriate timeframes. 
Dewey Decimal Classification 1871-1876; 1876-1885 
While devising the first edition, Dewey visited several major libraries including 
the Boston Atheneum (whose director was Charles Cutter), the Boston Public Library and 
the Harvard University Library and read the works of the directors of the Cincinnati 
Public Library and the St. Louis Public Library, who were influenced by the schemes of 
Francis Bacon and Hegel (Wiegand, 1996, p. 19-23). Dewey discussed his vigor for 
creating a better classification system in spiritual terms, as the library’s mission is to 
supplement the basic education provided in school, offering a method of self-directed, 
self-improvement idealized in that time period, particularly in New York (Wiegand, 1996, 
p. 18-19). In his first edition, Dewey emphasizes that the scheme makes it easy to identify 
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the “character of each person’s reading” (p. 8) perhaps identifying him as the originator 
of big data. Dewey graduated from Amherst College with sixty-five other white, 
Protestant, Anglo-Saxon males the year following publication of the scheme (Wiegand, 
1996, p. 24).  
Dewey’s relationship with women was complicated. He fought to include women 
in library education and promoted them to librarianship. He instrumentally, if not single-
handedly, is responsible for librarianship as a female-intensive profession. He reflected 
some of the biases of time, yet he was aware of their subjective nature. For example, in 
1886 he wrote an essay explaining why women are “handicapped” as librarians, but his 
reasoning was because they did not have the business training that men had, suggesting 
that with an equal education, women would be just as successful as men:  
Women have usually poorer health and as a result lose more time from illness and 
are more crippled by physical weakness when on duty. The difficulty is most 
common to women, as are bright ribbons and thin shoes and long hair, but it is a 
question of health, not sex. A strong, healthy woman is worth more than a feeble 
man for the same reason that a strong man gets more than a weak woman. (Dewey, 
1886, p. 20) 
He goes on to describe some of the social disadvantages women have suffered, yet 
concludes, “With equal health, business training and permanence of plans, women will 
still usually have to accept something less than men because of the consideration which 
she exacts and deserves on account of her sex,” with the justification that men can, in an 
emergency, lift a large box or “climb a ladder to the roof” (p. 20).  
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What follows is a discursive analysis of what Foucault calls “internal procedures.” 
As discussed in the methodology section, internal procedures refers only to each of the 
selected editions of the classification DDC and its associated discourse, addressing each 
epistemological aspect laid out in the methodology section (authority, rhetorical space, 
ontology, etc.).  These clues will be related to the gender topics (or lack of) found in the 
classification. This section documents the overarching epistemic attitude expressed in the 
discourse and traces the trajectory of the ontogeny of the gender-related topics within 
each rendition of the classification. The more specific epistemic connection with the 
medical and legal discourse will be discussed in the final chapter. 
First Edition, 1876 
The first edition of the DDC appeared in 1876 at the first meeting of the 
American Library Association. The entire volume covers just 42 pages, including the 
classification schedules and the relative index, the directory that points users to the 
preferred heading.  In the first edition, no general class heading exists specifically named 
“women” or “men” or unsurprisingly for the concept of trans, but a few feminine-related 
headings and “hermaphrodites” do appear in the scheme and relative index, which will 
explained below. Because of the temporal proximity, the timeframes surrounding the first 
and second editions are combined when discussing the medical and legal discourse; 
however, the first two editions of the DDC differ significantly, so they will be discussed 
separately. 
Authority. The epistemic clue of authority, where the degree of subjectivity allowed 
to the known object is determined, indicates who is making decisions about the 
ontological characteristics of sex and gender. Do women define their own characteristics, 
or do intersex people have a say in choosing their desired sexes (if they even identify 
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with one or the other) or does someone else tell them what their “true sex” is? Do trans 
people get classified in their birth sex or their desired gender? How are these questions 
treated in the discourse or manifested in the classification? Who or what is the 
enunciative modality? 
Dewey did not claim authorship of the first edition, publishing it anonymously, and 
he did not sign the ten-page preface. The only place his name appears is on the copyright 
statement. The preface mainly consists of instructions interspersed with sales pitches, 
emphasizing the amount of external works he consulted. He remarks, “It was the result of 
several months’ study…of hundreds of book and pamphlets, and in over fifty personal 
visits to various American libraries” (p. 3). He professed that “The author has no desire to 
claim original invention for any part of his system,” claiming influence from a Milanese 
library, and that “the inverted Baconian arrangement of the St. Louis Library has been 
followed” (1876, p. 10). Throughout the preface, Dewey removes himself from the power 
politics of knowledge mapping by repeatedly referencing his influences. He positions 
himself as a humble, hard-working, and anonymous librarian concerned first and 
foremost with how the utility of his scheme could benefit librarians and users alike.  
Rhetorical Space. Whether purposefully or not, Dewey did not include women in the 
classification, other than through the classes of “woman-education” and “woman-
suffrage.” Education and voting rights could not be avoided, as those were the 
characteristics that thrust women into the public eye at the time. The only class with an 
explicitly gendered heading is 376 Education—Female. Under Olson and Schlegl’s 
(2001) rubric, this heading treats the education of women as exceptional. By adding the 
qualifier of female to education, the assumption is made that the education of females is 
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anomalous from the males-only norm, which was represented by Education (p. 67). No 
equivalent masculine qualifier exists, which implies that education alone means that the 
education of males is natural and normal.  
The only other explicitly feminine topic, 618 Obstetrics and Sexual science 
again expresses a devaluation based on where it is rhetorically situated. Dewey (1876) 
explains that for convenience of the user, “the most nearly allied subjects precede and 
follow” each other, meaning that that proximity implies a close relationship (p. 7). 
Following this principle, women’s reproductive science is considered by Dewey to be 
allied closely with 619 Veterinary medicine. No other category includes feminine topics, 
and women are not explicitly mentioned in 640 Domestic Economy. Comaromi (1976), a 
later editor of the DDC, in his largely complimentary history of the system, has no 
comment that the category of “women” was omitted altogether from the first edition, but 
does complain that Domestic Economy, an implicitly feminine category, should not be 
elevated “to the same level as medicine or engineering or any of the other skills with a 
heading in the Useful Arts” (p. 73). “Hermaphrodites,” with a scientific aura, appears in 
the relative index, directing catalogers to 590 Zoology for animals or 612 Physiology for 
humans.  
The relative index is another of Dewey’s innovations, a tool included with the 
DDC that helps catalogers class topics that do not command classes names themselves or 
are alternative names for the same concept. Dewey (1876) explains, “Many subjects, 
apparently omitted, will be found in the Index, assigned, with allied subjects, to a heading 
which bears the name of the most important only” (p. 6). In other words, users are 
directed to the “correct” or preferred heading as determined by him. In the first edition’s 
154	  
	  
	  
	  
subject index, some feminine-identified concepts can be found, but they all in some way 
relate to education, reproduction, religion or exceptional circumstances—parallels of the 
headings that exist in the classification. 
Fallibility/Universality. The original stated purpose of the DDC in this edition is 
efficient access to information; however, without claiming to be accurate: “Theoretical 
harmony and exactness has been repeatedly sacrificed to the practical requirements of the 
library” (1876, p. 4). Dewey did not claim to map all knowledge as many other classifiers 
did (Frohmann, 1994b, p. 113). Dewey argues, “Philosophical theory and accuracy have 
been made to yield to practical usefulness” (p. 4). He admits, “the impossibility of 
making a satisfactory classification of all knowledge as preserved in books, has been 
appreciated from the first, and nothing of the kind attempted (p. 4). He also requested 
feedback from “quite a number of librarians,” but concedes that most of their feedback 
was positive and only minor shelving problems resulted from the implementation of his 
system. Once Dewey received more feedback over the next ten years, it evidently 
indicated that space was needed for women’s topics. 
Ontology. Dewey used the Amherst College Library to warrant his decisions on 
the classification. Without knowing exactly the contents of that specific collection, a 
search in WorldCat for “women” in the mid-to-late nineteenth century timeframe 
indicates that a great deal of literature on women existed. As expected, much fits into the 
suffrage, education, home, and gynecology-obstetrics classes. However, many works 
took a broader approach to the “new woman” or women’s worth and status (e.g. 
Farnam’s 1864 Women and her era, or McIntosh’s 1850 Woman in America: Her work 
and her reward) but because they touched (or it was assumed they did) upon suffrage or 
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legal rights, they perhaps would be shoehorned into the suffrage or education classes. 
Additionally, for works such as Elizabeth Blackwell’s 1860 work on medicine as a 
profession for women, no place existed for works on professions, either. Also plausible is 
that Dewey’s library did not carry such titles; however, considering the number of 
libraries he consulted, it seems unlikely none of them would be without them. A search in 
WorldCat between 1850 and 1871 for “Hermaphrodites,” which is mentioned in the 
relative index, brings up 19 titles in English that refer to human hermaphrodites, 
including a doctoral dissertation of 1875 on the medico-legal aspects of hermaphroditism. 
Many titles include such words as “curious” or “remarkable” or “monstrosity,” which at 
this point do not influence DDC’s language, but do so in future editions. 
Necessary and sufficient conditions. Though nowhere in the DDC does it state 
outright the characteristics that make a woman a woman, but a look at the gender-related 
topics in the classification and the relative index explicate what roles a woman is 
expected to play in the world at the time according to warrant or the classificationist’s 
worldview. The terms Dewey thought might be sought on women in the relative index 
include woman—education, woman—suffrage, which merely echo the two class 
headings. The index suggests that female seminaries and nunneries should be classed 
under schools and colleges, implying both seclusion and the idea that no other type of 
institution should educate women. The remaining terms include housewifery (but no 
housekeeping), midwifery, pregnancy, maternity, and finally, mothers, which should be 
classed under family. The term “fathers” was not included in the index and does not exist 
as a class or division heading. The absence of the term “fathers” emphasizes how the 
realm of the private—the home and family—was the responsibility of women. The only 
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two concepts in the classification and index that do not relate to the domestic sphere 
represent institutions that exclude women: suffrage and education.  Thus, the age-old 
division of public and private becomes evident as DDC’s first edition only represents 
women as restricted to the private and reproductive and excluded from public life. 
Second Edition, 1885 
In 1885, with Dewey still as editor, the classification was greatly expanded from 
42 to 315 pages, with input from “hundreds of specialists” (Dewey, 1885, p. 7). Tables 
made their debut, and women finally got their own classes, the infamous 396 class and an 
expansion of 376 Education of Women, shown and discussed below. Presumably, as 
some examples above showed, in practice a class was needed, but little effort seemed to 
be put into determining an appropriate location. Women are added into a rather random 
class under Customs, Costumes, Popular Life. Though the medical discourse focused 
on sexuality, the DDC and the legal discourse tended toward political and social subjects.  
Authority. Whatever underconfidence and humility Dewey exhibited in the first 
edition was gone by the second edition. Unlike his anonymous publication of the 
previous edition, this time his name was splashed on the cover, in large capital letters, 
with his many credentials, including “Professor of Library Economy and Chief Librarian 
of Columbia College; Consulting Library of Wellesley College; Secretary American 
Library Association; late of Amherst College Library, and Editor Library Journal,” with 
an “etc., etc.” to indicate much more. The publisher’s note took on a boastful tone, 
exhorting that “ten years’ experience has more than confirmed the great hopes of its 
usefulness” thanks to “many unsolicited and enthusiastic testimonials” (p. 7). And, for 
the first time, he refers to it as the “Dewey System” (p. 48). If the first edition was 
divinely inspired, the second showed a fulfilled purpose of making the world a more 
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organized place, everywhere from the notes of “some school-boy” to the “President of 
some Royal Scientific Society” (p. 7). The system “has been used by the ignorant and the 
lerned, by the most painstaking and accurate scholars, by hurried men of business,” thus 
establishing his vision for universal usership. The labor that went into the second edition 
is a “gift to the public” and “not as a source of income to either author or publishers” (p. 
7). Perhaps as a concession to all the feedback he received on the first edition, he writes, 
“no individual is sufficiently lerned to wisely classify books on all subjects and 
sciences…by the aid of specialists, the index can in time be made reasonably accurate” (p. 
34). Though he “is always grateful for suggestions,” in a rather thin-skinned and 
defensive aside, he advises, “The only safe rule is to make no changes or subdivisions 
without submitting them to the author, who will gladly advise on such matters without 
charge, not on the ground of any superior wisdom, nor even because of larger experience 
in this special work” but rather to prevent the user from having to defend all the 
“blunders” that will inevitably occur (p. 50).  The passage hints at Dewey’s desire for 
control and expresses his belief that unauthorized changes to the system will reflect 
poorly on him.  
Rhetorical Space. Women finally got a category of their own: 396, or in Olson 
and Schlegl’s (2001) parlance, they were “ghettoized,” or “gather[ed] and isolate[ed] 
rather than integrat[ed]” (p. 67). The 390s, Customs Costumes Folklore, consisted of 
the following divisions: 
391 Costume and Care of person  
392 Birth, Home and Sex Customs 
393 Treatment of the Ded 
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394 Public and Social Customs  
Including fairs; chivalry, tournaments; dueling, suicide 
395 Etiquet 
 396 Women’s position and treatment 
 397 Gipsies Nomads Outcast races 
 398 Folklore Proverbs  
 399 Customs of war 
Weapons, war dances, treatment of captives, scalping, mutilation, 
burning, cannibalism, etc. 
 
Comaromi (1976) comments, “This most interesting of catchall divisions was much more 
useful now” and dismisses the idea of a logical ordering as perhaps “not possible” (p. 
140). In a passage repeated from the original 1876 introduction, Dewey (1885) writes,  
As in every scheme, many minor subjects have been put under general 
heads to which they do not strictly belong…The rule has been to assign these 
subjects to the most nearly allied heads, or where it was thought they would be 
most useful. The only alternative was to omit them altogether. (p. 25)  
The threat of omission stifles the possibility of complaints, despite the absurdity of the 
arrangement. Keeping in mind the principle of hierarchical force, the arrangement 
necessitates that women’s position and treatment shares some characteristic with 
customs, costumes and folklore. Could women’s treatment be a custom? Women are 
allied with etiquette, outcast races, suicide, and treatment of the de[a]d. A tenuous 
allegiance can be found between Women and Birth, Home and Sex customs (unrelated 
to sexual ethics), which includes include marriage, sexual relations, and concubinage. 
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However, the jarring turns in the category obscures the usefulness of this arrangement to 
someone browsing the shelves.  
The subdivisions of 396 seem much more serious that the broad 390 class. 
Looking more closely at the subcontents of 396, we find: 
 .1 Emancipation 
 .2 Legal status, property, rights, etc. 
 .3 Political status 
 .4 Education 
 .5 Employment 
 .6 Woman in home 
 .7 Delineation of woman in art 
 .8 Delineation of woman in literature 
 .9 Woman in history, politics, war -Amazons 
Most of these classes fill needs that were lacking in the previous edition, as discussed 
above. In this group, the .9 Woman in history, politics, war-Amazons division deserves 
comment. A criticism of the structure of DDC leveled by Dewey himself is its 
“procrustean” nature (p. 31); that is, the idea even Dewey in the first edition calls “absurd” 
that all knowledge fits neatly into hierarchical categories of ten (1876, p. 4). A resulting 
quirk of that procrusteanism is the “Other” category, or the 9 slots, which Dewey 
promoted as a benefit of the system. To fit the structure, singular subjects are either 
stretched thin or many subjects are condensed into the 9 slot. The 9 slot of any particular 
category famously tends to house what the editors have deemed the leftovers of the 
category or marginalized topics shoved into one slot. Odd class-fellows result from 
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attempts to bolster sparse categories resulting in either a miscellany of orphan topics or 
an unreasonably large topic with only one number to accommodate it. The 9’s often 
starkly lay bare biases, as they rank the relative importance of concepts in the eyes of the 
classification. The .9 women here are excluded from the general categories of history, 
politics or war, which would lead a user hunting for them to believe women had no role 
in any of them. Those who accidentally discover them in 396.9 (since no “class here” 
note exists in the general categories) might conclude women played such a small role in 
those areas that they compress all three into the space of one heading, although it could 
be warrant-driven. The curious appendage of the term “Amazons” leads to either the 
assumption that the standards for inclusion in the category at minimum mean the 
founding of a female warrior nation or that the Amazons are the only women who have 
had a role in history, politics or war. Elsewhere, in perhaps an unintentional 
acknowledgement of oppression, 324.3 woman suffrage is allied with slavery. Labor of 
Women, in 331.4, is allied with labor of convicts and children, indicating that women 
working could be considered something either outrageous or punishing.  
Ontology. Given the historical events and literature of the time, the chosen topics 
of the subdivisions likely are warrant-inspired, which means that the feedback received 
after the system had been in use for a while reflected a need for classificatory space for 
these topics. The many catalogers providing feedback may have found that women 
represented such an anomaly that they did not “fit” into the general categories. Other new 
developments perhaps related to warrant includes the expansion of 176 Sexual ethics, 
which newly included topics seemingly ranked from good to evil: chastity, celibacy, 
continence [abstaining even from marital sex], solitary vice [masturbation], social evil 
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[sexual crimes like rape, pedophilia, sexual abuse], adultery [which also can be classed 
in Criminal Law], immoral art, and immoral literature. This likely reflects again the 
didactic literature of the societal improvement reform movements of the time, including 
that of the library. As Dewey (1885) notes, “so much wise attention has been given to 
educating the tastes of readers in our public libraries” (p. 57). A WorldCat search 
retrieves around 35,000 titles on women published between 1850 and 1885, so warrant 
obviously contributed to the addition of the class for women, regardless of its odd 
placement. “Hermaphrodites” only adds a handful more titles between 1876 and 1885. 
Necessary and sufficient conditions. The expanded 396 class acknowledged a wider 
range of roles for women and thus more recognition of women’s value and desire to be 
emancipated. Additionally, a larger 376 education of women included a variety of 
education topics, such as convent education, “fashionable” education, and the physical 
and mental capacities of women.  Women as teachers in 371.18 likely resulted from 
the literature of the Common School reform movement, led by Horace Mann in the 1840s, 
that established teaching as a female-intensive profession based on the belief that women 
would make better teachers because of their innate maternal nature and moral fortitude. 
A new class, Mental characteristics as influenced by sex 136.1 (under 
Philosophy/Mind and body) allies with physiognomy and phrenology, showing the 
nascent psychological connection between sex and mind. Sex differentiation begins to 
take on a psychological note, but in a manner that essentializes by attaching gendered 
behavior to sex. The allied topics, which also included witchcraft, though taken seriously 
at the time, were not considered medical or scientific. These subheadings were likely 
created in response to need, reflecting the biases of the literature being cataloged, yet in 
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structural warrant, either a parallel or more inclusive general category could have worked. 
A few additions to the scheme acknowledge men’s roles in family: the essentializing 
173.3 Duties of husbands and wives and 173.5 duties of parents. Origin of the sexes is 
the .9 category in 575 Evolution. 
“Hermaphrodites (man),” still only found in the relative index, lost its rather 
general place in Physiology; users now were directed to a subheading of Natural 
History of Man: 573.7 Craniology (another concept relating to phrenology), allied with 
Dwarves and Giants and Monstrosities. The connection between the pseudo-science of 
craniology and intersex is unclear, other than that phrenologists believed that personality 
was highly influenced by size and development of cranial features and passed down 
through the mother. Potentially the connection was that craniology could help explain 
variation in sex organs. Undoubtedly, the alliance with Dwarves and Giants and 
Monstrosities suggests abnormality, grouping them as freaks of nature. 
Fallibility/universality. In the section “Changes from first edition of 1876,” 
Dewey, conscious of the effort required to reshelf, again emphasizes ease of use.  Rather 
than expressing specifically why changes were made, he merely refers to “better” 
arrangements or that “a comparison of the old and new headings will make plain to any 
one familiar with the subject why it was best to change” (p. 45). In many spots in the 
second edition, Dewey makes note that feedback from the field contributed to the second 
edition; however, his urge to include cataloger feedback fought with his urge to maintain 
strict copyright. Several pages are dedicated to explaining that users of the system can 
and should make their own adjustments, but that they must adhere to copyright (e.g. pp. 
7-8).  
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Summary of the First and Second Editions 
 
The early DDC’s internal discourse reflected that women were only present in 
maternal and reproductive capacities. Other classes related to women were associated 
with institutions that excluded women. The second edition slightly improved in 
inclusiveness, reflecting women’s desires to enter into those institutions. However, it 
continued to minimize women’s roles outside the home. Trans people were not present in 
either of the first two editions, and intersex people were first cast not unfavorably as just 
another type of anatomic presentation, but then later allied with monstrosities. Regardless 
of how seemingly insulting or puzzling the class for women was in the DDC, it would be 
eighty years and the rise of the women’s movement before any change would occur. 
Seventeenth Edition, 1965 
The seventeenth edition of the DDC arrived shrouded in controversy. Melvil 
Dewey had died in 1931, though his son Godfrey remained associated with the DDC. 
Since 1937, a committee rather than a single editor oversaw the classification—the title 
page did not even list an editor. This was the first edition published since the DDC’s 
Editorial Office had merged into the Library of Congress’ subject cataloging office, and a 
power struggle ensued between the two. The edition also arrived after the tumult of the 
controversially stripped-down 15th edition and the consequent restored 16th edition. An 
overriding theme of “innovation to keep up with knowledge” that permeates the 
introductory matter required a break with some of Dewey’s original principles. In the 
introduction, Custer justified the decisions by asserting that modernity itself was at stake 
because the many class relocations would allow libraries to keep up with all the new 
knowledge being created, but, he acknowledged, would require a great deal of reshelving, 
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an outcome that Dewey would have vigorously avoided. Some discord seems evident 
within the editorial staff on this point. The preface, written by Wyllis Wright, chair of the 
editorial committee, notes, “A classification that does not keep reasonably abreast of 
current thinking must in time die, but one that imposes on its users the tremendous costs 
of reclassification too recklessly will die also” (1965, p. 3). Custer also rebelled from 
some of Dewey’s other positions by dropping the remaining simplified spelling, and 
argued for the integrity of a subject over the “preference for practicality over theory” (p. 
43). He mentions in his instruction that Dewey’s system became popular because of its 
convenience, not because of “any theoretical excellence of his arrangement” (p. 13). 
Though some aspects of Dewey’s legacy were rejected, he was repeatedly invoked for his 
intention of creating a theoretically imperfect but convenient system.  
Editor Benjamin Custer predicted that the seventeenth edition would contain such 
significant changes that librarians would potentially reject it, and he was right (Comaromi, 
1976, p. 540). The reaction from the field was negative. One reviewer criticized the large 
amount of required relocations, the appalling length of the numbers, but mostly the 
erudite instructions and reduced amount of cross-references made the system difficult to 
use (Hinton, 1966, pp. 396-401). The changes were announced in a defensive and prickly 
way that openly criticized librarians’ reactions and perceptions of the DDC that caused 
the reviewer to comment on the “vitriolic tone” and “rigid fanaticism” of the editors for 
their new philosophy (Hinton, 1966, p. 396). The defensiveness and convenient 
invocation of Dewey can be detected in such statements as, “In short, the DDC has been 
criticized in large part for not being what it does not set out to be” (1965, p. 16). He 
shamed practitioners by invoking Dewey: “Melvil Dewey's Yankee ingenuity would be 
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outraged by the thought that librarians were unable to devise ways by which an outmoded 
past could be prevented from tyrannizing over the future. We ourselves have great faith 
in the adaptability of librarians and in their ability to devise techniques by which to 
‘cope’” (1965, p. 47).  
Authority. The authority asserted by the editorial committee in this edition is 
expressed in a few ways, and in a fashion that alienates the catalogers who use the system. 
It also attempts to shed Dewey’s authority, by only partially using the reformed spelling 
(p. 57) and attempting to retain more theoretical consistency. Custer wrote that remarks 
and examples in Dewey’s original introduction “are now obsolete, and it should be read 
in the context of its time” (p. 61). However, Dewey is invoked when he serves as a 
convenient response to criticism. Throughout the introduction, repeated references to the 
criticism leveled at the system occur and are typically followed by references to the 
impossibility of finding a perfect system. They emphasize the inclusion of the work of 
experts, “the intense efforts of specialists in librarianship, in subject classification, and in 
the countless disciplines of which the world of knowledge is composed, from religion to 
mathematics to musicology to public administration to aeronautical engineering” (1965, p. 
6) as if pointing out their expertise exceeds that of practitioners. Perhaps anticipating 
criticism over the significant changes to the relative index, Custer thanks Marie Henshaw 
for her work, “including also the new index, which is almost wholly hers in conception 
and mostly hers in execution” (p. 60). The condescension and disregard of the wants and 
needs of the field, express a feeling of righteousness, seemingly intended to stifle 
criticism. Finally, the large “DEWEY Decimal Classification” with a large registered 
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trademark symbol in the title page reminds users that it is a sanctioned and protected 
entity. 
Rhetorical Space. Despite the controversy of the edition, Custer (1972), later in 
the Encyclopedia of Library and Information Science called the changes “Unabashedly 
progressive” (p. 139). The editorial team’s focus on the “integrity of numbers,” resulted 
in many overdue changes made to the system. In the prefatory works Custer recognized 
the “haphazard groupings of terms” and returned subjects to the appropriate disciplinary 
hierarchy. He wrote, “This edition emphasizes the hierarchical nature of true 
classification and restores the hierarchical feature of Dewey’s notation” (1965, p. 44). 
Indeed, after 80 years, women finally were transplanted from the problematic 396 
Customs, Costumes, Folklore class, and men gained a class of their own. Since the 
placement of women in that class violated hierarchical force, or what Custer called the 
“drip” principle, women, and, for the first time men, were transplanted to 301.4 
Institutions and Groups, positioning them as social groups.  
Knowing, however, that the editors were focusing on the drip principle, this also 
meant that they were also posed as Social characteristics and problems. 
301.41 The sexes  
 .411 Man 
 .412 Woman. Scope: feminism, superiority 
  .412 1 Emancipation 
  .412 2 Careers 
  .412 6 In the home 
  .412 9 In history, public affairs, war 
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Despite gaining a heading, Man seemed to be a perfunctory complement to Woman, as it 
had no parallel subheadings, or any subheadings at all. The scope note indicating radical 
feminist notions of superiority added an air of antagonism reflecting second-wave 
feminism.  
Adding to the sexes as a “social problem” and recognizing the sexual liberation of 
the 1960s was the addition of sexuality concepts to the class. If “social group” takes the 
social sciences definition of a group “bound together by patterns of interaction,” (OED) 
that interaction here is sex. The contents of what had previously existed separately in 
Sexual ethics were emptied into The sexes to create a hybrid where all the subclasses all 
relate to sexuality, and as allied topics, the relationship between men and women is a 
sexual problem. The other subdivisions include: 
.413 Celibacy 
 .414 Courtship 301.425 Including preparation for marriage  
.415 Sex life outside marriage; Concubinage, premarital relations, adultery, 
prostitution, homosexuality and other perversions 
Transsexuality does not appear anywhere in the classification or index. The “other 
perversions” does not include Transvestism, which appears in the index, although users 
must see Sexual disorders, which consequently pathologizes it as a medical issue, 
dripping down under Other Diseases/Psychoneuroses. With no class headings, it ends 
up in Other disorders, allied with an array of “deviances”:  
616.858 3 Sexual aberrations, manias, perversions 
.858 32 Frigidity and impotence 
.858 33 Nymphomania and satyromania 
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.858 34 Homosexuality 
.858 35 Sadism and masochism 
.858 39 Other disorders 
.858 4 Other character neuroses 
.858 42 Kleptomania 
.858 43 Pyromania 
.858 44 Homicidal and suicidal compulsions 
.858 45 Compulsive lying and defrauding 
.858 8  Mental deficiency Feeble-mindedness and mental retardation 
The following class in the .858s includes Idiots, Imbeciles, Morons, and Borderline 
Feeble-minded. The structure clearly communicates that transvestism is a pathological 
disease of deviancy. 
“Intersex” suffers a similarly humiliating fate, as hermaphroditic reproduction 
is the only term that appears in the relative index, directing catalogers to “see 
Reproduction.” However, hermaphroditic reproduction refers to animals that have the 
ability to self-fertilize, and although the reproductive organs manifest the condition, 
intersex people are often unable to reproduce, so intersex people were effectively erased 
from this edition. Hermaphrodites had been cut from the DDC, along with much of the 
content of the controversial fifteenth edition of 1951; however, Hermaphroditism/ 
animal physiology (allied with conjugation and sexual reproduction) had been restored 
in the 1958 sixteenth edition, so it is unclear why it would be removed once again. 
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions. The “drip” principle, or hierarchical force, 
reveals how the editors defined concepts. The adversarial feeling of the placement of the 
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sexes as a “social problem,” along with the antagonism of the “superiority” scope note 
indicate more difference than commonality between the sexes. In the relative index, “sex” 
refers to biology (current usage of “sex”) and psychology (current usage of “gender”). In 
“sex psychology,” the concept of gender appeared, but still under the name of “sex,” and 
laden with sexuality: 
  155.3 Sex psychology 
.31 erogenity and libido 
.32 sex and personality 
.33 sex differences 
.332 Masculinity 
.333 Femininity 
.334 Bisexuality 
.34 sex relations 
Masculinity and femininity refer to what we would now call “gender roles.” The term 
bisexuality in the nineteenth century had originally referred to hermaphroditism, but by 
this time had connotations of its current usage in sexual orientation. WorldCat indicates 
that the current usage was present but only emerging in publications during that time. It is 
unclear which usage is meant here, as the index only refers to “sex difference” or if it 
meant something entirely different, such as androgyny, which does not appear in the 
relative index. Sex had not entirely departed from biology, as 577.8 Sex in nature—
biological differentiation, ratios lumping humans and animals together. 
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Universality/Fallibility. Custer repeatedly emphasizes that the pace of 
knowledge necessitates change, acknowledging both that knowledge changes and that 
classification is an imperfect instrument that will evolve with the times.  He writes, “It 
appears unlikely that this or any other general classification will ever be ‘perfect,’ 
especially in view of the traditional dichotomy of demands for a system that will be both 
stable and up-to-date” (p. 61). He seems to be responding to a vein of criticism that 
assumes a perfect classification could exist. He defensively notes, “The faults inherent in 
the DDC are many. No serious student of classification since 1876 has failed to note them” 
(p.15). He also recognizes the importance of perspective and its role as a stumbling block 
in classification, at least in Western structures: “No system of classification can assemble 
at one point all that each student or reader may want on the topic of his current interest, 
because no two students or readers are alike” (p. 16). He acknowledges, “Classification 
shares with other human productions the attribute of imperfection” and accepts the 
fallibility with the platonic goals of progressing toward excellence: “The Committee 
hopes that this edition will be found better than its predecessors. It also hopes that future 
editions will be better still” (pp. 3-4). 
Additionally, more attention was paid to international users of the system, 
admitting to the culturally centric perspective of the system. Their subjectivity was at 
least perfunctorily sought as two editors “Miss Sarah K. Vann, assisted by Miss Pauline 
A. Seely visited 23 countries thruout the world to discuss with librarians in the field the 
deficiencies of the Dewey Decimal Classification that have been discovered by users 
outside the United States” (p. 3). Editors also acknowledged cultural bias and curiously 
vow to violently reduce it, saying that the system “has been much criticized for its 
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historical bias toward a Protestant Anglo-Saxon culture. Some efforts were made in 
Edition 16 to reduce this bias, but the present edition represents the first full-scale attack 
upon it by the general editors” (1965, p. 55). Potentially this reaction was brought on in 
response to international competition from the UDC. 
Ontology. A search in WorldCat indicates an approximate tenfold increase in the 
amount of work on women between 1850 and 1965 to near 300,000 volumes in English. 
The titles published between 1958 and 1965 tend toward biographies of notable women 
or women in particular professions or contexts that indicate a change in women’s status 
and opportunity. A search for “hermaphrodites” and “human” between 1958 and 1965 
retrieves around 140 items in English, showing a significant increase of output on the 
topic, mostly from a medical or psychological perspective, often in the context of sex 
differentiation, signaling intersex as a platform for defining the two recognized sexes. On 
rare occasions the titles suggest relationships between intersexuality and homosexuality. 
Google Books’ Ngram Viewer shows a steep spike in the term “intersex” in its corpus 
between 1960 and 1965 (the most significant spike was between 1920 and 1940). The 
term “hermaphrodite” remains mostly static in the corpus after a large decline from the 
nineteenth century, but draws significantly more results than intersex (the Ngram results 
cannot distinguish animal from human intersexuality). 
 “Transsexualism” between 1850 and 1965 retrieves around 30 titles along with 
an assortment of archival material from underground transsexual organizations or 
personal papers of transsexuals that came from the period but may not have been 
collected until later. About half of the literature is medical studies by familiar names such 
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as Benjamin, Burchard, and Green, but the amount of fiction and testimonials increased, 
showing the curiosity of the public toward the phenomenon.  “Transvestism,” searched 
between 1850 and 1965 retrieves about 300 titles, including serials established around 
that time and a similar variety of archival material.  The non-medical titles often refer to 
“masquerade” or “impersonator” or “imposters,” which suggests that it is a temporary 
condition intended for to deceive. A number of titillating titles appear, such as Muscle 
Man in Silks from 1963. The medical-psychological literature is overwhelmingly 
Havelock Ellis’s and David Cauldwell’s, who seem to be responsible for pathologizing 
cross-dressing. Here the assumed connection to deviancy and homosexuality are clear. 
Summary of Seventeenth Edition 
The women’s movement as well as research into sex and gender likely spurred change in 
the DDC, but with women presented as both a social problem and a sexual object, change 
would occur only fifteen years later. With the attention on Christine Jorgenson, it was 
impossible to avoid topics related to transgenderism and transsexualism. Intersexuality 
seems to continue to hold attention, but with uncertainty of what to do with it. The next 
edition would bring another attempt to appease women, but a change in view of 
intersexuality from something different to something wrong. 
Nineteenth Edition, 1979 
 
The nineteenth centennial edition of the DDC expanded to around 3,000 pages, with 
Custer still as editor, and this time, his name was on the title page: “Edited under the 
direction of BENJAMIN A. CUSTER” (emphasis in original), though Dewey’s name 
continued to be displayed more prominently. The tone in the prefatory material was much 
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more conciliatory toward catalogers than the seventeenth edition had been. Nine years 
prior to the publication of this edition in 1970, the ALA’s Feminist Task Force of the 
Social Responsibility Round Table had been founded, which led to a decade of activism 
including not only employment issues in the field, but also working toward “nonsexist 
cataloging” (Maack, 1994, p. 232). A note in the users’ guide signals this sensitivity, 
perhaps not as conciliatorily:  
an extensive repetition of pronouns to denote the classifier is unavoidable. While 
realizing that some readers will find distasteful the constant use of ‘he,’ ‘his,’ and 
‘him,’ to refer generically to classifiers of both sexes, the editors and the Decimal 
Classification Editorial Policy Committee find any other device or circumlocution 
either awkward or artificial, or an intrusion upon the sense of the exposition, and 
they have agreed to use the traditional masculine forms in their generic sense. (p. 
xxxvii)  
The impatience expressed with women intruding on an easier way of doing things and 
reversion to the “traditional masculine” also indicates first, a reminder of who holds 
power, second, an appeal to the authority of writing guidelines or grammar rules to avoid 
any awkward construction, and third and more broadly, how the English language’s 
reliance on gendered pronouns restricts our ability to avoid gendering any discussion of 
people. If the previous edition had focused on worldwide knowledge, the nineteenth 
edition reverted its attention back to North America. 
Authority. Continuing the theme of the imperfection of classification, the chair of 
the editorial committee John Comaromi wrote, “We are well aware of its imperfections, 
perhaps inherent in the very nature of classification systems, and again urge you, the 
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users of the DDC to continue to provide us with your ever-welcome advice and 
suggestions” (p. xvii).  Perhaps because of the vigorous criticism and the angry response 
toward the previous editions, the committee wrote as a committee, and then provided an 
explanation of how each edition is created, perhaps trying to get the readers to recognize 
the complexity of the process and the need to please many masters: 
Then, taking into consideration the response of users (including those in the 
Library of Congress's Decimal Classification Division) to the immediately 
preceding as well as earlier editions, the editors in consultation with the Decimal 
Classification Editorial Policy Committee and the Forest Press Committee 
determine which schedules require what degree of revision and review, from full 
phoenix treatment, which provides a totally new development on the old base 
number, to routine review, which may be little more than modification of the text 
to conform to changes in the editorial rules. Major revisions are prepared with the 
advice of subject experts. All revision includes at least a routine review of LC's 
Dewey-classed file to see if the textual provisions of the previous edition have 
been adequate for the literature and clearly understood by the user. The actual 
mechanics of setting forth revised text and cross checking every detail constitute a 
time-consuming and detailed effort. At all times the editors must keep in mind the 
needs of diverse users, including practitioners in small and large, popular and 
research libraries, as well as teachers and students. They must also provide 
guidance for international usage. They must balance innovation against stability, 
required degree of detail against length of notation. (p. lxxv)  
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Changes are still reluctantly allowed, but require justification. Deviations are 
“permissible if there is a real and permanent local need. By ‘real’ is meant that each 
variation should have a demonstrable reason that can be recorded and defended” (p. lxvii). 
This demonstrates impatience with users who perhaps are myopic to their own libraries 
or provide criticism without solutions.  
Some changes in the prefatory material also correspond with the death of 
Dewey’s son Godfrey in 1977, to whom the edition was “Respectfully Dedicated” in full 
page, which could indicate the freedom to remove more of Dewey’s direct influence. His 
“mostly obsolete introduction has been dropped” and a return to conventional spelling 
was complete, eliminating the remnants of Dewey’s simplified spelling (p. xxii).  
Rhetorical Space. The “badly crowded’ 301-307 section of Sociology was again 
structurally overhauled in this edition (called a phoenix schedule) and resulted in yet 
again moving “sex” (p. xv).  This time, it took on a more demographic role, and the 
adversarial tone and sexuality was removed from it. Men earned a scope note that 
indicated the class was for specific kinds of men, but the obvious omission of 
occupations and social role indicates the male norm is not yet challenged. 
305.3-4 Specific Sexes 
305.3 Men 
Single, married, divorced, widowed, of various specific racial, ethic, 
national language group or adherent to specific religion 
305.4 Women 
.42 Social role and status 
.43 Occupations 
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.44 Specific kinds of women 
Hermaphroditism returned and finally earned a class number, of 616.694, moving from 
Physiology to Sexual disorders. Its alliance with Impotence and Sterility and Male 
Climactic disorders removed it from the realms of reproduction and physiology to issues 
relating to intercourse, and only to males, as female sexual disorders are classed in 
gynecology. On a positive note, it was no longer considered a sociopathic sexual disorder, 
which still included homosexuality and the other deviancies such as kleptomania and 
nymphomania. The language slightly improved in some of the allied topics—idiots and 
morons are gone—but feeble-mindedness remained. However, conflictingly, 157 
Psychoneuroses in psychology still included sexual disorders, and similarly the language 
toned down slightly.  
.7 Disorders of character and personality Examples: sexual disorders and 
dysfunctions, kleptomania, compulsions 
.8 Mental deficiency 
.9 Clinical psychology. Class clinical psychology of a specific condition with 
the subject, e.g., of homosexuality 157.7 
This means if the topic is approached from a psychological point of view, it is considered 
psychoneuroses, but from a clinical perspective it is merely a disorder in sexual 
performance. Transvestism changed from a clinical medical issue of a sexual disorder to 
Sexual Deviations, perhaps as a result of the work of such people as Harry Benjamin, 
whose research discouraged attempts to rehabilitate. 
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions. The introduction reminds readers, “To 
classify a collection of objects is to place together in classes those objects which have 
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certain characteristics in common and to separate from them the objects which do not 
have those characteristics” (p. xxiv). This edition allows for an increase in ways that 
humans can be differentiated. The introduction describes a new focus on classifying and 
labeling people:  
persons may be classified, among other ways, according to (1) occupations, (2) 
physical and mental characteristics, e.g., healthy, blind, mentally retarded, (3) 
social status, e.g., criminals, unemployed, retired, (4) marriage status, (5) level of 
cultural development, (6) social and /or economic level, e.g., slaves, middle class, 
royalty, (7) age, (8) sex, (9) racial, ethnic, national backgrounds. (pp. xxiv-xxv) 
In terms of psychological sexual difference, the section remains exactly the same as in 
the seventeenth edition. 
155.3 Sex psychology 
.31 Erogeneity and libido 
.32 Sex and personality 
.33 Sex differences 
.332 Masculinity 
.333 Femininity 
.334 Bisexuality 
.34 Sex relations 
WorldCat indicates that at this time bisexuality was fully with its current usage, and the 
index newly refers to sex differences for psychology, but to homosexuality for “all other 
aspects.” Thus, bisexuality is somehow considered a gender in psychology, but 
considered a disorder in practice like homosexuality. Additionally, the alliance with the 
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terms “masculinity” and “femininity,” confers heteronormativity to sex practices. As an 
indication of the drive to class types of people, Psychology of adults 155.63-155.67 also 
allows to class by Specific categories of adults, which include all the categories 
mentioned above (marital status, social status, etc.) all broken down by sex. 
Universality/Fallibility. Perhaps to remind users that the editors are humans and 
the classification a human product, the editors once again reminded users of the utility of 
the instrument but reassured them, “Edition 19… has been faithful to stability where 
stability is more useful than change, and it has been changed where a new vision serves 
us better than the old” (p. xv). A nostalgia accompanies this edition, as it was Custer’s 
last edition, along with being the centennial edition. Additionally, the committee noted 
that the North American user survey “revealed many problems with the application and 
use of the DDC,” and they pledged to offer more training for users, giving the impression 
that it was not the classification that was wrong, but rather the users’ incorrect application 
that was wrong (p. xvi). 
Ontology. WorldCat unsurprisingly shows another substantial increase of about 
171,000 for titles about women published between 1965 and 1979, including over 40 
items with the simple title “Women.” Google Books’ Ngram Viewer shows this time 
period as the beginning of a dramatic spike in the appearance of the term “women” that 
continued on an upwards trajectory until peaking in 1995. Similarly to the previous 
timeframe, the titles focus on women’s status, notable women, and women in particular 
professions, with an uptick in works about women’s roles in history and of course 
women’s activism.  
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“Intersex” in WorldCat brings up around 300 entries in English, although about 
an estimated third tend to be on animals rather than humans. Titles often refer to the 
“problem” or the “disorder” of intersexuality. A search on “Hermaphrodites and human” 
from the same period retrieves around 350 results, indicating that the terminology was 
still in transition. The titles on hermaphrodites continue with the urology and 
endocrinology texts as before, but include slightly more reference to identity 
considerations such as gender roles. The references to intersex as curiosities or 
monstrosities gave way to terms such as “freaks” or “fringe” or “abnormal.” Most of the 
medical titles refer to chromosomal or hormonal combinations and commonly reference 
“true” hermaphrodites, which in the nineteenth century referred to people who 
supposedly possess complete sets of both female and male sex organs, but in this 
timeframe refer to people with a specific and rare chromosomal combination. NGram 
Viewer during this timeframe show only a slight decline in occurrences of 
“hermaphrodite” and a slight increase in occurrences of “intersex.” 
“Transgender” still does not appear in Ngram Viewer, but “transsexual” begins a 
modest but significant increase between 1970 and 1978. In WorldCat, around 600 results 
for transsexualism appear in English, including 11 doctoral dissertations. Transsexuality 
titles refer more often to surgery and the psychological aspects of living life post-
operatively (from the perspective of the psychologist), and also bring up contextual issues 
such religion, marriage, and the law, and continue to be associated with both transvestism 
and homosexuality. Many titles refer to psychoanalytic aspects of transsexuality. Also 
evident are more self-help titles and periodicals that guide individuals through processes 
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or identity formation (e.g. The Transvestite Survival Manual or Who am I?: The 
Transexual [sic] Dilemma). 
Summary of Nineteenth Edition 
Overall, the nineteenth edition of the DDC reflects an attempt to increase equity 
of representation for women in the classification by balancing the entries in 305, even if it 
tends to be an empty gesture. On the other hand, the editors still resist acts of 
inclusiveness such as continuing to use sexist pronouns under the guise of convenience, 
which lends a sense of annoyance at women’s disruption of the status quo.  An 
essentialized sense of gender characteristics continues as “sex psychology” remains, 
along with an increase of ways to class people by gender or other demographic 
characteristics, also with the assumptions these are innate characteristics. Representation 
is restored for intersex people, although now their classification as a male disorder in 
their own class is only slightly preferable to being classed in a category to which they do 
not share anything in common. Transsexualism, despite overwhelming literary warrant, 
remains inaccurately absent or subsumed with transvestism. 
Conclusion 
The rapid changes in the gender classification in the DDC after 80 years naturally 
should be caused by changes in the literature; however, the various epistemic clues 
investigated here suggest that other influences are also at play. The dynamicity in the 
DDC reflects the confusion in the medical literature, while the legal discourse digs in its 
heels against the changes in perceptions of gender. In the following chapter, these 
changes and epistemic clues are evaluated and discussed in terms of known epistemic 
outlooks. This final chapter identifies epistemic values underlying the three discourses, 
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and shows the interplay of these discourses as they merge to define sex and gender across 
the three timeframes. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 
A.C. Foskett famously wrote in 1971 that a classification system is “likely to 
reflect both the prejudices of its time and those of its author,” yet classificationists strive 
for and claim “some kind of eternal and external truth” (p. 117). In the nineteenth century, 
authority for the formal legal and medical definitions and classifications of sex for 
women and intersex lay undoubtedly with men, with trans people absent from the 
discourse altogether. Unsurprisingly, the “enunciative modalities,” as Foucault calls those 
who are authorized to speak, include educated, elite, white men who had access to those 
particular fields. Women had barely made it into the professions of medicine, law, or 
librarianship in the United States, with the first officially accepted to practice in 1849 for 
medicine, 1869 for law, and 1871 for librarianship. Intersexuality was consistently 
present in discourses since long before the eighteenth century; however, non-intersex 
trans people were rarely discussed in medical discourse and only in passing in legal 
discourse until the mid-century, after which they were discussed incessantly. As women 
began to be included in the discourse as knowing subjects, the characteristics ascribed to 
women began to shift. The previous two chapters laid out the ontological structures and 
epistemic attitudes toward sex and gender reflected in medical and legal discourse and 
the Dewey Decimal Classification editions across four timeframes. In this chapter, the 
task is to find any correspondence to epistemic stances as discussed above in knowledge 
organization or gender literature or elsewhere. Following that, the implications to 
knowledge organization will be discussed. 
If acknowledgement of epistemic approach is important to recognizing the 
perspective of the classification and also the ontological justification, then the 
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consequences can be considered in the design or revision of further classifications. 
Hjørland & Hartel (2003) argue that no “pure,” singular epistemic stance controls 
perception of a work, but rather the view of the discipline or profession. Moreover, as 
discussed previously, only the metanarrative of the field during a particular moment in 
time is evaluated for its epistemic values, acknowledging that the stance held by all 
participants is not uniform, as all of the examined discourses exhibit partial, fragmented 
and even opposing stances. On occasion, conflicting views are held, such as a positivist 
view supported by a realist justification. Just as the identified stances may not be uniform, 
also, the discursive pool from which the clues were drawn is also diverse. The stances are 
evinced from clues repeated across the discourses. Foucault did not want his discursive 
methods to be exploited as a tool of positivism, where conclusions are drawn broadly 
from limited observations. Thus, the conclusions described here refer to the stances as the 
most frequently expressed views, but do not purport to be generalized across the entire 
discursive body. 
Another complication is that of perspective. Although it seems like a quirk of 
bibliographic classification that a work may be classed in different places depending on 
its use, the same phenomenon occurs elsewhere. This corresponds to Foucault’s view that 
all the competing angles merge to create a discursively-constructed concept at particular 
points in time rather than a cohesive, universal and transcendent concept, even within the 
same discourse or even the same person. In medical and legal literature, about intersex or 
trans people for example, similarly-situated people can be deemed a different sex 
depending on the viewpoint taken by the physician, attorney, court or state. Is the desired 
sex of that person a transcendent constant despite the chaos of opinions and “facts” 
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swirling around?  Is the “impossibility” because of a postmodern viewpoint of the 
instability of things, or because of the instability of the world around it?  Similarly, the 
same librarian might have different standpoints at different moments, causing a differing 
placement in the classification. Is that concept or subject, whatever it is, situated 
differently because no universal “truth” or external reality exist, or is it placed differently 
because any concept has different meanings, or is it classed differently because of the 
context of the information need? Hjørland attributes this to the different uses by the 
different domains; however, this does not explain how the same person or domain uses a 
term differently.  
The epistemic clues detected in the discourse and classification are pieced 
together alongside the methodologies to see what values or emphases expressed by the 
discursive community correspond with known epistemic theories. Many epistemic 
stances are developed by philosophers or philosophers of science rather than practitioners, 
so some stances need to be “translated” into praxis, and conversely, some positions 
discussed in terms of subjects in bibliographic classification also need “translation” into 
the legal or scientific realms. Hjørland (2001) writes, “Because any document can, in 
principle, provide answers to an infinity of questions, subject analyses should establish 
priorities based on the specific user groups served…The subject of a document is thus 
relative to the aim of the specific information service” (p. 776). Rather than considering 
the sex and gender as “the subject of a document,” the “aboutness” identified in the 
discourse are used to understand those community priorities. As described in the 
methodology, a starting point for determining epistemic methodological priorities of the 
discursive community is Hjørland’s (2002) summary of schools of epistemic thought (see 
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Figure 1), used initially to drill down to each discourse’s interest or priorities and then 
further explored into more specific stances within the broader school of thought.  
Table 2 (adapted from Hjørland, 2002, p.269) 
Simplified relevance criteria in four epistemological schools 
Empiricism Rationalism Historicism Pragmatism 
Relevant:  
Observations, sense-data. 
Induction from 
collections of 
observational data. 
Intersubjectively 
controlled data. 
Relevant:  
Pure thinking, logic, 
mathematical models, 
computer modeling, 
systems of axioms, 
definitions and theorems. 
Relevant:  
Background knowledge 
about preunderstanding, 
theories, conceptions, 
contexts, historical 
developments and 
evolutionary perspectives. 
Relevant:  
Information about goals 
and values and 
consequences both 
involving the researcher 
and the object of research 
(subject and object). 
Non-relevant: 
Speculations, knowledge 
transmitted from 
authorities. “Book 
knowledge” (“reading 
nature, not books”). Data 
about the observers' 
assumptions and pre-
understanding. 
Low priority is given to 
empirical data because 
such data must be 
organized in accordance 
with principles which 
cannot come from 
experience. 
Low priority is given to 
decontextualized data of 
which the meanings 
cannot be interpreted. 
Intersubjectively 
controlled data are often 
seen as trivia. 
Low priority (or outright 
suspicion) is given to 
claimed value free or 
neutral information 
society. 
 
Additionally, other inventories of epistemic stances such as Budd (2001), Hjørland and 
Nicholaisen’s Epistemological Lifeboat (2008), as well as individual works describing 
epistemic stances such as those described in the literature review are consulted to 
determine the characteristics and criteria used to make decisions about the subject. It 
must be acknowledged that it is impossible to present the epistemic arguments with a full 
history and discussion of nuances, so the characteristics of the stances will be necessarily 
reductive to gain a broad sense of the epistemology at play. Finally, a particular discourse 
may be exhibiting the characteristics of an epistemic stance prior to it being articulated by 
philosophers until a later point in history.  
Some of the other questions addressed in this chapter include whether all three 
discourses take the same or similar epistemic outlooks, how and to what degree they 
influence each other, and finally, what this means to classification. This chapter traces the 
epistemic shifting, in the form of legal and medical classifications and their relationship 
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with changes in the Dewey Decimal Classification. I first revisit and analyze the findings 
of the previous chapter from an epistemic perspective to find epistemic alignment or 
departure, summarizing the characteristics of each discourse, asking who comprises the 
“user groups” or who Hjørland would identify as those having a stake in the definitions 
created in their domain for each discourse and what their priorities are, noting similarities, 
crossover, and difference, and identifying what epistemic stance seems to be at work. 
Then, I discuss the social consequences of that identification to gender categories, 
particularly in terms of the characteristics of oppression or subjection as described in 
chapter one. Finally, I close with the implications to knowledge organization and areas 
for future research.  
Law 
“User Groups” and their Interests 
Women and men. Parsons (1741), in his legal treatise on hermaphroditism, writes, 
“Doubt is the only Path to Truth; for by this we examine, search, and discern Truth from 
Error; Natural History affords Examples enough of Falsehoods copy’d and passed down 
from Age to Age, through the whole Class of Writers who never doubted each other, and 
consequently were never able to know the Truth of Things, upon which Volumes have 
been wrote” (p. 10). In other words, he critiques the authority of those who talk amongst 
themselves and maintain power for their own self-interest, despite evidence to the 
contrary, to the detriment of an excluded population. A century later, the approach had 
changed little in the legal field. Egregiously protecting their self-interests, the legal 
profession created a circular and insular domain that resisted women’s ability to join 
institutions of power and thus have a voice in defining their rights. The legal profession 
purposefully and explicitly excluded women from holding any positions, and later any 
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positions of power within the field, justifying their decisions with either the “law of 
nature” or the circular argument that women did not have particular rights because they 
were illegal. This resulted in an epistemological echo-chamber that excluded the 
subjective voices of women until the 1970s.  
Along with the exclusionary, self-protecting practices of the bar, economic concerns 
form the core of most legal decisions that “define” sex and gender, either directly or 
indirectly. Initially, keeping property and power in the arms of men seems to be a driving 
force based on the rights afforded women. In his medical jurisprudence text, Dean (1866) 
writes that lawyers need to have an “intimate knowledge” of the laws related to sex in 
order to “regulate the descent of property;” however, since in the United States “males 
and females are regarded alike,” in terms of property ownership, and therefore, 
“impotence and sterility” should be the focus of the decisions (p. 17). Even though 
women’s rights changed by 1866, with the Married Women’s Property Act, the dominant 
definition in the legal dictionaries remained with the outdated language for another 50 
years. 
Power was not restricted to the economic realm. Laws necessarily have a coercive 
or disciplining effect on the populace that enforces the normativity expressed by the 
particular law. The coercion is backed by sanctions or, in some cases, violence, with the 
idea that it will prevent and punish the undesired behavior. Undoubtedly sanctions exist 
for the condition of being a woman or non-conforming body in nineteenth-century law. 
The ability to violently “restrain her of her liberty” exemplifies the legal coercive effect 
men could have extra-legally (Bouvier’s, 1948, p. 512). Making the home the realm of 
women enables men to avoid the responsibility of doing unpleasant housework and what 
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they considered other dulling domestic tasks.2 Consequently, women are excluded from 
the rhetorical and real space of the profession, leading to their exclusion from other 
public institutions. Overall, the legal knowledge creation regarding women specifically is 
made by men with seeming self-interest in maintaining their own rights and power. 
Eighty years later, not much had changed. 
During the limbo period of the 1950s to mid-60s, women occupied a legally 
precarious position. Though they had gained some rights by this time, such as universal 
suffrage in 1920, in the eyes of the law, women were not equal, and would not be 
considered so until the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Compared to Lavinia Goodell’s 
nineteenth-century application to the bar, the discursive tone turned from condescending 
to outwardly vicious as women began to encroach on the legal field. Although women 
were also universally admitted to the bar at this time and were increasingly entering law 
school, they still had little voice in the rhetorical space of the discourse, because their 
legal inequality resulted in powerlessness. This meant they had no recourse against 
discrimination, power, or opportunity for self-definition, even if they had access. Though 
entering the field was the opportunity for women to join the discourse and perhaps 
exercise subjectivity to change perceptions, this was vigorously resisted. Thus, despite 
having access and limited membership in the field, the discourse was still controlled by 
men whose main priority was to keep this control. Feminist legal literature acknowledges 
that the legal field was particularly brutal, more so than other fields, and this entitlement 
was based on their recognition of their legal untouchability.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Although this seems like speculation, a report by the World Bank (2012) on gender and time use reported 
that worldwide, in both developed and developing nations, men still resist unpaid work such as housework 
and child care, even as more and more of women’s time is spent in the workforce.  
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Similarly to the nineteenth century, the result of this entrenchment was the legal 
sanctioning of women as “other.” The discourse reflects that women were seen as 
unnaturally forcing their way into men’s institutions. The legal definitions reflected a 
tone of nostalgia for how things previously had been better for men in the past. Perhaps 
these priorities can be seen as the response to the “decline of the masculine” that occurred 
in the 1950s and 60s. “Othering” of women occurred in other forms during this 
timeframe, such as the establishment of sex as an organizing principle on ID cards, as 
well as the inclusion of stereotyped, gendered psychological profiles as evidence in trials, 
where femininity is positioned as a failure of masculinity. 
In the next decade, once the Civil Rights Act had been in effect, women had 
limited access and some rights recognized. The 1970s were spent litigating the rights 
recognized by the Civil Rights Act, and consequently most of the legal discourse 
surrounding women occurred in the realm of employment law and often came in the form 
of fighting against the essentialism, “othering,” and determinism entrenched in the male-
dominated worlds of commerce, law, medicine and politics. In medicine, similar 
discourse shows the conditions for women physicians, medicine was continuing its 
integration with the discourse of psychology. With the surge of sex-reassignment 
procedures in the 50s and 60s, trans and intersex marriages and divorces began to surface 
in legal discourse. 
The legal discourse shows the shifting priorities of the user groups, as newly-
protected women fought to gain equal treatment in the workplaces as outlined by the 
Civil Rights Act. The opposing men fought equally hard to prevent them from entering 
the male-dominated professions, and women worked to close loopholes, such as through 
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the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 and Barnes v. Costle (1977), which, on appeal, 
banned sexual harassment in the workplace. If in the 1950s and 60s, the law had not kept 
up with social change, in the 1970s for women, the social change had not kept up with 
the law. Though women were now equal in the eyes of the law, the law had not changed 
social behavior, symbolized by the failed Equal Rights Amendment. One priority of the 
major law firms, then, was to show compliance with the Civil Rights Act, but at the most 
minimum level possible while not changing behavior. However, the limited access that 
women were able to forge, in combination with the platform of the Civil Rights, resulted 
in the being able to control a small piece of the discourse, more so than in the 50s.  
Intersex people. Similarly, the nineteenth century legal discourse relating to 
intersex people refers to marriage, divorce, and voting, (and alleged fraud therein). This 
too relies in practice on social norms but professes a moral purpose (rightfully regulating 
property, preventing same-sex relationships, protecting women who are “true” women). 
In intersex Levi Suydam’s alleged voter fraud case, for example, Suydam’s vote would 
have broken a tie; consequently, the decision as to his sex held stakes of interest to the 
outcome of the election. Had the election not been contested, his sex would have been 
less likely been questioned. Legal literature on intersex people from the time relies 
heavily on the opinions of medical professionals to make these decisions, but with an 
even stronger reliance on gender roles and gendered norms. Despite that intersex people 
signified a departure from the “law of nature,” attorneys did not stop invoking it 
backwards by ascribing sex based on characteristics rather than characteristics by sex. 
Intersex people seemed like they wanted to live their lives as they pleased, except in such 
cases as the woman who was unsure if she could legally marry. 
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By the mid-century legal discourse regarding intersex people began to move away 
from the language of “monstrosities,” and view “hermaphrodites” in medical terms rather 
than by social characteristics, although social characteristics still figure into sex 
determination. It also recognizes variance rather than the mythical “perfect 
hermaphrodite.” However, it again reinforces legal authority, dismissing the idea that an 
intersex person knows best which gender with which to identify.  
Trans people. Trans people did not appear in the legal discourse until the 50s, but 
only minimally until the 1970s, when the interests seemed to be arguing morality, 
maintaining heteronormativity, and once again regulating property rights. Following the 
Christine Jorgenson sex reassignment surgery, many of the typical economic concerns of 
law (descent of property, marriage, divorce) had not yet emerged because during this 
timeframe people were just beginning to have the surgeries and other treatments; 
marriage and divorce conflicts would arise later. Some effort toward preventing sex 
reassignment surgery occurred through the threat of lawsuits to surgeons who would 
ostensibly be committing “mayhem.” Though since no one was prosecuted, it is unclear 
whether the mayhem threats were rumor or reality. If it happened, typically this type of 
charge would originate from a state or local jurisdiction brought up by a prosecutor 
motivated by social pressure or seeking publicity. As time passed and legal loopholes 
such as vagrancy laws and fraud began to be applied to trans behavior, a certain strand of 
discourse began to argue that trans behavior was harmless and they should be left alone. 
Other efforts, such as the standardization movement, succeeded in reinforcing sex as an 
organizing principle despite the social differences incrementally dissipating. Although the 
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standardization of identification documents also reinforced the binary aspects of sex and 
gender, it was not rigorously enforced for trans people. 
Conclusion to User Groups and Interests 
Overall, it appears that the interests and priorities expressed in the legal discourse 
continue to maintain the exclusion in each timeframe, but since social norms were 
shifting—women were working in “men’s professions;” the public was fascinated with 
trans people—they were required to work harder at “othering” women and trans 
individuals. “Othering” serves as a tactic to preserve the difference previously attributed 
to the “law of nature,” but since the “law of nature” was losing credibility, they tried to 
create conditions that would sustain the artificial but still legally enforced difference. It 
also had a dehumanizing effect, repeatedly calling attention to the alleged inferiority 
caused by membership in a category. 
Legal epistemology—Justification of the ontological decisions 
Women and men. In the nineteenth century, the ontological characteristics of the 
concept of woman, as evident in the legal discourse include that women possess innate 
traits as delicacy, timidity, weakness and piety; they are innately nurturing, maternal, 
caring, yet incapable and unfit for public service. They have high voices and a tendency 
to try to control their husbands. These traits suit them for the home and childrearing and 
are celebrated as positive and ideal qualities in the female sex. These are reinforced in 
opposition to men’s characteristics through active “othering” and presented as immutable. 
Grosz (1994) calls this type of metaphysical essentialism “naturalism,” where “women's 
nature is derived from God-given attributes that are not explicable or observable simply 
in biological terms” (p. 84). 
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Methodologically, the knowledge of these traits is generated by observation by the 
men who serve as enunciative modalities within the profession and are applied absolutely 
to all women through logical deduction and attributed to the “law of nature” or the law of 
the land (i.e. women cannot vote because it is illegal). What they are observing consists 
of social norms within the experience of an advantaged, white circle and intuited broadly. 
The uncritical deferrals to the law of nature and the law of the land indicates that no 
critical reflection occurred on why these conditions occur. In the 1950s and 60s, this 
changes little, other than that the language changes slightly to become more insulting 
than condescending. Words such as “delicate” are replaced with “weak” or “incompetent” 
and rather than overtly stating that these traits are a result of the law of nature, the 
biological imperatives of reproduction and physical weakness are blamed. These 
immutable but unproven traits serve as a justification for determinism. In this time period, 
psychological observations gain legitimacy with the law, but they fit into an existing 
framework based on social norms. 
The approach taken by the men opposed to women’s rights results in a reverse 
version of “strategic essentialism” as articulated by Spivak (1993). In the feminist version, 
women who do not accept the existence of innate characteristics that all women share 
band together strategically to grasp political power that would be otherwise unattainable 
if they did not believe in “women” as a group or concept. In this context, however, the 
legal literature repeatedly references men being controlled by women indicating that men 
do not actually think women are weak or unpowerful, but essentialize them as such in 
order to restrict their political power. Another related position is “conferralist 
essentialism,” which is Sveinsdottir’s (2008) antirealist version. She argues that the 
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essentialism is “conferred,” rather than “real” in that the essential qualities are being 
conferred based on our values or “expressed in our conceptual practices,” rather than 
what is “real” (Sveinsdottir, 2008, p. 1). Therefore, in this example, the qualities of 
delicacy would characterize what Sveinsdottir would call “ideal versions” almost like 
prototypes, with the possibility of exceptions. This suggests a metaphysical immutability 
deployed for the purpose of exclusion. 
Despite this, rights were recognized as a result of the critical examination of the 
reasoning presented by groups above. The opposing voices, those that led to the 
recognition of women’s rights also relied on observation, but using an inductive approach 
that resisted creating “laws” about the nature of women that were logically applied to all 
women, instead focusing on the individual observed cases in individual situations. 
Additionally, social pressure toward civil rights had led to legislation designed to 
alleviate the difficult-to-justify extreme inequality experienced by blacks, and though 
women were persecuted for the same reasons, women were able capitalize on those 
opportunities to have their own rights recognized. Thus, because of the Civil Rights Act, 
these individual cases provided opportunities, little by little, for women to join the 
discourse and join in the knowledge-generation, even if they were not originally intended 
to be the primary beneficiaries of the legislation. 
Though the “methodology” at work in the legal discourse is not experimental in a 
controlled environment, it seems the dominant enacted epistemology expressed in the 
legal discourse, at least until the Civil rights Act, is positivistic, where the authorities or 
“enunciative modalities” observe women in the context of social conventions to find or 
intuit “facts” about them, and create deductive conclusions based on these observations. 
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Budd (2001) calls positivism “deterministic scientism,” and criticizes its tendency to 
create absolute theories from observation (p. 96). Absolutist “laws” can be dangerous, as 
rationalism accepts intuition as a form of “rational insight,” as long as it can be verified 
through observation (Markie, 2013). The observations originate from within the 
parameters of their experience (a priori knowledge not recognized). The “feelings” of the 
object are also discounted because they resist verification from the observer. This 
approach can be expressed in a rough syllogism:  
P1. All women, according to the law of nature/science/biology (verified through 
observations), are delicate (maternal, etc.) and must be protected. 
P2: The profession of law (insert any domain outside the home) is harsh and 
terrible. 
C: Therefore, women must be protected from the profession of law (or other 
domain). 
Though the language changes over the time, the underlying reasoning changes little, with 
no critical reflection of why these conditions are the way they are. In the 60s and 70s, the 
“law of nature” is defined more specifically in terms of women’s reproductive 
“responsibilities” rather than only for their delicacy. Rather than using the moral 
requirement that women stay home with their children, the professed justification was 
pragmatic and economic: Women’s inevitable reproductive requirements inconveniences 
workplaces, divides the women’s attention, and consequently, clients would not trust 
them and they would lose business.  
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Bentz & Shapiro (1998) summarize the characteristics of positivism, and eight of 
the points from their summary follow. For each I outline how the approach taken in the 
legal discourse matches the methodology and epistemic justifications for positivism: 
1. Knowledge consists primarily of turning “facts,” derived from observation, into 
sciences organized according to theories formulated as general laws (p. 177): 
Here the observed data that women are nurturing stem from their social position 
and the social position of the men observing them (e.g. a privileged group 
observing within their social circle, communicative modalities, etc.), yet is treated 
as a generalized fact of nature based on limited observations. The condition of 
being maternal is not “proven” through observation, but rather intuited, as the 
feelings of the object are not considered. The absolutist approach excludes 
evidence outside of white, affluent women, or any women’s experience that might 
replicate the harshness of the domains from which they hope to exclude women. A 
priori knowledge is not valued, so no information about women outside of the 
experience of the observers is considered. Sojourner Truth’s (1851) famous 
“Ain’t I a Woman?” speech exemplifies the contrast in experience:   
That man over there says that women need to be helped into 
carriages, and lifted over ditches, and to have the best place 
everywhere. Nobody ever helps me into carriages, or over mud-
puddles, or gives me any best place! And ain't I a woman? Look at 
me! Look at my arm! I have ploughed and planted, and gathered 
into barns, and no man could head me! And ain't I a woman? I 
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could work as much and eat as much as a man - when I could get it 
- and bear the lash as well! And ain't I a woman?   
The incorporation of psychological observations in the 50s and 60s, though 
seemingly adding subjectivity, were positioned within the framework of pre-
existing “laws” about sex. 
2. Only hypotheses that can be formulated as potential general laws involving 
relationships among measurable variables and verified through experiment and 
sensory observation can count as knowledge. These laws are what constitute 
explanation (p. 179): Philosophical dilemmas are deemed irrelevant and irrational. 
Although the measurability of women’s delicacy is questionable, if the privileged 
men speaking here observe only women in their capacities as wives and mothers, 
they may generalize from their limited experience and proclaim that what “is” 
without any critical examination of why it “is.” It then morphs into a deterministic, 
unquestioned “law of nature.” Creating a physical reason crucially gives these 
qualities immutability. According to Grosz (1994), biological traits “constitute an 
unalterable bedrock of identity, the attribution of biologistic characteristics 
amounts to a permanent form of social containment for women” (p. 84). Similarly, 
another “law” to which the reasoning referred is the actual law: women cannot 
vote because it is illegal. 
3. Values have no relevance to science except as expressions of irrational human 
emotions and preferences…the entire realm of values, the “ought,” and the 
normative need to be rigorously excluded from science (p. 180): The normative 
(“should” or “ought”) statements and value judgments are discounted. The 
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subjective experience, context, or desires of women to prove competence have no 
bearing on the reasoning for exclusion.  
4. The only things that we can know exist for sure are individual, isolated occasions 
of observations of the external world (p. 180): This compounds the circular logic, 
as without a model of a woman attorney, a woman voter, a non-affluent woman, 
no observations can be made of one functioning successfully within the public 
realm of men. Perhaps not in a lab, but in society, experience comes from 
constant exposure to social norms. Though exceptions exist, they are considered 
abnormal. At the time, women of a certain class and color reliably could be found 
in the home, rearing children; any deviations are explainable through some sort of 
exceptional difference (e.g. the “mannishness” of suffragettes). In other words, 
the condition of being a woman requires that one remain in domestic sphere 
because of her natural nurturing qualities. The “law” to which they referred, as we 
can view through a historical lens, however, was self-created, self-serving, and 
thus only deterministic as a method of restricting women’s free will. 
5. Knowledge is essentially the product of a “knower” and conceived from the 
perspective of an individual observer and knower of reality (p. 181): The 
“knowers” include men. Women as “knowers” do not count because they 
approach from a position of no power as the observer and generator of knowledge 
by merit of being explicitly excluded from the profession.  
6. The fundamental relationship of the knower to reality is essentially a passive or 
neutral one, consisting primarily of observing facts or sensory data and then 
building up knowledge from these observed facts and Knowledge serves as a 
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means of control, and this orientation toward control is built into knowledge itself 
(p. 182): There is no arguing with the law of nature. What “ought” to happen is 
irrelevant. This leads to determinism.  
7. The observer’s or knower’s context does not enter into knowledge, because 
context exists just as another source of intruding subjective or irrational elements 
into the research or knowledge process, and Just as there is no such thing as 
context, strictly speaking there is no such thing as history, because history is 
context or situation—and action within that context or situation—that changes 
over time (p. 182): Again, culture or social circumstances have no bearing on the 
reasoning. The emotional and historical separation from the object ostensibly 
increases objectivity, resulting in more “scientific” results.    
8. Positivism rejects “negative” thinking (social critique and “critical thinking” (p. 
184):  Underlying causes (i.e. what makes a woman gentle, nurturing, 
incompetent, etc.) remain unexamined—they “are” because they are observed that 
way).  No recognition exists that women have been historically positioned at a 
deficit 
Though positivism characterizes the dominant enacted epistemology, by virtue that 
resistance to this view existed within the profession (the legal discourse also led to the 
recognition of women’s rights to own property, vote, and eventually be treated equally 
under the law all originated within the same discourse community), a different epistemic 
methodology was taken in those cases.  
 If the positivism used in legal reasoning was absolutist, how did women get any 
rights recognized in the nineteenth century? The legal decisions that resulted in a 
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different ontological picture of women took empirical epistemic approaches to how the 
woman was “defined.” They observed the immediate evidence and drew conclusions 
based on these observations rather than appealing to pre-existing “theory” or “law,” or, 
like the opposing side, “laws of nature.” For example, after Justice Ryan’s dissent 
attributing Lavinia Goodell’s presumed incompatibility with practicing law to be the 
justified by the “laws of nature,” the majority decision simply stated, “We are satisfied 
that the applicant possesses all the requisite qualifications as to learning, ability and 
moral character to entitle her to admission.” They refer to the qualities observed in the 
applicant, and the applicant alone. They acknowledge Ryan’s dissent is based on “her sex 
alone,” a generalization rather than on the inductively perceived characteristics. The 
admission of one woman changes the discourse by adding another voice and changing the 
observable possibilities.  
Although exceptions occurred here and there, women were seen as unequal under 
the law until the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which dramatically changed the legal 
ontological definition of a woman from an unequal “other” to an equal. Overnight a new 
standard existed. Women legally went from being considered individuals to members of a 
protected class. Although the hypothesis had changed (simply stated, “all women are 
unequal/different from men” to “all women are equal/the same as men”), the reasoning 
structure had not. As a profession where women newly had access, the deductive, 
positivistic approach continued to be employed in legal workplaces to attempt to prohibit 
or limit women’s entry, still based on the old deterministic reasoning based on biology 
(modified to include economic interests), which painfully demonstrated the difference 
between equality and equity. The men attempted to “other” the women to preserve the 
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status quo that benefitted them or to require women to fit into the model they had 
structured. However, with women now painted with a wide “equality” brush, they could 
fight back with the same rationalist structure. Roughly put into a syllogism:   
P1: Women, by law, cannot be treated differently on the basis of sex 
P2: You are treating women differently on the basis of sex 
C: You are breaking the law 
It could be viewed as a form of nominalism (a rejection of abstract forms, that 
only language holds together a concept), or in this case, strategic essentialism. This is not 
to say that women involved did not believe in common or essential qualities of women, 
but placing them in a protected class ended up essentializing them in the same manner 
that the positivistic approach did. Elsewhere in the law, such cases as Roe v. Wade take a 
more critical approach, minimizing the moral aspects and taking a phenomenological, 
social constructionist stance. Justice Blackmun wrote that “recent attitudinal change, of 
advancing medical knowledge and techniques, and of new thinking about an old issue” 
and that “One’s philosophy, one’s experiences, one’s exposure to the raw edges of human 
existence, one’s religious training, one’s attitudes toward life and family and their values, 
and the moral standards one establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence 
and to color one’s thinking and conclusions about abortion. In addition, population 
growth, pollution, poverty, and racial overtones tend to complicate and not to simplify the 
problem” (Roe v. Wade, 1973). Applying a phenomological approach, he acknowledges 
and brackets the “preassumptions” and recognizes intentionality of the stakeholders.  
Arguably both the men fighting to keep women “othered” and the women fighting 
for access had pragmatic purposes for defining sex the way they did. Of course, neither 
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party would consider the other’s pragmatic approaches beneficial to them, which is a 
tenet of pragmatism—that the “solution” should be beneficial to both subject and object. 
The women filing lawsuits also took a Marxist, materialist epistemology, also considered 
a type of pragmatism, in that “our material life conditions (economic conditions in a wide 
sense) are the most important factors for the development of our knowledge and our 
subjectivity” (Hjørland, 2008, n.p.). The law firms then took a different economic 
approach: one of economic hardship. Because women are incompetent, uncommitted, and 
clients do not trust them, the business will suffer. 
Those women who made it into practice and were successful also could be considered 
to take a standpoint approach in that they view knowledge through the eyes of their group 
as well as through that of the dominant group. Though a small number of women 
practiced law throughout the beginning of the twentieth century, they had not yet 
penetrated the most powerful position within the top firms or within the juridical or 
political structures from which institutional power emanates, regardless of individual 
qualifications. Women struggled to navigate the environment so hostile to them. Foucault 
(1972) identifies this phenomenon as “this will to knowledge, thus reliant on institutional 
support and distribution, tends to exercise a sort of pressure, a power of constraint upon 
other forms of discourse (p. 219). Though they had the means to a voice, it was 
overpowered by the constitutive narrative that they were different from men, that they 
were biologically insufficient to handle the practice of law. 
Intersex people. Methodologically, legally deciding the sex of intersex people tends 
to take an inductive, empirical, case-by-case approach, if only because the existence of 
intersex people confounds the intuited, deterministic absolutism required for deduction 
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(e.g., all men have penises; all women have ovaries, etc.). The inability to make a 
definitive visual determination (i.e. observation) signifies the limits of observation based 
on the available scientific knowledge, and also signals the uncertainty of at what point to 
take the inductive leap. The criteria includes observation and speculation based on 
“knowledge transmitted from authorities:” medical professionals, or, in especially in the 
nineteenth century, gossipy stories found in the literature. Those same type of stories in 
later discourse took the form of case studies, with a less incredulous and more “scientific” 
tone, focusing heavily on medically-defined characteristics such as chromosomes, 
external genitalia, etc. The observed data only minimally taken into account are the 
performed genders, gender identity, or functionality of the “object, thus maintaining the 
authority and “objectivity” of the observer.  
Because of advances in medicine, the legal discourse starting in the 1950s can cite 
specific medical conditions (chromosomes, hormones) for determining sex and rely 
slightly less on social behaviors as observed, but those social behaviors become more 
divided into masculine and feminine in the psychological literature. John Money’s work 
heavily influences the discourse, and he is regularly cited, although leaving out biology is 
difficult. As an example, a medical jurisprudence article discusses how although the 
performed gender of an intersex child was recommended to be “chosen” by physicians 
and parents, based on their “psychic sex,” here meaning social indicators rather than 
biological features. Money’s term “gender role” appears, but it is minimized as the 
“seventh and last criterion,” and they indicate it should be subordinated to how well the 
external genitalia “lend themselves to surgical reconstruction in conformity with assigned 
sex,” citing Money again (Bowman & Engle, 1960, p. 295, 302). Attempts are made at 
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classification based on medical characteristics, but binaries continue to be upheld, as 
dictated by social roles and convenience of the medical team, indicating the same 
fundamentalism in the belief in “natural” sex roles, even when biology defies those 
assignations.  
Trans people. Intersex people were a perennial object of study, but in the 1950s they 
took a lower priority than the newer curiosity: trans people. For trans people, it seems the 
legal discourse intends to protect morality or at least protect traditional sex definitions in 
order to enforce heteronormativity. The inclusion of gendered psychological inventories 
in litigation might on the surface seem to increase subjectivity, but instead it was used 
against people to reinforce stereotypical views of femininity and masculinity and present 
femininity as failed masculinity. The legal silence during the 1950s and 60s seems to 
indicate that the newness of the trans phenomena had not yet hit the mainstream, or at 
least not the idea that a justiciable issue had ripened.  
Though no laws specifically against transsexuality existed, the search for ways to 
make it illegal seems to indicate a reach toward a sort of morality. Something seemed 
unnatural about it, and again a potential violation of the “law of nature,” communicated 
the fundamentalism underlying sex. Additionally, the discourse begins to emphasize the 
heteronormativity of institutions such as marriage to reinforce the law of nature. The 
initial silence could indicate many things, but Christine Jorgenson caused a large 
underground group to surface and have a voice previously considered too shameful to 
speak. The descent of property related to the validity of marriage dominated, but 
additional issues arose with government IDs. Appeals directly to religion as an authority 
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rather than the coded “law of nature” cropped up more in the later twentieth century, but 
were scattered and still relatively uncommon.  
Social Consequences of Legal Epistemology 
In the case of legal treatment of women and intersex individuals in the nineteenth 
century, nearly every type of oppression as defined by Frye (1983) and Young (1990) are 
evident, interlocking together to protect the professional, personal, and economic 
interests of a specific group of men. As previously mentioned, oppression can take forms 
“embedded in unquestioned norms, habits, and symbols, in the assumptions underlying 
institutional rules and the collective consequences of following those rules” (Young, 
1990, p. 41). Spade (2011), preferring the term “subjection,” writes that the term 
“oppression” implies that one group of people simply dominates another, not taking into 
account systemic issues; however, based on the widespread and focused reasoning in the 
legal discourse, “oppression” in Spade’s rendering seems appropriate. Intersex people are 
situated in such a way that depending on the decisions made about their sex, they may 
end up either oppressed or a member of the dominant group. This case in particular lays 
bare from another angle the absurdity of the justification behind sex differentiation, as a 
simple decision separates capacity from incapacity. Thus, intersex suffer from 
“powerlessness” in that they have no ability to make their own decision as to their sex. 
As for trans people, erasure or marginalization might be associated oppressions, although 
it could be argued that their absence from the legal literature keeps them out of the 
crosshairs of oppression and subjection during the nineteenth century. 
Rather than naturalism (Grosz’s critical view of essentialism, not the empirical 
epistemology), as in the nineteenth century, essentialist biologism justifies the legal 
decisions, as it has a material origin, not necessarily moral or religious. Positivism, 
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especially in Compte’s original rendering, would not accept a religious interpretation of 
the “law of nature,” as faith is unobservable. The assignment of biologically-based 
personality characteristics are applied rationally through logic. Those essentialist views 
sweepingly assigned through logic lead to determinism, as Budd (2001) warns, which is a 
philosophical explanation for restrictions of free will where: “if and only if, given a 
specified way things are at a time, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of 
natural law” and is supported by both experience and experiment (Hoefer, 2010). The 
feminist version of determinism, which I adopt here, suggests that the condition of being 
born a woman leads to a determined path that cannot be altered. Essentialism is 
considered a metaphysical concept, but can be an unintended consequence of rationalist 
approaches such as positivism (although positivists would deny it). 
As a result of the epistemic underpinnings of the ontological definitions of sex, 
women, particularly married women, find themselves systemically powerless and 
consequently vulnerable to exploitation and servitude, as their unpaid labor is used to 
support the economic and political endeavors of men. Women’s unchangeable purpose 
and destiny is the care of the home and nurturing protector of children. She manages the 
household so the husband does not have to, and her economic interests are merged with 
those of her husband, rendering her utterly dependent. They are marginalized as prisoners 
of their definition, as it is used to keep them in thrall to the dominant sex “situated so that 
they must take orders and rarely have the right to give them” with “little opportunity to 
develop and exercise skills” (Young, 1990, p. 56). The exclusion from the professions 
bars their entry from holding office or practicing medicine, all while being exploited, as 
“the transfer of the results of the [paid or unpaid] labor of one social group to benefit 
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another” (Frye p. 49). The circular legal decisions restricting women’s rights specifically 
because they are already illegal constitutes a “systemic barrier” as defined by Frye (1983) 
as a restriction unrelated to “individual talent or merit, handicap or failure,” but rather 
“membership is some category” (p. 7). Thus, they constitute “a whole category of people 
is expelled from useful participation in social life” (Young, 1990, p. 53). All of these 
oppressions interlock to sustain women’s vulnerability, thus erasing them from public life. 
For women, the 50s and 60s resulted in the same oppressions as above, but with 
the addition of “assimilation into the patriarchy” and a modified version of servitude. 
Assimilation into the patriarchy means changing behavior to fit with masculine norms, 
which can potentially cause resentment between women (Frye, 1983, pp. 8-9). Simply put, 
women “other” other women in order to gain the advantages of aligning with men. This 
seems to have sharply occurred in the legal profession, as women who had made it into 
the field distanced themselves from other women. One woman “was so intent on proving 
that I wasn’t like other women that it never occurred to me to fight back” (as cited in 
Bowman, 2009, p. 10). Additionally, the condition of servitude during these time periods 
changed slightly to encompass servitude at work in addition to servitude in the home.  
Women were steered toward low-prestige areas such as estate planning, probate, and tax 
law, which eliminated any chance of gaining partnership. A woman survey respondent in 
the 1950s warned, “Beware of the firm looking specifically for a woman lawyer. They 
want you for work they cannot get any man to do” (Morello, 1986, p. 206).  
In differing degrees, pathologization of intersex people and women also occurred. 
According to Adler and Tennis (2013), pathologization occurs when “classifications 
serve as a sort of diagnosis and reproduce medicalized norms” (p. 269).	  For women, it 
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limits them in that biology was blamed for exclusion, resulting in determinism. The “law 
of nature” morphed from vaguely moral to entirely physical. For intersex people, 
pathologization initially had a positive impact because it removed the supernatural and 
monstrous connotations, providing some humanity; however, the transition from 
frightening freak of nature to medical curiosity still resulted in the shame and stigma of 
being considered abnormal and requiring correction or normalization. 
For trans people, the initial omission from the nineteenth century legal discourse 
seems to indicate that nothing initially was perceived to be criminal about being trans, or 
possibly that it was so shameful it required silence. When they appeared in the discourse 
of the 50s, that uncertainty continued as laws and legislation attempted to stretch to 
include trans behavior (or surgical emendation) as criminal acts. As the laws formalized 
in the 1970s, the criminal aspects receded (but not harassment by law enforcement), but 
legal rights remained cloudy. The uncertain and unregulated environment could be 
manipulated to one’s advantage or could be frustratingly unreliable. For example, 
because clerks and other low-level, uninformed bureaucrats were handling issues such as 
driver’s licenses, they had much discretion and would amend the sex on drivers’ licenses 
if the applicants were persuasive enough to overcome the inconsistency in the application 
(Spade, 2008). Divorces and property disputes resulted in conflicting decisions based on 
medical knowledge mixed with judges’ personal feelings, society norms and moral 
concerns. Legal scholars noted the inconsistencies and often took a sympathetic tone. The 
plight of trans people rose in recognition and notoriety, subjecting them to both sympathy 
and derision.  
Summary of Law 
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Law’s epistemic trajectory varies little. Knowledge about women is developed 
positivistically and only ruptured when empirical approaches were taken to refute it. 
Hartsock (1990) argues that “the philosophical and historical creation of a devalued 
‘Other’ was the necessary precondition for the creation of the transcendental rational 
subject” of the Enlightenment (p. 160). “’Others’ such as women, [and intersex and trans 
people] were created in opposition to the rational speaking subject—to give “him” and 
systems that support his power legitimacy.” She emphasizes that this does not speak to 
the natural unity of women, but rather the constructed “other” made up of “negative 
qualities” (p. 161). They were forced to unite strategically against the efforts to “other” 
them. The tradition Hartsock describes continued throughout the late nineteenth and mid-
to-late twentieth century, as intuitively-conceived and logically-reinforced differentiated 
conceptions of sex. However, empirical and critical approaches increased with the 
introduction of women into the ontology of the legal profession and the rhetorical space 
of the discourse. Intersex and trans people were also considered violations of the law of 
nature, and thus othered with moralistic and heteronormative arguments that, like women, 
morphed into economic interests as marriage and divorce concerns arose.  
Science/Medicine  
 “User Groups” and their Interests 
User groups of the discourse include male physicians, the women striving to be 
physicians, and those women who became physicians, as well as patients. The discourse 
of medicine is less unified than that of law, as an inherent conflict exists in the goals and 
interests of scientific research. Basic scientific researchers conduct observational research 
in order to create knowledge of consistent “laws” that apply to the human body and the 
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physiology of how it works. Medical clinical work, on the other hand, focuses on the 
“abnormal,” seeking to identify the causes of the abnormality and “fix” them. The first 
uses observation to seek consistency, and the latter uses observation to seek abnormality. 
Also, similarly to the legal profession, another tangential, non-professional strand of 
informal discourse “defines” women, not in the context of being a clinical or research 
subject, but rather as a justification for first excluding women from the practice of 
medicine and then “othering” them once they had gained entry to the profession.  
Women and men. In the nineteenth century discourse, the connection between body 
and mind was mostly absent in basic research discourse on sex and minimized in clinical 
gender research, likely because it could not easily be observed. Though science professes 
objectivity in its observations, in the discourse, men’s self-interest surfaces, for example, 
in the early hypothesis that conception only results from orgasm helped men evade 
accountability for rape or that only women were sterile (usually because of “corpulency” 
or  “too frequent or promiscuous intercourse”) (Dean, 1866, pp. 16).  However, in direct 
conflict with the actual work of medicine, the discourse around women not entering the 
profession focused on women’s constitutions. The assumptions about women’s 
constitutions methodologically were intuited through limited observation (through men’s 
observations of women) rather than strictly verified by giving women a chance to prove 
themselves. Once Freud’s works had been published near the turn of the century, the 
concept of gender entered the conversation and thus practice began to prioritize research 
and incorporation of the mind into the discourse of sex. 
As in the legal reasoning, the same argument occurred through the three timeframes 
with slight modulations based on changing social norms. Also, similarly to law, the 
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rhetorical space of the discourse included repeated hostile utterances and a climate that 
signaled to women that they were unwelcome in the profession. In all timeframes, the 
abilities of women physicians continued to be debated in the medical discourse. However, 
in the 1970s, because women gained a voice in the profession, they were able to defend 
themselves, and gain a foothold in the discourse.  
Intersex people. Reis (2005) points out that the nineteenth century 
professionalization of medicine transformed the condition of being intersexed from a 
monstrosity to a medical condition. The recognition that no perfect hermaphrodite could 
exist was accompanied by the growing expectation of “perfect (that is, conventional) 
male or female embodiment” in all humans (p. 423). What was believed to be “women’s 
qualities” were often articulated in the clinical observations of physicians attempting to 
identify the “true sex” of an intersex person. Additionally, the so-called feminine 
characteristics used to tip the balance one way or the other in intersex cases tended to be 
negative characteristics, such as that women were “irritable” and had “shrill, squeaking 
voices” (Taylor, 1873, p. 679). Again particular sets of elite men positioned themselves 
in contrast to the “others” by presenting feminine characteristics as negative and the 
“monstrosity” of intersex people. Once again, the discourse seems to be upholding a 
moral order based on compulsory heteronormativity.  
Basic scientific research initially ignored or subsumed anomalies such as intersexed 
anatomy to their “laws.” Rather than accepting the variation of intersex, the clinical work 
sought to “fix” or force subjects to comply with fixing, especially as surgical technology 
advanced. Initially, the intersex discourse focused solely on physical markers, which in 
terms of gender knowledge creates the assumption that gender (and sex) do not extend 
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beyond the physical. Later on, as the mind became an ingredient, as gender and gender 
identity were conceptualized, the priorities of the physicians and psychologists in the 
John Money era seems to be finding the “optimal sex” of intersex people and “correcting” 
them to match the assigned sex physically and assigned gender behaviorally. In the 1950s 
the emphasis on heteronormative relationships receded as intersexuality was discovered 
earlier because of the cultural shift to hospital births. Intersex people’s gender less often 
was allowed to play out naturally without intervention.  
Intersex clinical cases, or at least those that appear in the discourse, if they were not 
solely about “correcting” anomaly, often were often in the service of some legal concern; 
that is, the expertise of the physician was consulted in order to support a legal decision. 
However, the legal decisions in the late nineteenth century typically related back to some 
maintenance of societal morality, such as ensuring no same-sex “perversion” was 
occurring, or that the intersex person was able to perform heteronormative sexual activity 
and could reproduce (impotency was grounds for divorce). On the physical side, as 
technology advanced, the convenience of the surgeons influenced the decisions. Based on 
the available technology, it was easier to make vaginas than penises leading to a 
preponderance of medical decisions to “correct” intersex to women shows a pragmatic 
solution to the difficulty of creating a working penis. Additionally, the surgical 
corrections showed a goal toward having heteronormative sexual relations rather than the 
sexual gratification of the patient. For example, emphasis was on creating a vagina 
“capacious” enough for vaginal, heterosexual intercourse, even if no pleasure was 
derived from it.  
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Trans people. News of Christine Jorgenson’s sex reassignment flooded clinics, and 
responses varied from annoyance to sympathy. Here the goals seems to be puzzling out 
the causes of transsexuality and treading lightly as not to be accused of committing 
violations of medical ethics. Psychologists, psychotherapists, endocrinologists and 
sexologists all weighed in to determine causes and the processes of gender identity, 
acknowledging John Money, the most prolific and influential voice of the time at this 
point, seemed to be motivated in part by fame and in part by the concern about his 
research subjects. 
The same pragmatism, convenience and leaning toward heteronormativity in the 
considerations of intersex people also applied with trans people, but with a slightly 
different bent. If the goal was to find the “true” or “ideal” sex for intersex people, the 
priorities expressed in the psychological discourse seem to be a desire to find the 
underlying causes of this vexing anomaly, and to create rational “laws” for its origin so it 
could be corrected. No doubt existed in knowing the birth sex of the trans person, so the 
mystery revolved around what forces compelled them to want to change and whether that 
truly constituted change. Since the mind seemed to be more malleable or impressionable 
than the physical body—Benjamin (1954, p. 130) wrote that “castration produces a 
eunuch, not a woman”—the psychological reasoning led to blame parenting, particularly 
the mother’s role, which, according to many psychologists, primarily caused the deviant 
behavior. Intersex cases manifested physically, so less attention was paid to the mind in 
those cases. Similarly to intersex patients, advancements in surgery and endocrine 
therapy led to more curiosity toward medical treatment; however, more medical ethics 
concerns and fear of legal reprisal impeded some from following through. 
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Medical Epistemology—Justification of the Ontological Decisions 
Women and men. The clues in the medical discourse indicate that women, or at least 
those who attempt to enter the medical profession in the nineteenth century, have weak 
and squeamish temperaments, are nurturing and caring, and should not seek out situations 
that compromise their moral decency or reproductive abilities. Observable physical 
characteristics of sex include the external genitalia, along with such markers as beards 
and breasts, but also heterosexuality or “the desires excited by presence of either sex” 
(Dean, 1866, p. 20). Gender identity is not taken into account, since real emotions and 
feelings cannot be observed by an external viewer, nor are they valued prior to the 
development of psychology as a complementary discipline in gender cases. The 
psychological literature of the 1950s began to identify people as blank slates, but that 
gender roles were imprinted, either through the process of living in a gendered society, or 
artificially through the parents in the case of intersex children. The feminine qualities 
identified in psychological literature include nurturing, emotional, and maternal 
behaviors; tidiness and squeamishness; an interest in fashion; and an aversion to physical 
labor and vermin. These characteristics were posed in direct opposition to men’s 
characteristics, as if they existed on a continuum rather than co-existing. 
As an applied science, medicine unquestionably relies on the observation and 
examination central to empiricism, as well as the rationalism of basic research of the 
natural sciences such as biology that supports clinical work. Basic research relies on 
“objective” sense data, unsullied by context or ideology, as well as infallible knowledge 
(facts) pieced together complex conceptualizations that lead to “general rules, principles, 
and ideas” (Hjørland, 1997, p. 69). The notion of empiricism developed with increase of 
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experimentalism in both medicine and psychology. However, in clinical practice, 
experience is valued over general principles, all conclusions are derived from experience, 
and experience is used to define concepts (Hjørland, 1997, p. 60). Foucault (2003) calls 
this phenomenon in medicine the “observing gaze,” which “will be fulfilled in its own 
truth and will access to the truth of things if it rests on them in silence, if everything 
keeps silent around what it sees” (p. 108). In other words, the type of empirical 
observation valued during that time presupposes a purity or objectivity of observation, 
which, without the noise of context, allows the “truth” to be seen. Foucault (1972) 
considered this part of the new “episteme” that began in the late eighteenth century, and 
called the knowledge generating observations the “medical gaze,” which could see what 
was beneath surfaces to determine truth beneath. He writes,  
for prior to all knowledge, the source, the domain, and the boundaries of experience 
can be found in its dark presence. The gaze is passively linked to the primary 
passivity that dedicates it to the endless task of absorbing experience in its entirety, 
and of mastering it. (p. xiv)  
Even though experience is also a tenet of phenomenology, this type of observed 
experience intends to match the abnormality to a presupposed condition that the observer 
has experienced before so that he or she can then identify a treatment plan for the 
abnormality to return them to “normal.”  
A conflict, then, exists between the knowledge-creation that occurs in basic research 
(rationalism), and how it actually manifests in clinical practice (empiricism). Newton 
(2001) articulates the tension as “Rationalism is the search for and emphasis on basic 
mechanisms of disease, which then color all clinical decisions. Empiricism is defined as 
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the emphasis on the outcomes of individual patients and groups of patients” (p. 299). 
Budd (2001) points out the conflict of using induction in the service of deduction, but 
admits that it forms the basis of many areas of praxis (p. 50). Markie (2013) also notes 
that rationalism and empiricism are not mutually exclusive, and come in conflict only 
when they refer to the same subject. These discourses confirm that applying different 
epistemic methodologies deployed in the interest of different users can generate 
conflicting results.  As shown in the legal discourse, a rationalist argument and an 
empirical argument for Lavinia Goodell’s bar application resulted in differing outcomes. 
In medicine, the epistemological paradox occurs in the conflict between “normal” and 
“abnormal.” Basic scientific research uses observes and logically applies it to define what 
is “normal,” and clinical research observes what is “abnormal” and attempts to correct it. 
Because the condition of being a woman does not in itself constitute a disease or 
abnormality, the physical characteristics of women mostly were defined in the basic 
scientific research, taking the form of identification and function of female organs and 
systems in anatomy and physiology texts. The knowledge creation in basic scientific 
research undoubtedly takes a rationalist approach, with careful observation creating laws 
about anatomy and physiology, generalizing the knowledge to all cases of the 
phenomenon—like an ideal Platonic form—but with the recognition that it is based on 
careful observation, not metaphysics. Despite the rejection of metaphysics, rationalism 
allows for an immutable human core—human nature—which as Budd warns, can lead to 
determinism. Prior to the dominance of psychology and psychiatry, taking up the mantel 
of defining mental characteristics of sex was the pseudoscience of phrenology, strictly 
defining immutable characteristics passed down from mothers to children. 
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Though no clear physiological “cause” could be identified in the nineteenth century 
for sex difference other than organs (although it did not stop anyone from speculating), 
the same positivistic, intuitive “law of nature” was used as a professed epistemology to 
support the exclusion of women from medicine, where women deterministically were 
considered too weak to withstand unpleasant anatomical realities. For example, the 
intuited feminine characteristic of being nurturing was compatible with medicine, so they 
focused on squeamishness, and in one case, “that their physiological condition during a 
portion of every month disqualifies them…is too nearly self evident to require argument 
(as cited in Justin, 1978, p. 42). The discourse includes other moral reasons, such as the 
indecency of women physicians viewing men’s sexual organs and that their divided 
attention (because of reproductive/family concerns) makes them less competent. The 
delicacy of their constitutions included the scientific justification that spending too much 
energy studying would kill cells necessary for supporting healthy reproductive function 
(Clarke, 1873, p. 51).  
This reliance on non-rigorous speculation infuriated the women already in the field. 
The women shot back with individual instances where women medical students had no 
change in countenance during potentially uncomfortable medical lectures. In response to 
the argument about menstruation, Dr. Mary Putnam Jacobi (1876) conducted an 
extensive study showing that menstrual cycles did not affect women’s work performance 
physiologically. In the introduction to her prize-winning study, she scathingly criticizes 
the lack of rigor and intentionality behind medical justifications of exclusion, writing, 
“the sex that is supposed to be limiting in nature is nearly always different from that of 
the person conducting the inquiry” (p.  2). Her multiple-methodological study refuted the 
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many essays that used the “law of nature” or menstruation as a cause for women to 
remain uneducated or excluded from the professions, citing them individually and 
refuting each point. Thus, she combines both standpoint and empirical epistemologies of 
knowledge-generation to combat the rationalist, intuited assumptions underlying the 
dominant reasoning. As Dr. Putnam’s research makes clear, since medicine relies on 
what can be seen, no consideration is taken either for the subjectivity of the object in self-
definition. The authority of the physician is final because the opinion of the subject is 
suspect, as they may be attempting to commit something illegal or immoral (or 
inconvenient or threatening).  
The social construction of sex and the addition of gender, as posited by Money 
starting in the 1950s, removed determinism based on visual sex organs but reinforced 
gendered stereotypes (e.g. girls like dolls and housework, boys like to wrestle). 
Accordingly, the discourse of women’s incompetence dropped the notion of physical 
incapability during menstruation or squeamishness and accepted the social notions that 
women had more family responsibilities. The discourse took into account the socially 
restraining circumstances, blaming the biological imperative of reproduction. Social 
structure is not implicated, nor is it suggested that it could be adjusted. The argument of 
women’s squeamish natures receded to be overtaken by the “divided attention” argument, 
which justified the diversion of women to low-prestige specialty areas in the field. The 
social attitudes echoed that in the legal field and referenced the inconvenience women 
caused men. For example, one woman physician in the 1970s recalled being told 
repeatedly that she should “stay home and take care of my children” (many times by 
many people), “we don’t need women in medical school because there aren’t enough 
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ladies’ rooms,” and “we can’t have a woman on our board because then we wouldn’t be 
able to smoke cigars, drink brandy, and tell jokes after dinner” (Atkinson, 2009, p. 1055). 
The separation of sex and gender could be considered characteristic of critical realism, 
a post-positivist approach that prescribes that knowledge generation should still primarily 
focus on the observable, but allow for amendment and fallibility. It characterizes 
knowledge generation as moving toward “truth” in investigations of a mind-independent 
reality that can be studied by science. Critical realism allows for constructivism and the 
imperfection of observation in that observations and perceptions are inherently biased. It 
also “assumes that reality is composed of different levels (e.g. the biological, the 
psychological, the social, and the cultural level)” (Wikgren, 2005, p. 12). Thus, the 
introduction and recognition of the psychological and social realms into the study of sex 
(and the conception of gender as a whole) indicates this new approach, but with the “truth” 
more elusive than attainable. Evidence-based medicine, which originated during the 
1970s timeframe, began the movement attempting less bias in medical evaluation and 
continual review of the state of knowledge of the field. The movement arose in response 
to what was considered unethical justifications of “interventions of dubious or unknown 
safety and efficacy, causing harm at both individual and population levels” (Ashcroft, 
2004, para. 3). In other words, evidence-based medicine suggests the fallibility of 
knowledge in both research and clinical settings, and requires stronger justifications of 
knowledge claims by incorporating several perspectives. It seems to take a post-
positivistic stance, where it recognizes the biases behind observations, includes the 
human, but still assumes a mind-independent reality.  
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Based on the outcome of John Money’s John/Joan case, it seems like just the kind of 
case evidence-based medicine was created to counteract. The professed epistemology of 
the social construction of sex might, at first blush, be considered postmodern, but with 
historical lens, his enacted methods would be criticized by a post-positivist for being 
“theory-laden;” in other words, his observations were colored by the theory he was 
hoping to prove. Additionally, he used only one (falsely conceived) case and generalized 
it to all cases, and ultimately, he still subscribed to stereotyped gender roles that 
developed based on assigned sex. Thus, the same positivist approach persists. 
Intersex people. The hallmark of intersex cases seems to be that the cognitive 
authority lies with the physician, but with little certainty about the decision. In the 
nineteenth century many physicians voiced their opinions on intersex cases, weighing in 
on other physicians’ cases that they had never examined in person. Determining the “true 
sex” of intersex people in scientific discourse seems to be professed as “induction from 
collections of observational data,” but perhaps not “intersubjectively controlled” 
(Hjørland, 2002, p. 262). Because of the inability of making a clear-cut sex classification, 
physicians struggled with setting a threshold to take the inductive leap. This uncertainty 
led to a new set of classifications such as the “female pseudohermaphrodite” that could 
cover sets of observed data that did not include gender identity. The epistemic values of 
determining “true sex” clearly does not follow a subjective realistic viewpoint during any 
of the timeframes, where the “subjects” would be considered the “cognitive authorities,” 
thus create the definitions of themselves, rather than relying on some “objective reality” 
(Hjørland, 1997, p. 62). This continued through all timeframes. Young, et al. (1971), for 
instance, report that some parents required that a priest be consulted before agreeing to 
221	  
	  
	  
	  
surgery for an intersex infant (the priest would answer whatever the parents wanted) (p. 
83). Once the technology had advanced enough to offer surgical “correction,” 
pragmatism asserted itself, as the convenience of the medical team more often took 
priority over the patients’ subjectivity or even parents’ wishes. Money, Hampson & 
Hampson (1957) recommend, “a great deal of emphasis should be placed on the 
morphology of the external genitals and the ease with which these organs can be 
surgically reconstructed to be consistent with the assigned sex” (p. 334). Also here the 
focus on “correction” and “normalizing,” and in John Money’s work, the condition of 
penis as the central determining factor, indicates more “othering.” 
Trans people. Trans people caused perplexing ethical dilemmas for medical 
professionals. First, the “condition” was unobservable; no definitive physical evidence 
indicated when or why people wanted to change their sex. Thus, the visually-based 
empirical methods upon which they relied failed, and the authority had to be relinquished 
to both psychologists and to the patient themselves, both suspect choices. Some 
philosophical viewpoints reject psychology as a valid source of knowledge; whereas, 
psychologists see psychology’s cognitive faculties and processes as integral to belief-
formation, perception, classification and behavior and can be considered an empirical 
methodology (Goldman, 1985, pp. 30-31). On top of it, surgeons and endocrinologists 
were expected to alter bodies that on the surface appeared healthy and be able to justify it 
to themselves and to others. The debate then, hinged on the ontological definition of what 
was “normal.” What needed to be fixed? Body, mind, or both? The focus on 
rehabilitation indicates a subordination of the person’s desires to a priority of maintaining 
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social norms. People desiring to change their sexes were considered mentally ill, and 
though they garnered some sympathy, the impulse was to make the problem disappear. 
The parent-blaming for trans behavior pervasive in psychology constitutes a 
“constitutive social-constructivist” epistemology in that the psychologists came to believe 
that the social circumstances provided in the home by the needy, narcissistic mothers and 
cold fathers caused the conditions for the transsexuality to occur. This then socio-
linguistically creates the need to change sex, a concept that has been created by society as 
a way of classifying. In other words, the condition of being transsexual was “created” by 
the parents and cultivated by the media fascination with Christine Jorgenson and by 
psychologists; it was not “discovered.” This stance, as articulated by Hacking (1999) 
argues that people “become aware of the way they are classified and act accordingly” (p. 
32). Hacking sees it as a type of willful, interactive response to knowledge of the 
existence of a category. This viewpoint might explain the suspicion of transsexuality, as 
well as the belief that it is a “choice” that can be rehabilitated through aversion therapy. 
Even Benjamin (1954), who argued against rehabilitation, believed that some trans 
people’s behavior was psychosomatic. The discourse refers to the onslaught of men 
rushing to find treatment once Christine Jorgenson’s news came out, as well as the 
willingness of patients to shape their stories to meet the threshold for surgical 
intervention. Those few physicians who were more sympathetic, such as Harry Benjamin, 
may have taken a more psychology-friendly naturalistic approach. Naturalism is a type of 
social construction that allows for scientific study of social concerns such as human 
nature and culture (Mallon, 2013). 
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Summary of medical/scientific epistemology. Like law, medicine, particularly clinical 
medicine, has a pragmatic purpose and requires that knowledge creation can be traced 
back to its practical consequences. If the “fixing” of the abnormal (disease, 
malformation) constitutes the basis of the profession, then the abnormal can be viewed as 
a “problem” that can be addressed pragmatically. It can also explain the propensity to 
“solve” issues that are not actually physical problems but moral dilemmas. The pragmatic 
ends are proceeded by the epistemology that determines what is a problem or not, what is 
abnormal and needs to be fixed. Women are artificially made abnormal through othering, 
while intersex people constitute a puzzle that needs to be fixed. Conversely, trans people 
are perplexing because their “problem” is not something easily observed; the physicians’ 
authority is undermined and they must trust in the subjectivity of the patient when no 
outward evidence can be observed, an uncomfortable position for trained empiricists.  
Pragmatism, however, has been associated with reform, and a purist pragmatist would 
recognize that no transcendent definition of sex exists, but rather that it is defined in the 
service of solving a problem. William James, for example, saw pragmatism as a way of 
pluralistically reconciling morality with science and religion (Hookway, 2013). The 
“problem,” as exhibited through the users’ interests, initially seems to be how to maintain 
a moral order, both through steering intersex people toward heteronormativity as well as 
ensuring women stayed in their realms without violating moral decency. Therefore, it can 
be said that medicine takes a pragmatic stance in that it defines concepts in order to “help 
achieve certain goals and support some values, while at the same time counteract[ing] 
other goals and values (Hjørland, 2008).  
Social Consequences of Medical Epistemology 
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The focus on fixing the abnormal and “problem-solving” leads to Foucault’s criticism 
(1995) of the normalizing or disciplining of docile bodies. Rather than militaristically 
training bodies for battle, Foucault’s context in Discipline and Punishment, women and 
intersex people in particular were subject to  
a policy of coercions that act upon the body, a calculated manipulation of its elements, 
its gestures, its behaviour. The human body was entering a machinery of power that 
explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it. A ‘political anatomy,’ which was also a 
‘mechanics of power’ was being born; it defined how one may have a hold over 
others’ bodies, not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may 
operate as one wishes. (p. 136) 
Feminists such as Bartky (1998) and Hochschild (1979) have argued similarly that 
this discipline forces women into gendered roles that restrict appearance and behaviors, 
amounting to what Hochschild calls “emotional labor” or Bartky identifies through 
bodily movement and bodily emendation. Though these behaviors are considered to be 
self-policing rather than violent, the overtly hostile rhetorical space for women physicians, 
for example, led to the consequent redirection either out of the field or to low-prestige 
specialties, similarly to women lawyers. The development of the concept of gender in the 
1950s was helpful to women’s cases, showing that the social conditions, not birth, 
directed but did not dictate one’s circumstances, but resulted only in a realignment of the 
argument. The “law of nature” was undermined with this development, yet it was evoked 
in a modified version to continue to force women into a double bind. Women who 
strayed from standard feminine ideals by attempting to enter the workforce, have a same-
sex lover, or enjoy sexual intercourse were all considered abnormal.  
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The goal of exclusion for the sake of moral decency and biological imperatives 
removes women’s agency and leads to determinism. The constant questioning of 
competence erodes women’s confidence and also leads to assimilation into the patriarchy, 
where women try to behave more like men or avoid having children to pre-empt the 
argument. This results in the oppressive circumstance of cultural imperialism, where “the 
dominant [here read ‘gender and sex-conforming or heteronormative’] meanings of a 
society render the particular perspective of one’s own group invisible at the same time as 
they stereotype one’s group and mark it out as the Other” (Young, 1990, p. 59).  
Once again, the medical attention paid to intersex people succeeds in both 
humanizing and pathologizing them. It freed them from the animalistic and “monstrous” 
connotations, yet, it made sex and gender a medical problem rather than just a variant of 
presentation. For intersex people, this disciplining was similarly restricted to discourse 
and rhetorical space until medical technology allowed the disciplining to become surgical 
correction and thus transformed into one of violence (or “reverted” may be a better term, 
considering historical treatment of intersex people). To be sure, some intersex conditions 
can be life-threatening, but the pathologization resulted in the rhetorical space being 
hijacked by the observer over the observed. Additionally, some physicians implied that 
not removing extraneous testes and the like would lead to cancer, though no evidence of 
this existed (Benjamin, 1969, p. 138). A consequence of the reliance on the observable is 
that intersex and trans people are silenced on the topic of their own genders. As an 
example from the 1970s, John Money’s subject David Reimer, the boy who lost his penis 
in an accident, underwent a multitude of surgeries and treatments to “correct” him into a 
girl because Money believed he could never live with the burden of being without a penis. 
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Money disregarded Reimer’s subjectivity, molding his answers to fit his hypotheses. 
Reimer suffered his whole life, and he ultimately committed suicide. Contrast him with 
the rural South Carolina man born with no penis, who absent of the anxiety of doctors, 
lived his life as he was with no psychological or sexual trauma. 
The psychological pathologizing of trans people corresponded with the emergence of 
the legal conviction that trans behavior was something immoral and potentially judicable. 
That rehabilitation was predicated on bad parenting or other external factors such as 
eating too much sugar, brushing teeth or wearing warm clothing on warm days (Brady, 
1944, p. A7) indicated that it was a choice and preventable, which leads to shame and 
self-loathing. The notion of neutrality-at-birth also reinforced this. The hope that arrived 
in the form of Christine Jorgenson was counteracted by the realities of the denied 
authority in their rhetorical space. Another considerable consequence of reliance on the 
observable is that trans and intersex people are subjected to invasive inspection and 
discussion of their anatomy and sexual practices (as objects, not subjects) in order for 
others “authorities” to decide their sex or gender. In medicine this involved in illustration 
or photography of genitalia and other body parts featured prominently in the medical 
literature. In legal cases this arrives in very public forums where the details of a person’s 
body and behavior are described in courtrooms, case law, exhibits, and textbooks. This 
public and humiliating justification reinforces the assumption that sex and gender are 
about the organs not the head, (you cannot see what gender someone feels).  
Summary 
Though both nineteenth century legal and medical discourse communities approach 
sex from different epistemic angles—the epistemologies of positivism and a specious 
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pragmatism in the case of law and a somewhat pragmatic empiricism along with elements 
of positivism in the case of medicine—they arrive at the same outcome: a reference to the 
“law of nature” with the twin goals of excluding women from the professions and 
generally upholding moral decency and sex roles. The definition of gender characteristics 
do not seem to reference at all the subjectivity of patients or clients, but rather the 
ostensible impact on the enunciating men, indicating a belief in the innate gentleness and 
delicacy of women, that intersex have a concealed “true sex,” or that men might possibly 
not want to be men. Neither discourse, for example, seems to express that women are 
incapable of practicing law or medicine, but rather that their natures are better suited for 
other vocations, namely, childrearing. Both indicate first that the exclusion is meant for 
her own protection, as her gentle nature would be incapable of handling such 
responsibility and unpleasantness as encountered in either field, and later that families 
will suffer if the mother works. Despite this, it seems that men’s difficulty with facing a 
woman attorney, discussing anatomy with a woman doctor, refraining from telling dirty 
jokes at board meetings would be too much for the men to bear (i.e. they are the delicate 
ones) and it would be a burden for men to change their own behavior. The discourse that 
evaluates women physicians’ and attorneys’ performances, at first focuses on physical 
difference, but then shifts to a more standpoint position as women join the discourse and 
are able to include their dual perspectives as women and professionals. This shifted the 
“way of knowing” from the (male) empirical or positivist observer of women to the 
perspective of the knowing subject. In the case of intersex people and trans people, 
curiosity and the discomfort with uncertainty seems to drive the intentions, but under the 
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guise of protecting heteronormativity and moral decency. Turning to the DDC, are the 
epistemic values professed and enacted in science and law similar to those in the DDC? 
Dewey Decimal Classification 
User Groups and Priorities 
The professed epistemology of the first edition of the DDC appears in the 
introductory matter, whereas the enacted epistemology appears in the classification itself. 
By his own admission and reinforced through the lore of the field, Dewey’s epiphany of 
the decimal system occurred in a church, but no mention of divine inspiration occurs in 
the classification discourse. Dewey’s initial disassociation with his knowledge scheme, 
along with his frequent disclaimers of imperfection, contrasts with the tone of the 
physicians, attorneys and phrenologists who claim final authority on subjects they may 
not have even viewed in person. Highly conscious of his users, Dewey repeatedly 
references not only librarians and library users, but also businessmen, schoolchildren, 
scientists and everyone in between as his target interest groups. He professes that 
efficiency for his users is his goal, and the first edition seems to be a tentative test run, 
given the anonymous publication and his reluctance to take credit. However, his 
copyright of the system betrays his intention as a commercial endeavor. Regardless, he 
takes a humble tone intent on building credibility. Thus, his professed interest seems to 
be pragmatic: solving organization and retrieval problems for both libraries and their 
patrons. 
Structurally and in content, Dewey’s system seems to unconsciously or 
consciously reflect his experience as a white male in an all-male, Christian college, and 
indeed, he based it on the Amherst College Library collection. Women do not appear in 
their own right, but rather as low-status, domestic subjects, allied with veterinary 
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medicine or in relation to institutions from which they are excluded. Though men also do 
not have a category of their own, because the “generic” terms pose women as exceptions 
(e.g. education—women), the assumption is that those “generic” terms imply a male 
norm (i.e. “education” means “men’s education”). Similarly, such clues, such as that no 
category for “fathers” exists under “families” reinforces the divisions between the public 
and domestic spheres. Dewey resists the “monstrosity” labels for intersex people, 
directing users to class the condition in physiology, which, though despite not having 
their own class, seems appropriate, or at least more appropriate than it would become in 
later years. Similarly as in the medical and legal discourse, trans people do not exist. 
Dewey does not comment specifically on women’s or intersex people’s places in the 
classification, but in practice, similarly to the legal and scientific fields, it serves to reflect 
and reinforce the social norms of the time.  
However, with the incorporation of nine years of external feedback and work and 
life experience for Dewey, the 1885 edition, while still professing efficiency as his main 
goal, becomes more detailed and insulting toward women and intersex people. Dewey’s 
confidence had grown from his student days and came to echo the authoritative tone of 
the medical and legal professionals. Consequently, despite his professed willingness to 
hear feedback, his defensiveness positions him as the highest authority and keeps him in 
control of his system. Thus, similarly to the legal profession, it seems to be economic 
concerns that underlie Dewey’s interests, as he began the protectionism of the system that 
has continued throughout the history of the system to the present day.  
In the eighty years between the second and seventeenth editions, other editors, 
including women, were appointed and Dewey died. Miksa (1998) credits Benjamin 
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Custer, the editor of both the seventeenth and nineteenth editions with “almost single-
handedly” modernizing the DDC by keeping it “up-to-date in its terminology and subject 
collocation, and the increasing use of subject faceting and notational synthesis” (p. 80). 
Custer also advocated for the “integrity of the subject,” a position that attempts to bring 
“theoretical accuracy” back to the DDC, rather than merely “convenience.” What this 
“theoretical accuracy” did is correct some undeniable ontological mistakes (i.e. 
classifying women as a “type of” custom, costume or folklore). Dewey’s 1885 structure 
was expunged and updated versions of sex and gender classes appeared and were nearly 
immediately revised. Custer apparently took “keeping up with the pace of knowledge” 
seriously with the swift revision of gender in the nineteenth edition, which corresponded 
to the burst of discourse emanating from medicine and psychology.  
Epistemology 
Women and men. If male attorneys and physicians formulated their epistemic 
methodology with the overt intention of excluding and othering women away from their 
workplaces and keeping them in their homes, what benefit would this be to bibliographic 
classification? Is another form of “othering,” worth the retrieval problems it causes?  In 
other words, how would excluding women or hiding women on the library shelves 
benefit him? How conscious was Dewey of his own complicity in the consequences to 
the artificiality of his system? He undoubtedly understood his system was artificial—his 
pragmatism revealed that. The treatment of women, intersex and trans people seems to be 
similar as appears in the legal and medical discourses, but arrived at through different 
epistemic approaches.  
Dewey (1876) clearly reveals his purpose for his classification by stating, 
“practical usefulness has been esteemed the most important thing. The effort has been to 
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put each book under the subject to the student of which it would be most useful” (p. 6). 
This echoes pragmatist John Dewey’s (1920) views on classification: “Convenience, 
economy and efficiency are the bases of classification, but these things are not restricted 
to verbal communication with others nor to inner consciousness; they concern objective 
action. They must take effect in the world” (p. 154). This certainly at least professes a 
pragmatic epistemology to the classification. The problems Melvil Dewey seeks to solve 
are obviously similar: the efficient retrieval of information, with some sacrifice of 
theoretical purity. Also echoing the pragmatists, Melvil Dewey (1885) recognized from 
the start how perspective affects classification, as he wrote in the introduction to his 
second edition of the DDC:   
The greatest objection to a clast catalog has ever been the impossibility of 
knowing just where to put a book in cataloging, and just where to look for it when 
it is again wanted. Different librarians, or the same librarian at different times, 
clast the same or similar books in widely different places. Where one man did all 
the work and held his place for a long series of years, there was a certain degree 
of uniformity; but even then there was the danger of looking at the same book 
from different standpoints, thus causing confusion. This danger will be 
understood by any one who has ever attempted classification, and is not at all 
surprising when one considers how differently competent authorities often class 
the same subject. (1885, p. 33) 
Just as a human group as a classified subject can be misplaced or defined strangely, as 
Dewey notes, depending on the subject or cataloger, it is easy to see how similarly-
situated people can have totally legal different outcomes or status depending on 
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jurisdiction, interpretation or application of existing law. He recognizes that despite the 
need to have consistent shelving, that nothing is constant, but rather defined by context or 
goals. John Dewey (1920), too, writes “Cherry trees will be differently grouped by 
woodworkers, orchardists, artists, scientists and merry-makers…Each classification may 
be equally sound when the difference of ends is borne in mind” (p. 153). Foucault (2003) 
attributes differing outcomes based on perspective to the existence of differing epistemes 
validating knowledge claims. 
The DDC follows Western, Aristotelian logical structures, which to some degree 
necessitates a rationalist approach in the formation of mutually-exclusive categories. As 
Hjørland (2004) puts it, “rationalism looks at our concepts as inborn structures, which 
match and classify our perceptions” (p. 135). In other words, in the structural warrant 
operating in the DDC, a cataloger finds a matching class for a work rather than creating a 
theoretically- or contextually- appropriate class on the fly. However, even a logically-
formed structure has some flexibility in how it shows relationships and, in the case of the 
bibliographic classifications that it can be and is regularly revised. In the introductory 
matter, Dewey professes a marginally critical approach toward his system, at least more 
so than the legal and medical discourses were of themselves. Dewey based his structure 
on warrant in combination with his lived experience as a librarian. He recognizes the 
consequences of his classification on the users (a select group of users, anyway). The 
recognition of the authoritative, intentional and cognitive aspects are all at least professed 
to some degree, but ultimate get sacrificed to the pragmatic goal of efficiency and the 
rationalist requirement that values “conceptual clarity and evidence and which prefers 
deductive methods rather than inductive methods” (Hjørland, 2004, p. 135). That Dewey 
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was able to recognize the imperfections and perspectivism involved in classification 
shows that he recognizes the fallibility of his structure. However, the recognition of 
imperfection does not extend to a critique of the knowledge being classified.  
Though Dewey was critical of his methodology of building structure, the 
outcomes do not mesh with his writings about women in the field of librarianship. He at 
least recognized the circumstantial rather than physical nature of women’s status. 
Language resembling the legal and medical discourse can be found in Dewey’s writings, 
but with a more thoughtful eye. He (1886) wrote, 
Women have usually poorer health and as a result lose more time from illness and 
are more crippled by physical weakness when on duty. The difficulty is most 
common to women, as are bright ribbons and thin shoes and long hair, but it is a 
question of health, not sex. 
Though he takes the same argument the others took in the 50s through the 70s, he goes on 
to make an admission the other discourses are not willing to make: “this is a fault of 
circumstance, not necessarily of sex” and “A strong, healthy woman is worth more than a 
feeble man for the same reason that a strong man gets more than a weak woman” (p. 20). 
Thus, he acknowledges the role of societal norms and approaches it with an open mind, 
which evidences a phenomenological approach, where he “brackets” his assumptions, but 
it also could be that Dewey at that point was actually exposed to women; he “experienced” 
them performing work within his field and thus his perceptions were colored by 
experience rather than assumptions. 
Before giving Dewey too much credit, the outcomes should be examined as well the 
methods. In law and medicine, women are posed as having innate and immutable 
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characteristics opposite of men’s. In the first edition of DDC, this manifests as the 
“othering” and exclusion of women. If authority determines about which subjects we can 
speak and what subjects are erased in formal discourse, the inclusions and erasures are 
manifested in the rhetorical space of a classification. Despite what is professed above, 
women are represented in the classification in only limited aspects; anyone looking for 
other aspects are inconvenienced. According to Code (2005), the transformation from 
subject to object reduces women to a collection of observable traits (p. 44). If women are 
perceived by the “enunciative modality,” in this case Dewey, to be absent from 
intellectual life, then absence becomes the observable feature and therefore how they are 
defined. The choice of characteristics implies that the conditions matter to the results, or 
as Olson indicated, to reflect the goal of the classification system. Ontologically, women, 
men, transgender, and intersex people “existed” in all timeframes, so their very existence 
cannot be denied. Clearly, Dewey knew at least that women and intersex people existed, 
and WorldCat records show that literary warrant existed for topic inclusion in his 
classification. Omission from his first edition of the DDC separates them from the 
intellectual sphere of knowledge, thus creating a deterministic epistemology which the 
condition of being woman dictates domesticity, motherhood and exclusion from 
institutions. Without presence in the system as a non-maternal, non-domestic, included 
population, women who seek answers from that space cannot find it.  
Though Dewey’s approach echoes the legal and medical approaches, what 
differentiates Dewey is his recognition of its fallibility and how it impacts the structures 
he puts in place. This places Dewey in the professed camp of critical realism in that he 
shows a “concern with causality and the identification of causal mechanism in social 
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phenomena” (Wikgren, 2005, p. 15). In other words, unlike the positivist legal field 
where conditions are accepted for what the “are” because they are observed that way, or 
unlike medicine’s “purely objective” empiricism, he accepts that his scheme is an 
artificial, discipline-based structure meant for information retrieval—disciplines that are 
socially formed. Critical realism assumes that a mind-independent reality exists, and in 
knowledge organization, that “reality” could be considered the collections that create the 
warrant for which knowledge organization systems exist. Dewey’s awareness of the 
problems of his system, however, do not make him particularly worried about the results 
on the users. Budd, Hill, and Shannon (2010) describe Bhaskar’s view of critical realism 
in tandem with Husserl’s phenomenological approach as foundations for LIS methods. 
Husserl’s phenomenological approach is about knowledge and thus relates best to 
knowledge organization (Budd, 2005, p. 47). Bhaskar’s approach is described as 
“epistemological fallibilism,” and includes “intransitive objects” or unchanging things 
that exist in a mind-independent reality, as well as “transitive objects,” which rely on an 
historical and compounding view of scientific knowledge—things that are defined as we 
know them at a specific point in time (p. 272). Dewey’s recognition of the fallibility of 
his definitions is evidenced by his willingness to take feedback and his frequent 
professions of the imperfection of his scheme (transitive objects). His ontological 
justification comes in the form of literary warrant (intransitive objects). However, though 
Dewey gets out in front of his explanations, he still is influenced by the very social 
structures he recognizes (e.g. that women are not “naturally” inferior to men), which 
limits but does not fully erase the “critical” aspect of his critical realism, or speaking in 
terms of phenomenology, his critical assessment of intention. 
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Nearly an entire generation passed before the next change to gender classification in 
the DDC. During that time, the conceptualizations of sex and sexuality had undergone 
seemingly transformative ontological (classification) changes based on ontological 
(philosophical) developments in psychology, psychiatry, and the newly-minted field of 
sexology. Gender was beginning to be recognized, along with social contributions to 
women’s position and treatment. Benjamin Custer shifted the professed epistemology 
from a purely pragmatic and utilitarian approach to one that attempts to “reflect reality” 
more accurately, both ontologically (e.g. better representation of whole/part relationships) 
and also with the recognition of the fallibility of knowledge. The “sacrifices to accuracy 
for the sake of economy” disappeared in a maze of arcane instructions intended to restore 
the “integrity” of the subject.  
When attempting to restore accuracy, Custer’s team posed gender and sex as “social 
problems” and the rhetorical space related mostly to sexuality. Does this constitute Custer 
recognizing the subject “at a point in time, in a place, within a social context, in a 
psychological state” (Budd, 2005, p. 45)? Even if Dewey or Custer take a more critical 
approach, the results still tend to replicate social norms because that reflects the 
experience at that particular point in time from an observer rather than a knowing subject. 
Custer’s “drip principle,” while professing to reflect reality, results in the (maybe) 
unintended consequence of providing no disclaimer for difficult-to-classify concepts such 
as intersex or trans people. In other words, in previous editions their placement as 
disorders or deviances could be attributed to convenience rather than accuracy. Here, the 
“integrity of the subject” principle implies a belief in the accuracy of the hierarchical 
force. This seems to justify the use of the gender classification as the means to 
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questionable ends, which reveals a flaw in pragmatic thinking. In practice, the actual 
classification scheme reveals a somewhat different story than both Dewey and Custer tell. 
Both the introductory matter and the classification reveal pragmatic ends, no doubt there. 
However, the end or result is manifested in the actual classification, where women are 
erased (omission from the 1876 edition), ghettoized into the domestic sphere (1885 
edition), and pathologized, sexualized, and problematized (1965 edition).  
Intersex people. Dewey clearly had experience working with women, at least 
once his professional career began. His experience with intersex people seems to be 
limited to literary warrant, an empirical approach which can be considered positivistic in 
that it lumps hermaphroditism as a type of physiology, considering it a condition rather 
than a social group. With input from “experts” in the second edition and perhaps finally 
picking up on tone in the literature, intersex people suddenly became people and were 
allied with other “abnormalities,” Dwarves and monstrosities. By 1965, the intersex 
condition became pathologized, likely influenced again by warrant, but inaccurately so 
by being lost without a place in hermaphroditic reproduction, which has nothing to do 
with humans and amounted to being erased entirely. Finally, in 1971, with a surge in 
literature, it gained its own class, but as a problem or disorder, as reflected in the titles. 
The literature generally included scientific or medical titles, referring to both animals and 
humans, and thus, with language that include “freaks,” and “abnormal,” the DDC 
ontologically follows suit, classifying it as a sexual disorder. Intersexuality as a sexual 
disorder is once again contingent on the definition of normal, and the authorities doing 
the defining are decidedly observers rather than knowing subjects. Intersex people 
changed from a variant to a deviant presentation of anatomy. The frequent changes, (it 
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had changed positions in every edition from the fifteenth to the nineteenth) indicate utter 
uncertainty of how to classify it, or at least the indecision reflected in the literature.  
Trans people. Trans people do not appear in the DDC until the 1965 edition, and 
only under the term “transvestism.” The omission from the first two editions result from 
warrant, so they can be considered empirically omitted. The appearance in the 
seventeenth edition as an “other” sexual deviance reflects the speculation in the 
psychological discourse of the time and uncertainty of how to classify it. Between 1965 
and 1971 it (meaning the inaccurate “transvestism”) morphed from a medical concern 
(disorder) to a moral issue (deviation). The repositioning from a moral angle indicates a 
shift in authority from medical to religious or another version of what Hjørland (2008, 
n.p.) calls “authoritarianism.”  
Social consequences  
Women. Since the DDC is a bibliographic entity, the social consequences are 
pulled both from Young (1990) and Frye’s (1983) types of oppression as well as from the 
types of oppression in knowledge organization described in the first chapter. Unlike 
medical and legal fields of this timeframe, Dewey never sought to exclude women 
entirely from the profession and acknowledged the role of social circumstances in 
women’s position. Thus, his discussion of women in the field does not reflect the same 
overt oppressions as the other fields’; however, his enacted interest in having women in 
the field as cheap labor does represent exploitation. The focus here though is on the 
classification discourse, and here, despite his epistemology enacted in his classification 
scheme resulted in an overriding impression of exceptionalism, or a way of 
“othering,’which, like the other discourses, echoed and reinforced the social beliefs.  
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The trick of classification is to ensure that the relationships are not forced, artificial or 
illegitimate—that conceptual violence is not committed is a more recent concern. The 
absence of a general category for women in the 1876 DDC communicates that women 
constitute a “minor” or unimportant topic, not worthy of inclusion, as Dewey called 
subjects that were omitted. Though it still results in oppression, it seems to result from 
omission rather than erasure, which carries more intentionality. In DDC, the rhetorical 
space around the subject of women demonstrates how naming and proximity can affect 
perceptions of the concept. If a classificatory space is imagined as a room, the assumption 
follows that those sitting around the table in the room have something in common with 
each other because of hierarchical force. In most cases, it works, but women present a 
challenge because of the absence at creation of the system; women was added as an 
afterthought.  
Women were only taken seriously in maternal and reproductive capacities and were 
otherwise treated as exceptions to the male norm (Olson & Schlegl, 2001). The few 
feminine topics that can be found in the 1876 classification scheme also are rhetorically 
situated in such a way that devalues women. The denizens of this rhetorical space include 
nuns, a housewife, a midwife, two pregnant women and a mother with an absentee 
husband, all of whom are uneducated and none of whom can vote. This fully represents 
neither the women of the time, nor the literature upon which the classification is 
ostensibly based. However, it might represent what is visible to Dewey at the time. Code 
(2005) would object to the singular identities assigned because she rightly believes that 
individuals are too complex to essentialize, but in the case of a classification, where 
categorization is unavoidable, she would argue that responsibility is to get to know the 
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characteristics of and gain empathy for the group. The group would be identified more 
specifically, and what would result is a roomful of women with more diverse credentials 
than just reference to reproductive roles and servitude toward a male public sphere. Their 
traits are essentialized and pathologized through such categories as “roles of husbands 
and wives,” mental characteristics of the sexes,” which leads to determinism. 
The ghettoization that occurs in 1885 is doubly insulting, considering that Dewey 
either felt there was no other option than to place women in a leftover category or that he 
did not believe people would notice. Foucault (1970) argues that the traits chosen to 
define a set “privilege the visible” by choosing “visible, simultaneous, concomitant 
variables, without any internal relation of subordination or organization” (p. 136), and 
this relates to how women appeared in the rhetorical space of the classification. Browsing 
the shelves would associate women with embalmment and suicide, social customs and 
etiquette. Once women and men emerged as social groups rather than a type of custom, 
costume of folklore or a generic norm in the 1965 edition, they were now considered a 
“social problem,” and likely because of the sexual revolution, the problem was sexual 
rather than related to social status. But by the 70s, the sexuality was drained from the 
class to be replaced with demographic traits. 
The constant movement of hermaphrodites, the changes in meaning and the 
haphazard sliding back and forth between zoological and human context all reflect 
uncertainty of the origins and the need for some subjectivity. Oddly enough, the first 
edition where Dewey classed it in physiology seems to be the least insulting or inaccurate 
of all the classes, even though they had no class of their own. As Olson (2001) points out, 
Dewey was concerned about “confuzion” (p. 647), and though he is referring to the 
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problem of perspectivism, the instability of the placement of the concept results in it 
being confused and consequently hidden or undiscoverable. 
For trans people at minimum omission or potentially erasure occurs; however, at this 
point in time, they are not necessarily viewed as pathological or breaking any laws so 
they are perhaps thankfully omitted from the legal and medical discourse. Initially, a very 
small amount of literature exists on trans people, making it feasible that warrant dictates 
their exclusion from the first two editions of the DDC. Although the term “transsexual” 
called up around 600 results in WorldCat during the 70s, still the vocabulary remained 
“transvestism,” which constitutes erasure. The erasure might have been an attempt to wait 
out the confusion, but it also could have stemmed from misunderstanding the 
phenomenon. Transvestism, then, standing in for transsexuality, was pathologized first as 
a disorder and then a deviance.  
Discussion: Implications to Knowledge Organization 
Though the legal and medical discourses never clearly articulate what could be 
considered a “formal” classification of gender—partly because it is so difficult—the 
repeated language and epistemic reasoning methods used to draw conclusions about these 
groups results in “formal informal” classification used and reinforced within and between 
those professions. The institutional or professional weight behind this discourse 
differentiates it from casual social perceptions of gender experienced by individual actors. 
In other words, the characteristics of women, intersex and trans people described in the 
legal and medical discourses represent institutionally-backed definitions, which lends 
them authority, even if it did not represent the views of all men or even all men within the 
profession. The ontological characteristics are informally agreed upon and reiterated 
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within the texts and utterances within and between disciplines. The legal profession relies 
on the medical as a knowledge source, and the medical draws from the legal the notion of 
the administrative and moral aspects of maintaining gender binaries. Medical 
classification can deny people subjectivity, but physicians need to be able to serve all 
patients. Legal discourse has the most opportunity to erase by not recognizing rights and 
by actively resisting participation in the discourse. Bibliographic classificationists and 
classifiers have the most difficulty fighting the ontological existence of women, intersex 
or trans people, as the works have to go somewhere on a shelf, but ignoring problems, 
working around them, or attributing them to “imperfection” can provide cover.  
Though the discursive analysis reveals little new or surprising information about the 
manner in which women, trans, and intersex people were discussed by observers in three 
historical periods, it does reveal three important points about epistemology and 
classification. First, differing knowledge-generation methods can contribute to both the 
reification and undoing of institutional discourse and knowledge. The constant repetition 
of knowledge claims creates a semblance of truth for a particular domain. Second, 
bibliographic classification replicates those epistemic values expressed in the discourse. 
Finally, as with other philosophical ideals, professed epistemology may look quite 
different from what is practiced in reality, and can be self-serving.  
The epistemic methods used in the discourses allowed for limited perspectives on 
gender to be intuited and applied widely through positivist methods, which led to the 
exclusion of women from both professions, rendering them impotent and dependent on 
men for access. Although positivism has been condemned in philosophical and scientific 
circles for many years, as a method of knowledge-generation it has been hard to shake. In 
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fact, many LIS researchers identify it as the dominant epistemic viewpoint in the field. 
Budd (2001) summarizes several researchers including Harris, Radford, and Dick, who 
generally argue that the dominance of methodological positivism in the field can be 
attributed to a desire to give the perception that LIS is a valid “science” (pp. 14-15). 
Similarly, the positivism used in the legal discourse attempted to appear “scientific” with 
its concomitant authoritative weight. 
The medical discourse unsurprisingly used both positivism and empiricism when 
generating knowledge about sex and gender. Intersex people confounded any attempt to 
make generalizations about sex, and in many ways they interacted with each other to 
support desired hypotheses. Hjørland (2004) sees the two as closely related, and 
summarizes the recent climate specifically in knowledge organization:  
Today the great divide is not so much between empiricism and rationalism. Now 
these traditions seem much more alike in their faith in neutral observations and 
deductions. They are opposed to traditions like hermeneutics, historicism, 
pragmatism and postmodernism, which emphasise the cultural influence, interests 
and theory-laden nature of knowledge. At the beginning of the twenty-first 
century not many theorists defend positivism any longer, which does not imply, 
however, that the positivist way of thinking is not still influential as a kind of 
naıve or silent philosophy (positivism has been termed the “invisible philosophy 
of science”). (p. 133)  
Hjørland believes positivism still reigns because “no alternatives have yet been able to 
establish a strong position in the practical guidance of research processes” and because of 
a “considerable lack of clear terminology in the philosophy of science” (p. 133). In fact, 
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the very notion of bibliographic control directly opposes the notion of subjectivity, 
employing similar absolutism to smooth over inconvenient exceptions.  
Knowledge organization researchers are well aware of the conflict between the 
subjective and the need for decisive categories. In the past ten years since Hjørland wrote 
the words above, a multitude of knowledge organization researchers have offered up 
options for epistemic approaches, most of which fall into a form of pluralism, 
recognizing the ontological “reality” behind literary warrant, but also taking a more 
critical perspective to avoid the conceptual violence such as that reviewed in this study. 
Viewpoints such as critical realism, integrative levels, domain analysis, phenomenology 
experiential realist or feminist approaches all attempt to balance recognizing individual 
perspective and concept stability for the purpose of classification. For example, Hjørland 
has recommended domain analysis to restrict the KOS’s to the knowledge of a particular 
discipline, Feinberg (2007) has recommended simply owning up to bias, and researchers 
such as Gnoli & Poli (2004) and Szostak (2003) have attempted to construct or 
recommend phenomenon-centered classifications ostensibly flexible enough to be both 
universalist and perspectivist. Social tagging has been coupled with more controlled 
systems to accommodate other subjectivities, but none of these seem to provide a 
satisfactory solution. The DDC has recently attempted to increase subjectivity by 
increasing and simplifying feedback mechanisms (discussed below), but they seem to be 
perfunctory and do not command enough response to constitute a “voice.” Knowledge 
organization research has also shown that positivism is very hard to avoid, as much as 
other approaches are recommended. 
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 The analysis also exposed the influence subjectivity plays in controlling the 
discourse and the recognition why control of the discourse was defended so fiercely. The 
medical and legal discourses from the start “other” women through either pragmatic, 
positivistic, or logical positivistic approaches, based on intuitive and deductively applied 
knowledge and continue to do so through all three timeframes, albeit with slightly 
modulated justifications. Women simply did not exist for Dewey until consultation with 
“hundreds of experts” indicated they were missing. Similarly, transexuality as a concept 
never made it into the DDC despite an explosion in research and literature. The 
recognition of women’s rights, for example, follow a gradient that echoes the amount of 
subjectivity allowed women in the discourse.  
Controlling the discourse manifests in political power, and the more authority women 
had in the discourse, the more access and germs of power they had, although still mostly 
nascent by 1979. Intersex and trans people still existed underground as an “other,” and 
recognition of rights had not reached the employment realm. In the DDC, they never 
reached the status of a social group, but instead were still defined in the negative. Trans 
and intersex people are othered as well, in part through shaming them for difference and 
in part to correct their anomalous existence so that they fit into the binary social norms of 
each timeframe. The knowing subject is more present, but not necessarily valued, which 
led to further entrenchment in views.  
Given the frequent references to “the law of nature,” the practitioners took a 
problematic, deterministic approach meant to safeguards their power positions from 
change. The reasoning, in practice, is justified by social norms (i.e. that women must 
reproduce and serve as caretakers), but professed to be justified by invoking the law of 
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nature, which suggests a higher, universal moral or scientific power (i.e. going outside 
the domestic sphere is a violation of fate, immoral, or will causes wrongs). When social 
norms and knowledge of the enunciative modalities do not match the subjectivity of the 
knowing subjects, such as here, it leads to an epistemological echo chamber.  
The slight changes in subjectivity follow Longino’s (1990) idea that science (this 
applies to law and bibliographic classification as well) requires social interaction with 
more diverse communities in order to recognize their own situatedness. This ostensibly 
widens the notion of “experience” aiming to reduce underdetermined hypotheses that 
without that added perspective result in the subjective preferences of the observer to 
dominate. Thus knowledge, while still normative, encompasses a wider range of 
perspectives. DDC included women’s perspectives far earlier and “welcomed” them 
more readily than the legal or medical discourses. A difference between DDC and the 
medical and legal discourses is that a feedback mechanism existed, thus showing a more 
critical side as well as a recognition of fallibility, despite the thin-skinned and prickliness 
of the responses. 
If the medical and legal discourses partially set the agenda for knowledge-creation, 
the DDC holds up a mirror to that agenda, reflecting the coherence or incoherence of the 
conceptualizations in the professions and society. Obviously the medical and legal 
discourses are not the only discourses at play, but they have outsized influence because of 
the power they wield in directing how people can or cannot publicly live their lives, and 
their official discourse gets entered into the ontological pool for literary warrant. The 
Foucauldian method reveals the disorder that follows when society’s views are divided or 
confused because of ignorance, inexperience, or indifference, or when some interest has 
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been established, such as medical research streams or litigation. The changing definition 
of intersex people from frightening and supernaturally-derived monstrosities to immoral 
deceivers to biological curiosities, to ungendered tabula rasas is reflected in the bouncing 
around the DDC. The concept of trans, though surely extant through history, only 
legitimized as sex research grew and focused attention on it, but again it was 
pathologized and demonized. The changes to gender classification in the DDC mirror the 
changes in the discourse, but most glaringly reflects the scrabble to find an appropriate 
classes for all three human types resembles the same fumbling occurring in research as it 
interplays with societal beliefs. “Keeping pace with knowledge” too closely results in the 
unintended consequence of turmoil in the bibliographic classification when the pace of 
knowledge was in flux. 
The discursive analysis also revealed some of the limits of theory. Epistemic 
approaches as described in philosophy of science or legal theory texts merely describe 
and argue the ideal methods and values emphasized in knowledge generation. Despite the 
many epistemic movements occurring simultaneously in legal theory and the philosophy 
of science, those refer mostly to individualistic ideals that describe how approaches to 
knowledge generation should be taken in a lab or research setting, but not how they 
actually spill over into active knowledge-generation. Legal systems expect that citizens 
will obey laws because of moral obligation, and though the legislatures may have 
believed in the higher power by which they abided, the fact that resistance existed (e.g. 
women attempting to vote, attending law school, wanting to work and be educated; 
dissenting legal opinions) allows that it was not universally accepted and someone 
deemed it immoral. All three discourses in all three timeframes, for example, either 
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profess or enact a pragmatic intention; however, the intentionality does not always come 
from a critical or good-faith place and does not represent the ideal pragmatic stance as 
articulated by theorists.  
Thus, an element missing from discussions of epistemology in knowledge 
organization is the role of emotion and self-interest and how they can influence the 
epistemic foundations of classification. Philosophy has always grappled with the 
concerns of good and evil, but the recognition of it epistemically comes from critical 
approaches, which tend to be reactive rather than proactive in knowledge organization. 
As the focus on ethics and the incorporation of more critical approaches toward the 
epistemic evaluation of knowledge organization systems has increased in the last two 
decades, some focus should address moral uses of reasoning and application of epistemic 
stances, which will naturally raise questions of what morality is. The personal 
motivations of catalogers and classificationists arise in the literature associated with 
knowledge organization ethics, but no focused and detailed discussion of how this relates 
to epistemology have been done.  
What, then, is the epistemology of self-interest? Hjørland (2008, n.p.) constructs an 
all-purpose category of authoritarianism, with several subconcepts “in order to cope with 
certain attitudes to knowledge not covered by other epistemological labels.” Several 
stances from this category apply here. Self-interest seems to fit into the category of 
“opportunism.” Hjørland defines opportunism as “what you argue is not determined by 
the best arguments in case but by what it seems opportune to support in the social 
situation.” The repeated justifications referring to the “law of nature” excluding women 
from the legal profession prevented self-definition, but also express a belief in the 
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universal, immutable nature of women’s characteristics. The laws of God (or natural 
law): “Theism is the view that God has decided the social order and that human should 
not question this order” (Hjørland, 2008, n.p.). The laws of nature as a justification for 
knowledge contains the combined benefits to opportunists they can neither be proven nor 
questioned. All epistemic stances in practice have flaws, which is why philosophers for 
millennia have debated them.  
 
Future Research   
This research raised a range of diverse questions, many more than it answered. 
Further research could provide a more nuanced discussion of narrower slices of the areas 
covered in this project.  
• The three gender concepts and the timeframes necessitated brief and at times 
uneven coverage. Future projects could investigate other concepts such as 
sexual orientation using a similar methodology or provide more depth of 
analysis of a particular timeframe or another discourse such as media or 
pedagogy.  
• An empirical investigation similar to Christensen’s (2011) of library shelves 
may also shed light on the idea of oppression experienced while browsing the 
shelves. 
The project also raised questions about domain analysis and what constitutes a domain.  
• If this discursive analysis resulted in an examination and identification of how 
concepts are used within a discipline or domain, what distinguishes it from 
domain analysis? Domain analysis incorporates several epistemic angles; how 
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are these incorporated in practice? Can digital frequency reflect the same 
value judgments as a discursive analysis? 
• Certainly further research merits asking whether gender constitutes a domain. 
Using Smiraglia’s (2012) definition of a domain as “a unit of analysis for the 
construction of a KOS” indicates the possibility; however, moving on to the 
more specific aspects of the definition: “an underlying teleology, a set of 
common hypotheses, epistemological consensus on methodological 
approaches and social semantics” all seem to lead in different directions, and 
back to the age-old question of whether gender is a social group. Does the 
conflicting scopes of the concept of gender mean it cannot constitute its own 
domain, but rather that it can only exist in relation to other domains?  
• This project illuminated the gulf between “professed” and “enacted” 
epistemologies, and thus another area for future research includes ethical 
considerations in the application and use of epistemological approaches.  
Critical approaches raise concerns about how knowledge is generated and whose 
knowledge it is, but these are reactive approaches and seek to revise existing systems. 
Despite the professed grievances issued toward the current systems in use, revising the 
master’s tools is less painful than enacting ameliorative change. The knowledge 
organization discourse can be as entrenched as others in welcoming differing 
epistemologies. The vitriol directed at such resistance as the libraries enacting BISAC, 
newly-created system such as Szostak’s phenomenon-based classification, or at 
RDA/FRBR replicates the resistance that women encountered as they attempted entry 
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into the discourse. A Foucaudian discourse analysis of the rebelling and resistance 
literature can reveal the ingrained attitudes within the KO discourse.  
The Foucauldian methodology approaches the discourse from a presumption of 
instability, that the conceptualizations of each time frame exists unto itself rather than as 
part of a connected and transcendent continuum; however, in this case it revealed the 
utter entrenchment and persistence of social perceptions of women, intersex and trans 
people through a 100-year span. Foucault (1977a) believes that intellectuals are 
responsible, at a micro level, for “ascertaining the possibility of constituting a new 
politics of truth. The problem is not changing people’s consciousnesses—or what’s in 
their heads—but the political, economic, institutional regime of the production of truth” 
(p. 133). Here, what’s “in someone’s head” was sweepingly applied to entire gender 
categories. Worse, the discourses all in some way recognize individual instances that 
undermine the absolutist and rationalist method of knowledge-generation, but the legal 
discourse marks these instances as an immoral abnormality (e.g. women working is a 
“crime against nature”), the medical discourse distorts (e.g. studying hurts your 
reproductive system; women are too squeamish) and the DDC dutifully replicates the 
biases evident in the other discourses. Will knowledge organization tools continue to 
replicate the biases evident in society? Is there any way to escape this or should it be 
embraced? This circles us back to the question that most critical research eventually leads 
back to: Should a classification be useful or accurate?  
Epilogue: Where Are We Now? 
Another thirty-five years has passed since the last timeframe, and though much more 
subjectivity and rhetorical agency has been incorporated for the epistemic rendering of 
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subjects of legal gender, medical, and bibliographic classification, old models persist and 
social norms are inching toward an empathetic, if not sympathetic, view of gender. In 
medicine, though women are not overtly “othered” as they were in the past, research 
fields such as evolutionary biology, sociobiology, or neurology seek to find biological 
origins of sexual difference, where modern human behavior, such as sexual selection, is 
related to either animal or primal behavior. Feminist critiques of evolutionary biology 
point out the circular practice of imposing cultural stereotypes on animal behavior to 
explain human behavior (cf. Houde, 2001). Medical issues common to women such as 
stress-related conditions like sleeplessness are being identified, but are recognized as 
results of social influences. Money’s influence persisted into the early twenty-first 
century. Sexologist Milton Diamond and others critiqued his work throughout his career, 
most influentially in a 1997 paper written with Sigmundson that announced the fraud in 
the Joan/John case. Unlike Money’s announcement as a glowing success, at age 14, after 
years of resistance, Brenda Reimer finally demanded to be treated as a male, renamed 
himself David, and began treatment to transition back to being a male. He went on to get 
married and raise a family, but led a troubled life, eventually committing suicide in 2004. 
In 2001, John Colapinto wrote an investigative study that originated as an article in 
Rolling Stone, which uncovered Money’s flawed research methods.  
The unearthing of Money’s embellished research corresponded with the rise of 
intersex rights. Intersex advocates have challenged and protested what Money considered 
“correction” as mutilation. The Intersex Society of America (ISNA), with the goal of 
creating “a world free of shame, secrecy, and genital mutilation for intersex people)” was 
founded in 2008 to provide recognition and subjectivity for intersex people 
253	  
	  
	  
	  
(http://www.isna.org). Dreger (1998a) sees the “Age of Surgery” changing to “the Age of 
Consent,” but a stigma still accompanies intersex people. Many consumer medical 
resources are directed toward parents and patients, and medical discourse emphasizes the 
anguish of parents in the face of social gender pressure. However, intersex physical traits 
are still considered “abnormal” rather than “variant,” such as in the National Institute of 
Health’s MedlinePlus guide. It also uses the term “ambiguous genitals,” which is not 
preferred by the ISNA because of the implication that they need to be unambiguously 
situated in a specific sex (Storck, 2013). A parents-focused article about intersex 
conditions still uses the language of stigma, such as “normal,” and “abnormal,” and that 
the condition can be “severe” or “corrected.” Though sympathetic, the vestiges of the 
past are evident through statements such as “Surgeons are becoming increasingly aware 
that it is important for girls to retain normal sexual sensation after genital surgery” 
(Urology Cares, 2011), which distressingly suggests that some surgeons are not aware. A 
2014 website for the condition congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH) which can result in 
genital variation hardly mentions that aspect, and makes a point to differentiate it from 
intersex. The website notes several times, however, where sexual function in women can 
be restored or retained. A recent medical study reported how elite women athletes had 
surgery to remove testosterone-producing testes and that the physicians recommended to 
the women to also have cosmetic procedures to normalize the appearance of their genitals 
(Berman, et al., 2013). However, through the media and the internet, the concept of 
intersex is gaining more widespread recognition as regular, everyday humans rather than 
pathologized as hermaphrodites.  
 Males Females 
Genetic/chromosomal sex XY XX 
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Gonadal sex: reproductive sex 
glands 
Testes Ovaries 
External morphologic sex Penis and scrotum Clitoris and labia 
Internal morphologic sex Seminal vesicles, prostate Vagina, uterus, fallopian tubes 
Hormonal sex Androgens Estrogens 
Phenotypic sex (secondary sex 
features) 
Facial and chest hair Breasts 
Assigned sex/gender of rearing Male Female 
Gender identity Male Female 
Table 3: Typical path of sexual differentiation (Greenberg, 2012, p. 13) 
Table 3 shows the characteristics of sex differentiation as it is recently considered. 
Both women and men are subject to heteronormative assumptions, and despite more 
subjectivity, these are forms of classification are still engrained in society.  
Recent legal cases are most commonly related to intersex or trans people marrying or 
divorcing. In the case of divorces, a spouse may have been intersex, or transsexual, and 
the original validity of the marriage is being challenged for various reasons. The next 
thirty years were spent chipping away at the Corbett test, leaning more toward the 
inclusion of gender identity in the mix of factors considered, but still with notable 
setbacks, mostly in conservative states (Greenberg, 2012, pp. 59-60). Most of these cases 
occurred in between 1997 and 2005. In 1999, Littleton v. Prange, another Texas case 
relating to the rights to an estate, stated that even if the new gender status was on the birth 
certificate, that did not guarantee the law would treat hear as such (Allen, 2008, p. 178). 
Either way, it appears that courts have bent over backwards to sidestep any 
decisions that might accidentally result in same-sex marriage. In 2002, In re Estate of 
Gardiner, the court wrote that despite the extensive procedures the trans wife had gone 
through, she still remained a male and thus their marriage was same-sex and therefore 
invalid. The decision read “The words “sex,” “marriage,” “male,” and “female” in 
everyday understanding do not encompass transsexuals. The common, ordinary meaning 
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of “persons of the opposite sex” contemplates what is commonly understood to be a 
biological man and a biological woman….A post-operative male-to-female transsexual is 
not a woman within the meaning of the statutes and cannot validly marry another man. 
(In re Estate of Gardiner, 2002). The language represents more fervent “othering” in the 
service of a scientific-sounding (“biological man”), legally justified (“cannot validly 
marry”) social norm. Several still stand, but a few were appealed and overturned by the 
courts of appeal in Kansas, Florida, Texas, and Ohio.  
None of the above cases have intersex clients. One case in Texas in 2010 had 
what was likely an unintended consequence of allowing two women to marry because 
one spouse was intersex, but had “male” on her birth certificate, but had had surgery and 
presented as a woman since her late twenties (Netter, 2010). The marriage was declared 
invalid in 2011 based on Littleton v. Prange, a case that relied on the Corbett test, but 
ultimately reversed upon appeal in 2014. The bind for conservative courts is that 
transsexuals as a human group cannot be constitutionally banned from marriage, but 
depending on the timing and combination, it might be impossible to allow. For example, 
if a MTF trans married a man, it could be considered same-sex marriage if sex 
reassignment is considered invalid, but if she tried to marry a woman, then they have the 
appearance same-sex marriage. In order to enforce their conservatism, they have to allow 
some sort of what they consider non-traditional marriage. However, as same-sex 
marriage movement grows in stability and consistency, this point may eventually be moot. 
The influence of more critical and subjective epistemologies evident in the legal 
and medical discourses are reflected in the recognition of the concepts of trans (for the 
first time) and intersex people in the most recent DDC. The twenty-third edition of the 
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DDC made a significant change in how sex and gender are classified by adding facets: 
T1—081 People by gender or sex and T1—0867 Transgender and intersex people. 
This means that rather than being in a class, works can also be gathered by a different 
subject and the facet is considered a descriptor than as a means to define. The DDC 
editors employed a methodological change for this edition by using the Dewey website 
and blog to get feedback on the how the concepts of intersex, transgender and asexual 
should be classed. Despite this effort, they received little response and problems persist 
with the latest iteration in that trans and intersex people share a facet and transsexuality is 
considered a sexual orientation. More work is to be done, but it is encouraging to see the 
editorial board attempting to take epistemic responsibility. 
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